What is Purely Epistemic Normativity, and Why? A Study in Wolfian Epistemology

Richard Pettigrew (University of Bristol)

7 November 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: What is the distinction between what we ought to believe simpliciter and what we ought to believe epistemically speaking, and why do we draw that distinction? I motivate this question through a series of examples, consider various existing answers, and find them wanting. Then I propose and explore an alternative based on a version of Susan Wolf’s rule consequentialism transposed to the epistemic realm: the norms that determine what we ought to do epistemically speaking are those such that broad adherence to them across your epistemic community would give the best results from an epistemic point of view. I argue that norms that exhort us to believe only what we ought to believe epistemically speaking follow from this Wolfian version of epistemic rule consequentialism. In a coda, I offer an alternative account of the function of knowledge ascriptions that improves on Edward Craig’s.

A Puzzle Concerning Reason and the Emotions

Ram Neta (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill)

31 October 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Each of the following theses enjoys some support in recent philosophical discussions: (1) emotions, like judgments and resolutions, can be exercises of rational agency, and held in light of various considerations that seem to the agent to support them; (2) emotions, unlike judgments or resolutions, cannot constitute our drawing the conclusion of some reasoning; (3) any exercise of rational agency, held in light of considerations that seem to support it, can constitute our drawing the conclusion of reasoning from those same considerations. Proponents of thesis (1) (e.g., Olivia Bailey, Rachel Achs) have sought to argue against thesis (2). Proponents of thesis (2) (e.g., Conner Schultz, Nate Sharadin) have sought to argue against thesis (1). In this paper, I defend both theses (1) and (2), and give an explanation of why thesis (3) is false. This explanation will shed light on how inference differs from other forms of reasons-responsiveness.

The Overcoming of Dynamical Explanations by Geometrical Explanations in Three Scientific Revolutions

Mauro Dorato (Università degli studi Roma Tre)

24 October 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: According to Kuhn, scientific revolutions are characterized by a radical change in the phenomena that are thought to require an explanation. In my talk, I will illustrate this thesis by arguing that three revolutions in the history of spacetime physics share two related patterns that can be summarized as follows: (i) pre-revolutionary dynamical explanations have been replaced by post-revolutionary structural explanations postulating new “natural” states of motion; (ii) this postulation has been made possible by the discovery of anthropomorphic projections over the physical world. In the last part of my talk, I will try to investigate whether this scheme can also be applied to quantum mechanics.

Tasting Together

Giulia Martina (University of Nottingham)

17 October 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Experiences such as cooking and eating together or participating in a wine tasting suggest that we can attend together to the flavours of foods and drinks. But is joint attention to flavour really possible? This talk focuses on two challenges from the case of flavour that existing accounts of joint attention do not address. First, the object question. How can we have the same object of attention if, as in most cases of tasting together, we are not literally tasting the same particular object? Second, the attention coordination question. Since the things we taste may not be public objects we can point to and follow with our gaze, how can we monitor and affect how the other attends to the object? I will argue that a form of joint attention can be established independently of vision, and that communication-based accounts of joint attention are especially well-suited to explain this. However, we need to move beyond the visual model and take seriously the distinctive structure of taste and flavour experiences.

Katerina Standish

University of Northern British Columbia

Encounter Theory: A Pathway Forward

28 October 2025, 17h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+1)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

Encounter Theory: A Pathway Forward is a theory and practice for dealing with conflict in the 21st Century. We are living in a world of anger, prejudice, trauma, and destitution. We need a way forward that creates human unity from responsible and nourishing attention—to change the future and step away from the violence and vitriol of the recent decades. Designed to both illustrate and agitate our perception and utilization of conflict transformation, Encounter Theory offers scholars, peacebuilders, and students a unique opportunity to see the work of violence transformation in a comprehensive and complementary way. Bringing together frames, concepts, pedagogies, and praxis from several interventional disciplines, Encounter Theory is a platform for understanding and addressing violence in society, culture, community, and the self.

This event is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa

Upper Logicist Ordinals

Bruno Jacinto (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

10 October 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Ordinals are commonly identified with particular kinds of sets. This identification is, however, highly implausible. Accordingly, in this talk I develop an “upper logicist” characterization of ordinals inspired by (i) Cantor’s view that ordinals are abstractions of well-orderings, and (ii) Russell’s view that such abstractions are higher-order entities. After reviewing important challenges to abstractionist characterizations of ordinals, and to Florio & Leach-Krouse’s (2017) recent logicism about ordinals, I will show that the upper logicist characterization does not fall prey to those challenges. I will conclude by sketching how my characterization paves the way for a defense of Upper Logicism – in the sense of (Jacinto 2024) – about ordinals as well as about sets.

The Substrate Flexibility of Consciousness

Jeremy Pober (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

3 October 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: In this joint work with Eric Schwitzgebel, we present a novel argument for the substrate flexibility of consciousness: the claim that consciousness can be instantiated in systems made of different substances (e.g., Chalmers 1996; Bostrom 2003). A common (e.g., Cao 2022; Block 2023; Seth 2025) way of investigating substrate flexibility has been by asking whether a fine-grained functional equivalent to a human brain that is somehow composed very differently, (e.g.,) of Silicon, would also be conscious. We believe the question is the wrong way to go about investigating the topic. The pull of the functional equivalence framing is that functional equivalence to us is sufficient for consciousness: a creature’s being functionally equivalent to us is a good reason to attribute consciousness to it. Functional equivalence is not, however, necessary, and therefore not the only good reason to attribute consciousness to a creature. We provide independent reason to attribute consciousness to creatures with different substrates: the Copernican Principle of Consciousness (Schwitzgebel and Pober, under review).This principle states that we should not assume ourselves as humans special with respect to consciousness among creatures of equivalent behavioral (or functional) sophistication. As long as the extent to which a creature exhibits sophistication is not somehow essentially linked to its substrate, we have no reason to think that consciousness is substrate inflexible.

The Portuguese Epistemology Group (PEG) was set up by Giada Fratantonio, Joshua Rowan Thorpe, and David Horst, to foster the study of epistemology in Portugal.
 
The PEG runs a seminar series, workshops, and conferences.
 

The PEG Seminar convenes in term time, on Fridays at 13:00 – 15:00, in person at the Universidade de Lisboa.

Autumn 2025 Seminar Schedule

26th September

“Disquotation and Silence”, Josh Thorpe (talk)

3rd October 

No seminar

10th October

Chapter of Maria Lasonen-Aarnio’s forthcoming book (discussion)

17th October

“On the Evocation Norm of Questioning”, Giada Fratantonio (talk)

24th October 

Social Role Epistemology, Jesper Kallestrup (talk)

31st October

Chapter of Maria Lasonen-Aarnio’s forthcoming book (discussion)

7th November

Title TBD, Francesca Scapinello (talk)

14th November 

Title TBD, Nuno Venturinha (talk)

21 November

“Epistemic Teleology and the Seperateness of Propositions”, Berker (discussion)

28th November 

“Narrative Epistemology”, Fraser (discussion)

5th December

“Joint attention as a joint communicative action” Felipe León (talk)

12th December

“We Have Positive Epistemic Duties”, McGrath (discussion)

19th December 

“What is the Lichtenberg objection?”, Josh Thorpe (talk)

For updates, see the PEG’s website.

Topics, Focus, and Relevance Properties in First-Order Relevant Logic

Nicholas Ferenz (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

26 September 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: In this joint work with Andrew Tedder, we investigate the problem of providing relevance properties for first order relevant logics by expanding on recent work concerning relevance as topical in propositional relevant logics. We propose a theory of topic for first order languages in general, relying on the use of focus markers in an extension of the usual first order language. Such an enrichment of the language and conceptual apparatus of a logic provides avenues into the problem of identifying relevance properties for first-order relevant logics.

This event is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa.

Sjoerd van Tuinen

Erasmus University Rotterdam

Agamben’s modal metaphysics

21 October 2025, 17:15 (Lisbon Time — GMT+1)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

Starting from an observation made by the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, I draw the outline of what could be called a ‘continental modal metaphysics’. Agamben suggests that the difference between analytical and continental philosophy goes back to the unresolved tension between the logical notion of modality (the four modal categories of necessity, possibility, contingency, impossibility that quantify the reality of some quidditative thing) and the ontological concept of a mode that is itself real yet not like things, and that is more fundamental than the distinction between essence and existence. My argument consists of two steps. First, I discuss two problems in the dominant form of modal metaphysics, analytical modal logic and its Aristotelian antecedents: the problems of the indeterminacy of the possible and its exhaustion by the actual. Drawing on Agamben, I then develop a concept of mode of existence that revolves around difference rather than identity. I argue that we must modalize the relation itself between the possible and the real: what passes from potential to actual is not an essence mirroring existence according to varying degrees of perfection, but the modality or sense in which existence alters itself. Accordingly I argue that continental philosophy defends a sense of possibility that is, firstly, not separate from the real but strictly a part of it, and secondly, that is more rather than less than the actual.

This event is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa