Ricardo Mendoza-Canales

Praxis-CFUL, University of Lisbon

What Is An Act of Resistance?

29 April 2025, 17h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+1)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

 

Abstract

In his conference “What Is the Creative Act?,” Gilles Deleuze defines the work of art as counter-information, closely linking artistic creation with the act of resistance. Both, he argues, short-circuit established positions and hegemonic discourses propagated by systems of communication and information. In this paper, I argue that Gilbert Simondon operates as a kind of gravitational force in Deleuze’s formulation—an invisible yet active presence whose influence has remained largely unacknowledged. To unpack the enigma of Deleuze’s definition, I proceed in three steps. First, I offer a close reading of the conference to trace the train of thought that binds together the creative act, the work of art, and the act resistance as counter-information. Second, I turn to Giorgio Agamben’s commentary on the conference to examine his interpretation of resistance as inoperativity, focusing in particular on his brief but suggestive reference to Simondon. Finally, I return to Simondon’s cybernetics-inspired account of signification. For Simondon, resistance involves the significative inscription of action and emotion within the broader, reticular structure of the transindividual—a form of signification capable of resonating collectively across time. Any human act that expresses itself creatively through material concretion carries within it a potentiality capable of continuing to transform—through resonance—both the individual and their milieu. I conclude by suggesting that Deleuze’s definition of the work of art as an act of resistance implicitly relies on Simondon’s philosophical framework—particularly his account of ontogenesis as a fundamentally informational process.

 

 

 

Shai Tubali

University of Leeds

Will Humans Ever Become Conscious? Jiddu Krishnamurti’s Thought About AI as a Fresh Perspective on Current Debates

22 April 2025, 17h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+1)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

 

Abstract

Discussions about AI often center on whether machines can think, understand, or even become conscious. However, in our fascination with AI’s capabilities, we overlook a more pressing question: What happens to human consciousness when machines replicate and outperform our cognitive functions? Drawing on Jiddu Krishnamurti’s radical insights, this talk shifts the debate from AI’s potential consciousness to the mechanization of human thought. The Indian philosopher and spiritual teacher saw AI not as an existential threat but as a mirror reflecting our own conditioned, repetitive mental patterns. If thinking is merely an accumulation of experience, memory, and knowledge, then AI’s rapid processing power forces us to ask: Is our intelligence truly intelligent, or is it merely mechanical? Krishnamurti’s challenge is not to fear AI’s progress but to recognize the urgency of cultivating a non-mechanical mind—one that transcends habitual thought and awakens a deeper intelligence. This talk explores how AI compels us to reconsider the nature of human awareness and whether we can move beyond programmed cognition to discover a consciousness that no machine could ever replicate. Instead of asking whether AI will ever become conscious, we must ask: Will we?

 

 

How Inference Can Be Explained in Terms of Logical Consequence

Rachel Boddy (IUSS Pavia)

 

11 April 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

 

Abstract: Philosophers have held that validity of inference can be explained in terms of logical consequence. In today’s debate on the normativity of logic, however, it is commonly taken for granted that this view is mistaken. Harman’s (1986) criticism appears to have settled the matter: Current logic fails to explain what beliefs may or should be inferred from what other beliefs. The issue here is that logical principles are not defeasible, whereas principles of belief revision are. I argue that this criticism does not settle the matter because it relies on a notion of inference that logical accounts do not share. The focus of this talk is on the question this raises: What is an inference supposed to be in logic? Starting from the view that inference is an epistemic notion, I argue that the notion of inference at play in logic should be expressed in terms of knowledge, not in terms of belief.

Pedro Galvão

Praxis-CFUL, University of Lisbon

O que se segue da Regra de Ouro?

8 April 2025, 17h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+1)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

 

Resumo

A Regra de Ouro, penso, é um princípio constitutivo do próprio ponto de vista moral. O que se segue dela, quando devidamente entendida? Ao abordar esta questão, começarei por propor um subjectivismo acerca de razões normativas, conectado com o Princípio do Espelho – um princípio epistémico que nos diz algo sobre o que é necessário para saber como é estar no lugar alguém. Argumentarei que, livre de restrições ditadas por outros padrões normativos, a Regra de Ouro conduz a uma forma de utilitarismo. Não conduz forçosamente, no entanto, a um utilitarismo dos actos.

 

 

Subjectless Certainty

Joshua Rowan Thorpe (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

 

4 April 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

 

Abstract: Descartes claims to find certainty in the cogito. Lichtenberg responds: ‘one should say it is thinking, just as one says, it is lightning. To say cogito is already too much as soon as one translates it as I am thinking.’ (Lichtenberg, K 76, translated in Gomes 2024.) Here we have the negative claim that ‘I am thinking’ is not certain. We also have the positive claim that ‘it is thinking’ is certain. The aim of this paper is to assess these claims. I first argue that the negative claim is correct. I also argue that there is something right about the positive claim. We can be certain (only) of the occurrence of something subjectless. However, we should characterise this something in a way that is neutral as to whether it counts as thinking.

Luciana Martinez

HPhil-CFUL

Originality and Taste: Kant on Genius

1 April 2025, 17h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+1)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

 

Abstract

In this contribution I intend to develop an interpretation of the Kantian view of genius. From the earliest sources up to the Critique of Judgement, we can identify some variations in Kant’s thinking on this issue. In my view, the most significant variation that occurred during the pre-critical period, and which took place towards the end of the silent decade, is the specification of genius as a feature of art-making. At that time, furthermore, Kant began to mention Shakespeare as a genius in his Anthropology lectures, according to the available notes. I argue that, in relation to the figure of Shakespeare, there is another significant turn in Kant’s thinking about artistic creation. This change is expressed especially in the Critique of Judgement, where Kant omits Shakespeare’s name and, moreover, adds an explanation of the technical aspects of artistic creation. The specific aim of my paper is to justify the claim of this second turn and to explain what it consists of and why it occurs.

 

 

 

 

O Grupo de Investigação em Filosofia Prática do Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa (Praxis-CFUL) convida à manifestação de interesse de candidatos qualificados para a submissão de candidaturas a bolsas de doutoramento (até 4 anos) financiadas pela Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT), no âmbito do concurso de Bolsas de Doutoramento de 2025. A investigação deverá conduzir à obtenção do grau de Doutor em Filosofia na Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa (FLUL), tendo como instituição de acolhimento o Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa (CFUL).

Os projetos de investigação submetidos a concurso deverão estar alinhados com o âmbito e linhas de investigação atualmente desenvolvidas no grupo Praxis-CFUL [ver aqui]. Os candidatos serão sujeitos a uma triagem inicial, após a qual os selecionados deverão submeter a candidatura diretamente à FCT para obtenção de financiamento [anúncio da FCT]. O Praxis-CFUL prestará apoio no processo de candidatura.

 

Submissão de manifestações de interesse

Os interessados devem manifestar o seu interesse até 2 de abril de 2025, enviando a seguinte documentação, em inglês ou português:

 

E-mail: c.filosofia@letras.ulisboa.pt

Assunto: BID 2025 FCT_[Nome do Candidato]

 

Documentação necessária:

    • Resumo do plano de investigação (400 palavras)
    • Curriculum Vitae (formato PDF)
    • Nome do investigador integrado (Full Member) do Praxis-CFUL com quem gostaria de trabalhar como orientador [ver aqui]

 

A decisão sobre as candidaturas que o Praxis-CFUL irá apoiar será comunicada no prazo de três dias.

 

 

 

The Many-Objects Interpretation of Relativistic Change

Damiano Costa (Università della Svizzera Italiana)

 

28 March 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

 

Abstract: I explore a new solution to Sattig’s problem of relativistic change. First, I provide a reassessment of the problem, according to which the numerically same object appears to have something as a part in one frame but not at another (i.e. its “corner slices”). Second, I present a new solution that takes this mereological difference seriously, thus entailing that the relevant ordinary object is frame-bound. Finally, while this solution is naturally coupled with four-dimensionalism, I explore the possibility of coupling it with three-dimensionalism in order to provide an answer to Gilmore’s location question.

Søren Mau’s Mute Compulsion: A Marxist Theory of the Economic Power of Capital (Verso, 2023) offers a compelling entry point for examining the exercise of power in our contemporary post-industrial world, moving beyond traditional frameworks of violence and ideology. Bringing together philosophical, economic, historical, and sociological perspectives, the book enriches both the reading experience and the discussions that follow.

This activity is open to researchers and students—whether affiliated with Praxis-CFUL or not—who are interested in a deep analysis of political economy. Sessions will take place on Thursdays (except for Friday, May 2nd) from 12h30 to 14h00 in Room Pedro Hispano (Department of Philosophy).

Working language: English

Co-organizers: Mariana Teixeira (mariana.o.teixeira [at] edu.ulisboa.pt) and Juana Polo López (juana.lopez [at] edu.ulisboa.pt)

More info here!

 

Program

 

Session 1 | 27 March

Introduction (pp. 1–19)

 

Session 2 | 3 April

Part I: 1. Conceptualising Power and Capital + 2. Power and Marxism (pp. 23–69)

 

Session 3 | 10 April

3. The Social Ontology of Economic Power + 4. The Human Corporeal Organisation (pp. 70–103)

 

Session 4 | 24 April

5. Metabolic Domination + Part II: 6. Transcendental Class Domination (pp. 104–151)

 

Session 5 | 2 May

7. Capital and Difference + 8. The Universal Power of Value (pp. 152–199)

 

Session 6 | 8 May

9. Value, Class, and Competition (pp. 200–221)

 

Session 7 | 22 May

Part III: 10. The Despotism of Subsumption (pp. 225–252)

 

Session 8 | 29 May

11. The Capitalist Reconfiguration of Nature + 12. Logistical Power (pp. 253–295)

 

Session 9 | 5 June

13. Surplus Populations and Crisis + Conclusion (pp. 296-326)

 

 

Rodrigo Castro Orellana

Complutense University of Madrid

Neoliberalismo y temporalidad

25 March 2025, 17h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+0)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

 

Abstract

Los dispositivos neoliberales modelan la vida como una tarea infinita y acelerada para lograr un futuro que nunca llega o que siempre está en riesgo de desaparecer como consecuencia de las decisiones personales que se tomen. Así se configura un mundo sin exterioridad en donde el porvenir se retrasa sistemáticamente expandiendo el presente hasta convertirlo en una realidad absoluta. La construcción neoliberal del tiempo opera, entonces, como ausencia de novedad y disolución de la percepción del futuro, haciendo que la experiencia de la aceleración coexista con la experiencia de la repetición y de un presente cada vez más lento. Sin embargo, estos procesos resultan inseparables de dinámicas de construcción del espacio, de mecanismos de captura de la subjetividad que operan como atmosferas generadoras de incertidumbre. Nuestro objetivo en esta conferencia será reflexionar sobre estos procesos que caracterizan la temporalidad propia de las sociedades neoliberales.