Against Norms of Knowledge

David Papipneau (King’s College London)

14 November 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Intuitive support for norms of knowledge (governing assertion, belief and action) comes largely from lottery-like cases in which high confidence is causally unconnected with the facts at issue. I shall argue against knowledge norms precisely because of what they advise in such cases. Where they make a difference, they lead us astray. (I shall also consider the role knowledge plays in our emotional engagement with the world, and show that this too lends no support to knowledge norms.)

This activity is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310/2025, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
(https://doi.org/10.54499/UID/00310/2025)