HPhil Seminar: March 26, 2026
The HPhil (History of Philosophy) Research Group of the Centre of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon announces the 2025/26 edition of its permanent seminar on the history of philosophy, devoted to the presentation of conferences by renowned specialists while also creating opportunities to emerging scholars, aiming to promote advanced studies in groundbreaking debates and the permanent training of its academic community.
In this session of the seminar, Silvia Locatelli (CFUL) will present a paper, entitled “Sexual Difference in Hegel’s System: An Ambiguous Oscillation between Laqueur’s One-Sex and Two-Sex Models”. (abstract below)
The session will take place on March 26, 2026 at 5 p.m., in the Room 201.J (Room Mattos Romão, Department of Philosophy). Admission is free.
Streaming available here.
Abstract
My presentation examines the status of sexual difference within the structure of Hegel’s system, tracing its emergence across the Science of Logic, the Philosophy of Nature, and the Philosophy of Spirit. I argue that sexual difference is articulated differently according to the systematic sphere in which it appears, assuming a specific configuration in each domain. Thus, in the Logic it appears only in a germinal mode; in the Philosophy of Nature it takes explicit shape as the opposition of the two sexes; and in the Philosophy of Spirit it is sublated within the structure of ethical life (Sittlichkeit).
Building on this systematic reconstruction, I focus in particular on the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit in order to show that Hegel conceptualizes sexual difference through a hierarchical polarity: the male is aligned with activity, mediation, and spiritual development, while the female is associated with passivity, immediacy, and the natural. From this perspective, certain interpreters are justified in relating Hegel to Thomas Laqueur’s “one-sex model,” according to which the female appears as a derivative or deficient version of the male. However, this identification is not unproblematic. Selected passages—especially in the Philosophy of Nature—suggest attempts to grant the female a relative conceptual independence, thereby complicating a straightforward assimilation to the one-sex paradigm. As Alison Stone has argued, Hegel can thus be understood as oscillating between the one-sex and the two-sex models. This oscillation becomes even more visible when we consider the status of nature within the system as a whole. If nature is not simply overcome in spirit but persists as a conditioning and resistant moment within its process of self-realization, then the dialectic between nature and spirit—much like that between woman and man—points less toward a definitive hierarchical synthesis than toward a structural duality in which the two terms remain distinct and mutually implicated.
Nevertheless, this structural tension does not eliminate a fundamental limitation in Hegel’s account, which Irigaray rightfuly observes. This limitation consists in the fact that sexual difference, probably becuse is oriented toward reproduction, is ultimately conceived as opposition rather than radical difference. Thus, even where Hegel moves between the one-sex and the two-sex models, he does not succeed in articulating sexual difference as an irreducible alterity.
This activity is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310/2025, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa (https://doi.org/10.54499/UID/00310/2025).
