Curso Livre

Introduction to Epistemic Logic

João C. Miranda /Ricardo Santos

When:

6, 13, 20, 27 March 23, 6-8 PM

Where:

Sala Mattos Romão (C.201J) – School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Pretende-se que os estudantes desenvolvam competências de análise e avaliação de argumentos envolvendo noções epistémicas, em particular, ‘crença’ e ‘conhecimento’, aplicando os instrumentos da lógica epistémica. Pretende-se, também, que desenvolvam competências para participar em discussões filosóficas acerca de quais os axiomas adequados para uma lógica destas noções. Pretende-se, em particular, que fiquem familiarizados com a discussão acerca do axioma “Se o agente sabe que p, então o agente sabe que sabe que p” (conhecido na literatura como “princípio KK”).

The course aims at developing skills to analyse and assess arguments involving epistemic notions, in particular, ‘belief’ and ‘knowledge’, aplying the tools of epistemic logic. It also aims at developing skills to participate in philosophical discussions about which axioms are fit for a logic of those notions. It aims, in particular, at getting students acquainted with the discussion around the axiom “If the agent knows that p, then the agent knows that the agent knows that p” (known in the literature as the “KK principle”).

Organização: Ricardo Santos e João C. Miranda

Programa:
1. Lógica proposicional modal
2. Lógica epistémica
2.1. Os operados B e K
2.2. Interpretação de R
2.3. Restrições sobre R
2.4. Axiomas
2.5. Lógicas epistémicas – de K a S5
3. Que lógica para ‘conhecimento’ (e ‘crença’)?
3.1. Factividade
3.2. Fecho sobre consequência
3.3. KK
3.3.1. Hintikka sobre um “conceito forte de conhecimento”
3.3.2. O exame surpresa
3.3.3. Anti-luminosidade

Duração: 8h (4 sessões de 2 horas)

Syllabus:
1. Modal propositional logic
2. Epistemic logic
2.1. The operators B and K
2.2. Interpretation of R
2.3. Restrictions on R
2.4. Axioms
2.5. Epistemic logics – from K to S5
3. Which logic for ‘knowledge’ (and ‘belief’)?
3.1. Factivity
3.2. Closure under implication
3.3. KK
3.3.1. Hintikka on a “strong concept of knowledge”
3.3.2. The surprise examination
3.3.3. Anti-luminosity

Duration: 8h (4 sessions of 2 hours)

Bibliografia /Bibliography

-Arló-Costa, Horacio, Vincent F. Hendricks, and Johan van Benthem (eds.), 2016, Readings in Formal Epistemology, Cham: Springer
International Publishing
-Ditmarsch, Hans van, Joseph Y. Halpern, Wiebe van der Hoek, and Barteld Kooi (eds.), 2015, Handbook of Epistemic Logic, London:
College Publications.
-Hintikka, Jaakko, 1962, Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
-Stalnaker, Robert, 2006, “On Logics of Knowledge and Belief”, Philosophical Studies, 128(1): 169–199.
-Williamson, Timothy, 2000, Knowledge and Its Limits, Oxford University Press.

Custo/fee: 20€

Inscrições no secretariado do CFUL até 24/04/2023

Ângelo Milhano

University of Évora

‘Mirror, mirror on the wall, whose body is this, after all?’ Don Ihde – Postphenomenology and the Body Problem in the Metaverse

6 December 2022, 17h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+0)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

The investment of the big digital companies in the concepts of “virtual reality” and “augmented reality” seems to indicate a new course of development of the various digital technologies. Taking into account their ubiquity and the dependence we have been developing towards them, the total immersion of the human consciousness in the digital seems, in fact, to be the most natural development of the digital platforms we have available today. In the unfolding of social networks as “metaverses”, in the transition from smartphones to “neuralinks”, it is possible to understand the tendency of total incorporation of technology, the same one that has marked the whole history of technological development until our days. The technological fantasy continues to be to make technology as transparent as possible: to enjoy its capabilities while eliminating, as best as possible, its sensory limitations. The relation that the human being establishes with the body when using this kind of platforms will be the target of the debate that we intend to raise with this communication. Starting from Don Ihde’s post-phenomenology, we will try to discuss the role that the incarnated body (here body) plays in the construction of a disembodied, digital “dwelling”, like the one that is prefigured in the use of the “metaverse”. How, from it, a user may create a new perception of his body, capable of transcending the limitations that are imposed on it by culture, by biological gender, or by the physical circumstances that limit its mundane existence.

Abbed Kanoor

University of Tübingen | Collège international de philosophie (Paris)

Plaidoyer for an Intercultural Study of Cultural Ontologies

29 November 2022, 17h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+0)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

At a time when cultural encounters have become inevitable, intercultural experience plays an essential role in a deep understanding of cultures. However, it should be noted that in the experience of cultural encounters we are dealing with different, sedimented perceptions of the world and their ontological registers. One of the important dimensions of cultures that is neglected in the culturalist attitude is their inner life: their corresponding cultural lifeworld, their imaginary geography with symbolic cartographies, the dynamic transmission of beliefs, rituals and wisdom passed on from one generation to another; these invisible but living aspects are missing in the culturalist attitude and especially in multiculturalism. In contrast, traditionalism, which is aware of these neglected aspects and the world-constituting dimension of cultures, can easily lead to a conservative and even ideological misinterpretation of cultures. My argument is that an intercultural study of cultural ontologies can be seen as a third approach beyond multiculturalism and traditionalism; an approach that is aware of the invisible world of cultures without neglecting their inner hermeneutic dynamics and falling into a closed and static understanding of traditionalism.

Stephan Zimmermann

Praxis-CFUL/University of Bonn

Kant’s Distinction between Duties of Right and Duties of Virtue in View of the ‘Table of the Categories of Freedom’

22 November 2022, 17h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+0)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

The way Kant distinguishes between duties of right and duties of virtue in the Metaphysics of Morals makes the unity of his moral philosophy doubtful, at least as some interpreters understand it. He seems to specify the particular nature of these two types of duty in such a way that this specification is in tension with his general concept of duty in the Groundwork and the second Critique. Kant, however, uses several criteria to distinguish between duties of right and duties of virtue. I want to explore suggestions that have so far been ignored by the interpreters in order to deal with these criteria. In the second Critique, Kant maintains that the “Table of the Categories of Freedom” contains the whole plan for the future system of duties. And in this table, he includes one division of duties. In doing so, he emphasises this division above all others. My thesis is that the recourse to the “Table of the Categories of Freedom” provides a reliable benchmark for dealing with the many characteristics of the two types of duty later used in the Metaphysics of Morals: some of these characteristics can indeed be traced back to the table.

Date: November 17 and 18, 2022.

The Cogito research group (University of Glasgow) and the LanCog research group (University of Lisbon) are glad to announce the upcoming Epistemology Workshop, which will take place on November 17 and 18, 2022, at Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon.

Programme November 17 (Thursday) 2.00-3.45 – Mona Simion (University of Glasgow) 4.00-5.45 – Matt McGrath (Washington University St Louis) November 18 (Friday) 9.00-10.45 – Michel Croce & Matt Jope (University of Genoa & University of Edinburgh) 11.00-12.45 – Claire Fields (University of Stirling) 12.45-2.00 Lunch 2.00-3.45 – Domingos Faria (University of Porto) 4.00-5.45 – Chris Kelp (University of Glasgow) Location Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon, B112B Room (Library building)   Organizers Mona Simion and Domingos Faria

Marco Maurizi

Lombardo Radice Institute/University of Rome “Tor Vergata”

What is Animal Freedom? Political Perspectives for the Critique of Anthropocentrism

15 November 2022, 17h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+0)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

The theory of liberation and animal rights develops in a period of decline of the Marxist left and in line with the establishment of neo-liberal hegemony. Consequently, the classic utilitarian approaches, those founded on moral rights or on the juridical implementation of the animal condition, but also the kind of liberal-oriented eco-feminism of the 1980s do not seem to take into due account the economic structure of capitalist society. Though the highly industrialized and anthropocentric nature of real socialism has partly justified the disinterest in classical antispecism for the class struggle, the lack of a serious analysis of capitalism and its intrinsic tendencies makes any theoretical definition and practical defense of animals and animality problematic. By judging class relations irrelevant with respect to the “domination of man” over the animal world, classic animal liberation theories have worked with abstract and static concepts of “animality” and “humanity” often falling behind the profound insights into the relationship between humanism and nature proposed by Marx and Engels themselves. Is it possible to overcome the traditional anthropocentric orientation of the Left to make room for a discourse that does not exclude animal liberation from the overall project of emancipation of the working class? This paper will try to criticize the limits of liberal animalism and Socialist anthropocentrism by resorting to the theses defended by Adorno and Horkheimer in their Dialectic of the Enlightenment, while expanding Marx’ and Engels’ insights on the dialectic of nature. We will try to show how the elaboration of different and dialectical concepts of “nature” and “animality” is essential to correctly set these questions and establish a new way to articulate the relationship between animal liberation, critical theory, and eco-socialism.

James S. Pearson

Praxis-CFUL | University of Lisbon

Monsters of our Own Making: The Political Value of Illusory Dystopias

25 October 2022, 17h00 (Lisbon Summer Time — GMT+1)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy) | School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

Dystopian fears currently loom large in the public imagination. In this talk, I examine whether it might be politically valuable for people to fear illusory dystopian scenarios. The dominant view among contemporary political theorists is that members of a polity should only fear real dangers – that is, credible threats, which are based on facts and evidence. On this view, which I call the credibilist view, widespread fear of imaginary threats causes political harm. There is reason to believe, however, that it may in fact be politically beneficial for citizens to fear illusory dystopias under certain conditions. I refer to this competing position as the illusionist view. The first point that speaks in favour of the illusionist stance is that recent political theorists have convincingly demonstrated that pursuing illusory – i.e., infeasible – utopias can promote collective flourishing. Given that utopias are to a certain extent structurally symmetrical with dystopias, we might then reasonably expect illusory dystopias to be just as valuable as their utopian counterparts. To test this hypothesis, I consider the two strongest pieces of evidence that might be cited in support of the illusory view.  First, philosophers and social psychologists have argued that collective fear of hell (perhaps the illusory dystopia par excellence) can foster social cooperation and compliance. The second piece of potential evidence is to be found in the field of international relations (IR). Certain IR theorists (e.g., Thomas Christensen) maintain that political leaders can enhance national cohesion by inspiring the citizenry with a dystopian fear of foreign invasion and occupation – and this is said to hold even where there is no real threat. If groundless fears of hell and foreign occupation can promote the commonweal, then the illusionist view would appear to be correct. I scrutinize these two pieces of evidence, finding them to be too contentious to vindicate the illusionist view. It does follow, however, that we should therefore endorse the credibilist view. Although the current evidence in favour of the illusionist position remains weak, stronger evidence may still be forthcoming. In light of this possibility, we should refrain from automatically dismissing dystopian fears that lack credibility since they may still prove to serve our collective interests.

Daniela Voss

University of Hildesheim

The Machinic Unconscious: Deleuze, Guattari, Spinoza

18 October 2022, 17h00 (Lisbon Summer Time — GMT+1)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy) | School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

How can we desire our own repression? This is according to Deleuze and Guattari the “fundamental problem of political philosophy […] precisely the one that Spinoza saw so clearly” (Anti-Oedipus, p. 29). Spinoza posed this question for the first time in the Theological-Political Treatise, and since then it has been taken up by various thinkers, for instance, Wilhelm Reich. Yet attempts to solve this paradox commonly make use of the concept of ideology, assuming that the masses have been deceived. By contrast, Deleuze and Guattari propose a ‘materialist psychiatry’ that overcomes the dichotomy between the rationality of social production and the irrationality of imaginary production. This paper sketches out their approach to this problem by focusing on their concepts of the unconscious and of desire, and in doing so we will return to Spinoza’s thought.

Mariana Larison

CONICET/University of Buenos Aires

Tempo e revolução: Que ideia de práxis?

11 October 2022, 17h00 (Lisbon Summer Time — GMT+1)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy) | School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

Na segunda metade do século XX teve lugar uma releitura da obra de Maquiavel em autores de diferentes correntes de pensamento que, movidos por diferentes interesses, se viram na necessidade de pensar especificamente sobre o problema da fundação de uma nova ordem política. No pensar o totalitarismo, no pensar a democracia, no pensar a política, no pensar contra Hegel, no pensar com Marx ou sem Marx, emergiram da Europa e da América novas interpretações do florentino que disputam o sentido da instituição da ordem política. Nesta apresentação, o meu interesse será aprofundar apenas numa das muitas leituras da fundação política de Maquiavel na segunda metade do século passado, nomeadamente, a proposta de Merleau-Ponty. O objetivo consistirá em analisar alguns dos problemas fundamentais que surgem da análise da noção de revolução baseada em Maquiavel, assim como pensar as possibilidades que esta oferece para apreciar com clareza o vínculo profundo que se estabelece entre fundação e tempo, o que alguns chamam instituição.