Bolsa de Investigação Pós-doutoral (BIPD), no âmbito do projecto de I&D “Tradução Anotada das Obras Completas de Aristóteles” (PTDC/FER-FIL/0305/2021), do Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa, da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, financiado por fundos nacionais da FCT/MCTES

Referência: CFUL_55_2022_BIPD_ProjectoCWA6_Julho

Prazo de candidatura: 10/10/2022 a 11/11/2022

O CFUL acaba de abrir novo concurso para atribuição de uma Bolsa de Investigação (BI) para Estudante de Mestrado.

Bolsa de Investigação (BI) para Estudante de Mestrado, no Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, financiada por fundos nacionais da FCT/MCTES, através do projecto UIDP/00310/2020

Referência: CFUL_58_2022_BI_EstudanteDeMestrado_Programatico_Setembro

Prazo de candidatura: 10/10/2022 a 21/10/2022

Susanna Lindberg

Leiden University

From Technological Humanity to Bio-technical Existence

4 October 2022, 17h00 (Lisbon Summer Time — GMT+1)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy) | School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

 

Abstract

In this conference, I will present the end results of a forthcoming book titled From technological humanity to bio-technical existence (SUNY 2023). The concrete motivation of this book is the rapid extension of the field of what I call anthropotechnics. This word designates in a general manner the technologies that are used, not simply on the nonhuman nature around us, but on the human being itself. We know how modern, technology, fulfilling the Cartesian project of becoming “masters and possessors of nature”, has ended in the mega-phenomenon called the anthropocene. Anthropotechnics returns this project on the human being itself and thinks of the human being as the master and possessor of its own nature. This is how all problems that have been generated by the Cartesian project concerning nonhuman nature not only find their echo in the case of the human being, but are also amplified, because the human being is not only the object of anthropotechnical elaboration but also its subject. As the object of anthropotechnics the human being can cultivate itself but also ends by exploiting and polluting itself; as the subject of anthropotechnics it is the responsible of all these effects, so that we might no need  an ecology of the “human nature” under the pressure of anthropotechnics. In this conference I do not answer to such conrete ethico-political questions, however, but I investigate the philosophical presuppositions of the phenomenon of anthropotechnics. How has the human being come to treat itself as an object of technical production? Since when it thinks of itself essentially as a technician? I condensate the philosophical presuppositions on the expression technological humanity, and I show how it has evolved notably in the works of Plessner, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida, Stiegler, Agamben and Hayles. They have discovered the importance of technics to the becoming of the human, but they have also shown how technics hollows out humanity – or how the concept of ‘technics’ allows showing the hollowness of the term ‘humanity.’ Technological humanity is therefore not an ideal figure that this philosophical discussion aims to erect, but is on the contrary an ambient and distorted image of the human that philosophy reveals in order to undo, dismantle, and deconstruct it. In this conference, I underline the deconstruction of the idea of technological humanity and present the notion of bio-technical existence that – as I claim – emerges as its condition. With the notion of “bio-technics” I want to show how not only how life is conceived of in technical terms today and how contemporary technics tends to imitate life. I also want to show on a fundamental ontological level how technics belongs to life, being its own way of reaching itself.

 

 

 

Inferential Constraint and If φ ought φ Problem

Una Stojnić

Princeton University

23 September 2022, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: The standard semantics for modality, together with the influential restrictor analysis of conditionals (Kratzer 1986; 2012) renders conditional ‘ought’ claims like (1) trivially true:

  1. If John’s stealing, he ought to be stealing.

While this might seem like a problem specifically for the restrictor analysis, the issue is far more general. For any account must predict that modals in the consequent sometimes receive obligatorily unrestricted interpretation, as in (1), but sometimes appear restricted, as in (2):

  1. If John’s speeding, he ought to pay the fine.

And the problem runs deeper, for there are non-conditional variants of the data. Thus, the solution cannot lie in adopting a particular analysis of conditionals, nor a specific account of the interaction between conditionals and modals. Indeed, with minimal assumptions, the standard account of modality will render a massive number of claims about what one ought to, must, or may, do trivially true. Worse, the problem extends to a wide range of non-deontic modalities, including metaphysical modality. But the disaster has a remedy. I argue that the source of the problem lies in the standard account’s failure to capture an inferential evidence constraint encoded in the meaning of a wide range of modal constructions. I offer an account that captures this constraint, and show it provides a general and independently motivated solution to the problem.

Encontra-se aberto concurso para a atribuição de 3 Bolsas de Iniciação à Investigação (BI) para Estudante de Mestrado, no Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa, da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, financiada por fundos nacionais da FCT/MCTES, através do projecto UIDB/00310/2020

Referência: CFUL_38_2022_BII_EstudanteDeMestrado_Base_Junho

Prazo de candidatura: 05/07/2022 a 18/07/2022

Mais informações em:

 
 

Encontra-se aberto concurso par a atribuição de 3 Bolsas de Investigação para estudantes de Mestrado, no Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa, da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, financiada por fundos nacionais da FCT/MCTES, através do projecto UIDB/00310/2020

Referência: CFUL_39_2022_BI_EstudanteDeMestrado_Base_Junho

3 Bolsas de Investigação (BI) para Estudante de Mestrado, do Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa, já foi publicado quer na webpage da FLUL quer no Euraxess. Seguem abaixo os links de acesso.

Prazo de candidatura: 05/07/2022 a 18/07/2022

 

Mais informações em:

https://www.letras.ulisboa.pt/pt/investigacao/investigar-em-letras/bolsas-de-investigacao#concursos-abertos-2

https://euraxess.ec.europa.eu/jobs/805379

Argument Rodizio
LANCOG DAY 2022

01 July 2022, 15:00
Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract:
1. Federico Lauria: Desires are not motivational states: The argument of satisfaction conditions.
2. João C. Miranda: Desires are question-sensitive.
3. Gabriel Malagutti: Greco’s dilemma for testimonial knowledge.
4. Domingos Faria: An argument against individualistic accounts of group belief.
5. Diogo Santos: On whether one ought to do what one ought to do.
6. Hugo Luzio: On Human Enhancement at Cryo-Revival.
7. Delia Belleri: Conservatism about concepts: testing the argument.
8. José Mestre: Frege’s objection to Neo-Fregeanism.

The Argument Rodizio is a seminar in which each participant presents a short, desirably surprising, thought provoking and philosophically provocative argument in 5-10 minutes, to be exhaustively (and exhaustingly) discussed in the following 5-10 minutes.

Bolsa de Investigação (BI) para Estudante de Doutoramento, no âmbito do projecto de I&D Tradução Anotada das Obras Completas de Aristóteles (PTDC/FER-FIL/0305/2021), do Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa, da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, financiada por fundos nacionais da FCT/MCTES

Referência: CFUL_34_2022_BI_EstudanteDeDoutoramento_ProjectoCWA6_Junho

 

mais informação em

https://www.letras.ulisboa.pt/pt/investigacao/investigar-em-letras/bolsas-de-investigacao#concursos-abertos-2

https://euraxess.ec.europa.eu/jobs/802726

On Wednesday 22 June Hans Christian Öttinger (ETH Zürich) will give a talk titled “A robust approach to quantum field theory: A give-and-take situation for philosophy” (abstract below).

The series of online seminars is organized in the context of the activities of the LanCog Research Group at the Centre of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon, and will focus on the foundations of quantum and spacetime physics.

The meeting will be online on Zoom (17:00-19:00 CEST). If you have not registered yet, you can do so here.

You can address any question to Andrea Oldofredi (aoldofredi@letras.ulisboa.pt).

ABSTRACT:

I present an intuitive and robust mathematical representation of fundamental particle physics based on a novel approach to quantum field theory, which is guided by four carefully motivated metaphysical postulates. More concretely, I explore a dissipative approach to quantum field theory [1] and propose a possible explanation of the Planck scale in quantum gravity. Offering a radically new perspective on this topic, my presentation focuses on the conceptual foundations of quantum field theory and ontological questions [2]. It also suggests a new stochastic simulation technique in quantum field theory which is complementary to existing ones.

[1] H.C. Öttinger, A Philosophical Approach to Quantum Field Theory (Cambridge University Press, 2017).
[2] A. Oldofredi and H.C.Öttinger, The dissipative approach to quantum field theory: conceptual
foundations and ontological implications, Euro Jnl Phil Sci 11, 18 (2021).