Provisional list of results:

1. João C. Miranda
2. Guilherme Riscali
3. Yazan Freij
4. Silvia Locatelli
5. Marco Gomboso
6. Elisa Mozzelin
7. Manuel Zambrano (ex aequo com 6º lugar)
8. Erik Lind
9. Maura Ceci (ex aequo com 8º lugar)
10. Ignacio Fluxà
11. Jorge Luis Rosales Macías (ex aequo com 10º lugar)
12. Catarina Tello de Castro
13. Octavio Garcia (ex aequo com 12º lugar)
14. Mansour Golpour
15. Stefano Zanni
16. José Camillo Neto
17. Max Mazoteras (ex aequo com 16º lugar)
18. Vladimir Brodskiy (ex aequo com 16º lugar)
19. Youssef Aguisoul
20. Júlio Costa
21. Sara Romão (ex aequo com 20º lugar)
22. Gabriel Reis de Oliveira
23. Mariana Pereira
24. Julien Belhassen
25. Maira Hallack

From the Final Classification List Ordering Proposal, candidates can claim within 10 working days from the date of its publication (from March 31 to April 14, 2021)

For more information: https://www.letras.ulisboa.pt/pt/investigacao/bolsas-flul

A collaboration between the Practical Philosophy Research Group (Praxis) of the Centre of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon and the Research Group Ethics and Rights of the Animals (Diversitas, Núcleo de Estudos das Diversidades, Intolerâncias e Conflitos, FFLCH- University of São Paulo) 

Reading Group as part of the Praxis-CFUL activities

Working Language: Portuguese

Organizers: Dr. Dirk Michael Hennrich (Praxis-CFUL – dh@letras.ulisboa.pt) & Luanda Francine Garcia da Costa (DIVERSITAS-USP – luanda.francine@gmail.com)

A atividade é aberta e não é necessário realizar inscrição. Os encontros serão realizados pela plataforma Zoom, neste endereço. (ID da reunião: 854 1592 7501 | Senha de acesso: 994220)

Além da preocupação contínua da filosofia com as questões da diferença antropológica, a filosofia animal é uma disciplina filosófica relativamente nova. Somente na segunda metade do século XX, com obras fundamentais como ‘Animal Liberation’ (1975), de Peter Singer, pode-se falar de um sentido intenso e cada vez mais aprofundado da filosofia animal e do status ético e legal dos animais no contexto acadêmico. O grupo de leitura ‘Filosofia Animal’ tem como objetivo ler e discutir textos clássicos e contemporâneos sobre a questão do lugar ético e legal dos animais, no âmbito da ontologia, da política e da atual crise ecológica.

Para o primeiro módulo , escolhemos o filósofo Jacques Derrida, por seu interesse e consideráveis contribuições sobre a questão da animalidade e dos animais. Iniciaremos com a leitura do livro O animal que logo sou (a seguir).

Texto da aula proferida durante o terceiro colóquio de Cerisy, em 1997, cujas atas do colóquio resultaram no livro L’animal autobiographique, o O animal que logo sou (a seguir) apresenta a construção de um novo olhar sobre os animais e o sobre a genealogia distintiva entre humano-animal fundamentada na posição de domínio da visão pelo homem. Derrida faz a sustentação de que os animais tenham os seus próprios pontos de vista, indagando o esquecimento calculado dos animais (não os metaforizados, mas os viventes reais que escapam aos conceitos) e da própria animalidade pela filosofia, colocando assim em  questão o “que quer dizer viver, falar, morrer, ser e mundo, como ser-no-mundo ou como-ser-ao-mundo” quando nos aproximamos “do que chamam o animal” (p. 28-29).

Trabalharemos com a edição brasileira, traduzida por Fábio Landa pela editora Unesp. A versão original francesa poderá servir como apoio se necessário. Com periodicidade semanal, realizaremos 10 encontros, às sextas-feiras. A programação detalhada será distribuída na primeira sessão, onde iniciaremos a leitura a partir da pág. 11 até o início da pág. 21.

Bibliografia:

DERRIDA, Jacques. O animal que logo sou. Trad. Fábio Landa. São Paulo: Unesp, 2002.

Bibliografia complementar:

BERGER, John. Porquê Olhar os animais? In: Porquê Olhar os animais? Tradução: Jorge Leandro Rosa. Lisboa: Antígona, 2020. (p. 21-60)

DERRIDA, Jacques, ROUDINESCO, Elisabeth. Cap. 5: “Violências contra os Animais”. In: De que amanhã… Diálogos. Trad.: André Telles. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar Editor, 2004, pp.80-96.

DERRIDA, Jacques. L’animal que donc je suis. Paris: Galilée, 2006.

On Proper Presupposition
Julia Zakkou (Bielefeld University)

09 April 2021, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT+1) | Online, via Zoom

Abstract: In this talk, I investigate the norm of presupposition, as one pervasive type of indirect speech act. I argue against the view that sees presuppositions as an indirect counterpart of the direct speech act of assertion and propose instead to consider them an indirect counterpart of the direct speech act of assumption. More concretely, I suggest that the norm that governs presuppositions is not an epistemic or doxastic attitude such as knowledge, justified belief, or mere belief; it’s a practical attitude, most plausibly the attitude of rational acceptance. This view has important ramifications well beyond debates in philosophy of language and linguistics. It affects not only our view of which speech act sequences are fine and which are off; it bears on whether presuppositions can function as testimony, whether they can be lies, and whether they are ontologically committal.

Free Attendance, but preregistration required: https://cful.letras.ulisboa.pt/lancog/registration/

Apr 7 2021 15:00 – 17:00: Celso Alves Neto (Dalhousie University)
What is it that Evolves?
Traditional formulations of natural selection assume that entities undergoing selection form lineages. This assumption motivates recent claims that multispecies microbial communities do not undergo selection. Yet, these claims are controversial in part because the role and nature of lineages are poorly understood. In this paper, I clarify these issues by revisiting David Hull’s notion of units of evolution. Lineages are units of evolution in traditional formulations of natural selection, while the entities that form lineages are units of selection. I revise this idea in two ways. First, we argue that lineages can also be units of selection. Second, I argue that units of evolution do not have to form clear parent-offspring relations. With this aim in mind, I analyze a set of borderline cases of lineage and the underlying notions of reproduction and inheritance. Our analysis offers a framework to compare traditional and more recent formulations of evolution by natural selection. It also helps to clarify how multispecies microbial communities might evolve.

Join from PC, Mac, Linux, iOS or Android: https://videoconf-colibri.zoom.us/j/84705629515?pwd=bWVITk5iTzZUZWVRMmYzSEJOSDlKdz09
Password: 817996

For details of past and upcoming talks, please see: https://www.kdyates.com/events/#upcoming.

The Disputatio issue 59 is now available at https://sciendo.com/issue/DISP/12/59

The Lisbon Circle Reading Group – a joint collaboration of the Center for Philosophy of the University of Lisbon (CFUL), Center for the Philosophy of Sciences of the University of Lisbon (CFCUL) and the Institute of Philosophy of NOVA University of Lisbon (IFILNOVA) – will soon resume its activity for the Summer term of 2021.

We will meet fortnightly, on Thursdays, 17:00-19:00. The reading for this term will be Timothy Williamson’s The Philosophy of Philosophy.

Our next meeting will take place tomorrow at 15:00, and will feature a talk from Samuel Kimpton-Nye (Bristol) on pandispositionalism. All welcome!

Join from PC, Mac, Linux, iOS or Android: https://videoconf-colibri.zoom.us/j/84705629515?pwd=bWVITk5iTzZUZWVRMmYzSEJOSDlKdz09
Password: 817996

For details of past and upcoming talks, please see: https://www.kdyates.com/events/#upcoming.

Abstract

Some philosophers maintain that physical properties are irreducibly modal; that properties are powers. Powers are then employed to provide philosophical explanations of other phenomena of philosophical interest such as laws of nature and modality. There is, however, a dispute among powers theorists about how far the powers ontology extends: are all manner of properties at all levels of fundamentality powers or, are powers only to be found among the fundamental properties? I argue that the answer to this question depends on the details of the metaphysics of powers. More specifically, I argue that if one understands powers as qualitative grounds of dispositions (call this qualitative dispositional essentialism), as opposed to properties whose essences are constituted by dispositions (as orthodox dispositional essentialists would have it), then all properties are powers, i.e., pandispositionalism is true. The conclusion: If qualitative dispositional essentialism is true, then pandispositionalism is true, is significant because there is increasing concern that orthodox dispositional essentialism is explanatorily deficient and perhaps even incoherent, meaning that qualitative dispositional essentialism is gaining increasing support in the literature on powers. All things considered, then, it is beginning to look more likely that pandispositionalism is true simpliciter.

Conceptual Engineering and Making Conceptual Change Happen
Delia Belleri (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

26 March 2021, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT+0) | Online, via Zoom

Abstract: Conceptual engineering is a philosophical project that aims at reflecting on conceptual representations, identifying their flaws, and proposing possible revisions. The next step (at least in theory) is that of implementing such revisions. Yet, how can conceptual engineers get entire linguistic communities to adopt the conceptual changes they recommend? In this talk, I focus on an important background condition for the implementation of conceptual change, which I dub “metalinguistic awareness”. I explain which metalinguistic skills should preferably be displayed by the conceptual engineer’s interlocutor. I survey a number of strategies that could stimulate such skills, and explore some of their ethical and social aspects.

Free Attendance, but preregistration required: https://cful.letras.ulisboa.pt/lancog/registration/

Our next meeting will take place on Wednesday 24 March, and will feature a talk from Samuel Kimpton-Nye (Bristol) on pandispositionalism. All welcome!

For details of past and upcoming talks, please see: https://www.kdyates.com/events/#upcoming.

Abstract

Some philosophers maintain that physical properties are irreducibly modal; that properties are powers. Powers are then employed to provide philosophical explanations of other phenomena of philosophical interest such as laws of nature and modality. There is, however, a dispute among powers theorists about how far the powers ontology extends: are all manner of properties at all levels of fundamentality powers or, are powers only to be found among the fundamental properties? I argue that the answer to this question depends on the details of the metaphysics of powers. More specifically, I argue that if one understands powers as qualitative grounds of dispositions (call this qualitative dispositional essentialism), as opposed to properties whose essences are constituted by dispositions (as orthodox dispositional essentialists would have it), then all properties are powers, i.e., pandispositionalism is true. The conclusion: If qualitative dispositional essentialism is true, then pandispositionalism is true, is significant because there is increasing concern that orthodox dispositional essentialism is explanatorily deficient and perhaps even incoherent, meaning that qualitative dispositional essentialism is gaining increasing support in the literature on powers. All things considered, then, it is beginning to look more likely that pandispositionalism is true simpliciter.

Dirk Michael Hennrich

Praxis-CFUL, University of Lisbon

Anarchitecture: Beyond the Trinity of Modern Subjectivity

23 March 2021, 18h00 (Lisbon time – GMT+0)

Online Seminar (Zoom link here)

Abstract

Thinking architecture today, in the age of total transformation of the planet earth through human interventions, recommends a reinterpretation of its purpose and meaning. Architecture understood as the technique of grounding and the art of the inauguration and the establishment of dwelling is since ever the mirror of human relationship to his environment and, before all, of the relationship to himself. Modernity may be characterized as the foundation of subjectivity and subjectivity as the principle of modernity. The modern subject is conceived as the absolute centre of world perception and everything, even himself, is the object of his own. The fundamental relationship of modern human to earth is therefore, what one may designate as the trinity of modern subjectivity: the proper, the property and the appropriation, well presented in Hegel’s Elements of Philosophy of Right (Property §41-§71). Contrary to this, the present talk aims to affirm the anarchic essence of human being and the necessity of a renewed form of dwelling on earth: Anarchitecture, a non-possessive architecture for the common.