Author: cful

Dominik Finkelde SJ

Hochschule für Philosophie München

Reason and Anamorphosis. On Subjectivity as a Feature of Reality in Hegel and Lacan

5 April 2022, 17h00 (Lisbon Summer Time — GMT+1)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy) | School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

In any account of how things really are, subjectivity can be both a formal and a distorting factor for Hegel and Lacan’s adaptation of Hegelian dialectics. Lacan speaks of a pre-theoretical experience of being in the world where human beings are literally called by reality to be social agents and fill in gaps of this reality at the same time with their fantasies. As such, fantasies play an epistemic role, neglected often in both epistemological and ontological debates. But since the status of reality, with or without fantasies, is never all and complete, antagonisms within reality cannot be contained. Ontology, as our inquiry into ‘what there is,’ affects ‘what there is’ in that subjectivity, troubled by antagonism, always goes beyond established forms of facts, theoretically, practically and phantasmagorically. In my presentation, I argue that, especially with reference to Kant, Hegel and Lacan, that subjectivity, with its imaginary intertwinement of what Lacan calls the symbolic order, is a feature of reality (as virtuality) and not just a hallmark of the conscious mind.

The cognitive life of maps
Roberto Casati (Institut Jean Nicod)

01 April 2022, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT+1) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: The cognitive life of maps is distinct from the life of cognitive maps. But then, there are two senses of ‘the cognitive life of maps’; in the wake of theories of extended cognition, one may claim that maps have a cognitive life of their own. Here we follow a different path, the study of the cognitive engagement with maps. In a sense, maps are temporarily alive for those who design, draw and use them. How can they? What kind of life is it?
I first introduce the main claims about what maps are and how they work – their specific syntax, their peculiar semantics, and their pragmatics. Then I delve into the mechanics of maps as they are used for navigation, the differences and similarities between maps and pictures, and between maps and models. Then, I test the skeletal theory of maps on an enlargement: can we find maplike structures in other cognitive artifacts, and how are these structures specifically maplike? I’ll make the case that clock faces, music notation, writing, organizers (such as calendars), and numeral series are or contain essentially map structures. This enlargement strategy makes a case for the centrality of maps. Missing an understanding of maps, we cannot understand how a number of other crucial cognitive artifacts work.

The room has a limited number of seats. Pre-registration is required at <info@lancog.com> until a day before the event. Note that this is an in-person event and everyone should wear a mask.

Jesús Adrián

Autonomous University of Barcelona

What Does It Mean to Dwell? Heidegger on the Relationality of Things

29 March 2022, 17h00 (Lisbon Time – GMT+0)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy) | School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

In August 1951, Heidegger hold a conference in the city of Darmstadt entitled Building, Dwelling, Thinking. Since its publication, architects, town planners, environmentalists, designers and artists have engaged in a fruitful dialogue with Heidegger —particularly focusing on the relation on space and place, the difference between dwelling and residing, or the problem of contemporary rootlessness. Having this dialogue in mind, the lecture will tackle three questions open to a later discussion with the audience: i) the ontological meaning of space; ii) the difference between dwelling in the technological era of positionality (Gestell) and dwelling in the fourfold (Geviert); and iii) the development of an ontology of relationality. In my presentation, I argue that Heidegger’s late thinking develops an interesting phenomenology of things. The bulk of his writings —such as the 1949 Bremen lecture cycle, Insight Into That Which Is, The Question Concerning Technology, Building Dwelling Thinking, or The Thing —explore new phenomenological routes to think of the immediacy and proximity of things. As Mitchell shows, the concept of the fourfould (Geviert) provides an account of the things as inherently relational. Unlike the encapsulated object of modern philosophy, the fourfould presents things as unfolding themselves in opening relations with the world beyond them. The things are utterly worldly or, to put it differently, things are immersed in the world. It is the field of their interaction. In this sense, the fourfould is the key to understanding the relational, mediated and finite nature of things. Therefore, we could speak of the passage from an ontology of substantiality to an ontology of relationality.

Bolsa de Investigação (BI) para Estudante de Doutoramento, no âmbito do projecto de I&D Tradução Anotada Das Obras Completas De Aristóteles (PTDC/FER-FIL/0305/2021), do Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa, da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, financiado por fundos nacionais através da FCT/MCTES

Referência: CFUL_13_2022_BI_EstudanteDeDoutoramento_ProjectoCWA6_Março

• ACTA N.º 1
• AVISO DE ABERTURA
• EURAXESS NOTICE (Offer ID: 760504)

Prazo de candidatura: 22/03/2022 a 22/04/2022

Mais informação aqui.

Modals and Copulas in Aristotle
Simona Aimar (UCL)

25 March 2022, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: The following sentences

(1) The Queen is necessarily British.

(2) The Queen is possibly Italian.

are modal claims. They contain modals, words that make a sentence express modalities like possibilities and necessities. Claim (1) contains the modal adverb ‘necessarily’ – a necessity modal. Claim (2) contains the modal ‘possibly’ – a possibility modal. This talk asks: How does Aristotle account for modals?
So far, scholars assume that my question is a non-starter. In their view, Aristotle does not account for modals: no such account is present within his reconstruction of modal logic (in the Prior Analytics), or in his account of language (in De Interpretatione). Even the claim that Aristotle has a systematic semantics for natural language is regarded as suspicious.
My talk debunks the suspicion that Aristotle was no semanticist. I reconstruct his theory of modals and show that it stems from a systematic account of language. Just like many contemporary linguists, Aristotle assumes that language is compositional and assertive claims have truth-conditions. Unlike contemporary authors, however, he analyses predications of the form ‘a is F’ as have a tripartite structure: a copula (‘is’) takes scope over two terms (‘a’ and ‘F’). Given this picture, he argues that modals are copula-modifiers, where his modifiers can be modelled as expressing a function that takes an item of a given linguistic type and issues a different item of the same linguistic type. Specifically, modals take a (non-modal) copula as an input and yield a modal copula as their output. I reconstruct his argument for the claim that modals are non-copula modifiers and how it relies on semantic intuitions about negations (a technique also used in contemporary linguistics). Finally, I show how Aristotle’s account guarantees the insight that modals and quantifiers work in a parallel way and accounts for differences in scope. I conclude by raising the question of why (for all we know) Aristotle did not think about higher-order modal claims. Is there room for these in his semantics at all?.

The room has a limited number of seats. Pre-registration is required at <info@lancog.com> until a day before the event. Note that this is an in-person event and everyone should wear a mask.

The Centre of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon (CFUL) is interested in receiving proposals from candidates wishing to develop research activities leading to the award of a Doctorate in Philosophy (with particular emphasis on the History of Philosophy, Analytic Philosophy or Practical Philosophy), with the CFUL as the host institution, in the context of the Call for PhD Research Grants – 2022, promoted by the Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT) [info] [opening announcement].

Interested parties are invited to express their interest until March 25, 2022, by sending the following information, in English or Portuguese:

e-mail: c.filosofia@letras.ulisboa.pt

Subject: BID 2022 FCT_ [the applicant’s name]

Send:

1) Research Plan

2) Curriculum Vitae in PDF

3) Name of the supervisor with whom you intend to work / research group where you intend to develop your research.

The decision on which applications the CFUL will accept will be communicated by 30 March 2022.

The FCT call will be open from 8 March to 7 April 2022 at 17:00 (Lisbon time) and must contain the following elements:

1) Detailed research plan

2) Curriculum Vitae (on the CIÊNCIAVITAE platform)

3) Motivation letter

4) Two recommendation letters

5) In case of academic degrees awarded by foreign higher education institutions, recognition of those degrees and conversion of the respective final classification into the Portuguese classification scale.(*)

(*) The recognition of foreign academic degrees and diplomas as well as the conversion of the final classification into the Portuguese classification scale may be requested in any public higher education institution, or in the Directorate-General for Higher Education (DGES). Regarding this matter, we suggest that you consult the DGES portal at the following address:https://www.dges.gov.pt/en/pagina/degree-and-diploma-recognition

Concurso FCT para Atribuição de Bolsas de Investigação para Doutoramento – 2022

No âmbito do Concurso FCT para Atribuição de Bolsas de Investigação para Doutoramento – 2022, o CFUL informa que todas as candidaturas que pretendam ter o Centro como Instituição de Acolhimento devem ser enviadas previamente para conhecimento/aprovação, de acordo com as instruções em baixo:

O Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa (CFUL) mantém o interesse em receber propostas de candidatos que pretendam desenvolver actividades de investigação conducentes à obtenção do grau académico de Doutor em Filosofia (com particular ênfase na História da Filosofia, Filosofia analítica e Filosofia prática) tendo o CFUL como entidade de acolhimento, no âmbito do concurso para Atribuição de Bolsas de Investigação para Doutoramento – 2022, promovido pela Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT) [info][aviso de abertura].

Convidam-se os interessados a manifestar o seu interesse até ao dia 25 de Março de 2022, enviando os seguintes elementos, em inglês ou português:

e-mail: c.filosofia@letras.ulisboa.pt

Assunto: BID 2022 FCT_ [o nome do candidato]

Enviar:

1) Plano de Investigação
2) Curriculum Vitae em PDF
3) Nome do orientador com quem pretendem trabalhar.

A decisão sobre as candidaturas que o CFUL aceitará acolher será comunicada até ao dia 30 de Março de 2022.

O concurso FCT estará aberto de 8 de Março a 7 de Abril de 2022 às 17:00 (hora de Lisboa) e terá de conter os seguintes elementos:

1) Plano de investigação detalhado
2) Curriculum Vitae (na plataforma CIÊNCIAVITAE)
3) Carta de motivação
4) Duas carta de recomendação
5) No caso de graus académicos atribuídos por instituições de ensino superior estrangeiras, reconhecimento desses graus e a conversão da respectiva classificação final para a escala de classificação portuguesa.(*)

(*) O reconhecimento de graus académicos e diplomas estrangeiros bem como a conversão da classificação final para a escala de classificação portuguesa pode ser requerido em qualquer instituição de ensino superior pública, ou na Direcção-Geral do Ensino Superior (DGES). Relativamente a esta matéria, sugere-se a consulta do portal da DGES através do seguinte endereço: https://www.dges.gov.pt/en/pagina/degree-and-diploma-recognition

Andrés Saenz de Sicilia

Central Saint Martins, University of the Arts London | UNAM

Capitalism as System and History: On Marx’s Theory of Subsumption

22 March 2022, 17h00 (Lisbon Time – GMT+0)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy) | School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

One of the fundamental tensions within Marx’s writings arises from the complex relationship between the systematic and historical aspects of his description of capitalist society. This paper argues that among all the concepts deployed by Marx ‘subsumption’ is key with respect to this issue. The different forms of capitalist subsumption analysed by Marx designate the mechanisms by which capital shapes the developmental dynamics of modern societies. Yet the concept is undertheorized in Marx’s writings and has been subject to divergent interpretations. Its implications remain contested. By returning to the philosophical origins of subsumption, in particular to Kant’s ‘critical’ reconceptualisation of it as a productive act of ‘synthetic determination’, this paper seeks to establish its centrality for Marxist thought. Subsumption, it is argued, is the fundamental category of analysis linking capital as system to capital as history.

Barcan Formulas and the Limits of Contingency
Adam Russell Murray (University of Manitoba)

18 March 2022, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Our simplest and best understood theory of first-order metaphysical modality represents individual existence and non-existence as strictly non-contingent. However, these necessitist implications of the simple theory appear to be undermined by robust intuition to the effect that existence and non-existence are largely contingent matters. In this talk, I show how resources familiar from two-dimensional semantics support a novel interpretation of the necessitist’s theoretical commitments. In contrast with existing positions in these debates, the necessitist theory I develop preserves both the simple theory and a non-revisionist metaphysics of individuals, while also explaining much of the intuitive allure of the alternative, contingentist picture.

The room has a limited number of seats. Pre-registration is required at <info@lancog.com> until a day before the event. Note that this is an in-person event and everyone should wear a mask.

Viriato Soromenho-Marques

Praxis-CFUL, University of Lisbon

Anthropocene, Utopia and Dystopia. Contributions to a Philosophy of History of the Near Future

15 March 2022, 17h00 (Lisbon Time – GMT+0)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy) | School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

The roots of our present predicament are entangled in the humanistic turn of European Modernity, which was quickly embedded with a new vision of technology. The latter ceased to be a mere instrumental and secondary derivative consequence of knowledge primacy, to become the very vehicle and purpose of the most desirable future, able to be reached through our increased ability to alter and mobilise nature to suit our needs and even our whims. It is no sheer coincidence that the concept of utopia was invented in this period (in Thomas More’s Utopia, 1516), and that the most influential utopias that followed suit, like those of Tommaso Campanella and Francis Bacon have the increasingly predominant presence of techno-science as the anticipation driving force of a desirable future. We have reached the contemporary period with a full-fledged technological orientation of the science infrastructure, and also of its planning and operating procedures, in an atmosphere of uncritical optimism, averse to any prudential reserve. The discourse of unlimited scientific progress marginalised dissenting voices and discounted as acceptable collateral damage the increasing toll of environmental and social negative impacts. The utopian drive of techno-science is growingly escalating towards the opposite world of a dystopian nightmare.

An Internal Realist Interpretation of the Primitive Ontology Programme
Andrea Oldofredi (University of Lisbon, LanCog)

11 March 2022, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: New interesting developments and extensions of the Primitive Ontology (PO) programme have been recently proposed in order to defeat Laudan’s Pessimistic Meta-Induction on the one hand, and to provide a theory-independent fundamental atomistic ontology of the world on the other. Against this background, the aim of the talk is twofold: I will firstly discuss the main assumptions behind those arguments according to which the PO programme can overcome Laudan’s induction and offer a scale-invariant ontology, showing possible counterexamples to these claims. Secondly, I will argue that the realism introduced by the PO approach can be consistently interpreted as internal realism, i.e., I will show that the internal realist view can faithfully represent the ontological commitment (and its limits) implied by the acceptance of a given PO theory, capturing also the pluralist stance of this programme as originally conceived by David Bohm and John S. Bell.

The room has a limited number of seats. Pre-registration is required at <info@lancog.com> until a day before the event. Note that this is an in-person event and everyone should wear a mask.