Author: cful

On Wednesday, 18 May, Baptiste Le Bihan (University of Geneva) will give a talk titled “Composing and Causing Spacetime in Quantum Gravity” (abstract below).

The series of online seminars is organized in the context of the activities of the LanCog Research Group at the Centre of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon, and will focus on the foundations of quantum and spacetime physics.

The meeting will be online on Zoom (17:00-19:00 CEST). If you have not registered yet, you can do so here.

You can address any question to Andrea Oldofredi (aoldofredi@letras.ulisboa.pt).

ABSTRACT:
According to a number of approaches in quantum gravity spacetime does not exist fundamentally. Rather, spacetime exists by depending on another, more fundamental, non-spatiotemporal structure. A prevalent opinion in the literature is that this dependence should not be analysed in terms of composition. We should not say, that is, that spacetime depends on an ontology of non-spatiotemporal entities in virtue of having them as parts. But is that really right? On the contrary, I will argue that a mereological approach to dependent spacetime is not only viable, but promises to enhance our understanding of the physical situation. I will then discuss some of the roles that causality might play in these scenarios. Based on a collaboration with Sam Baron.

Moirika Reker

Praxis-CFUL, University of Lisbon

Em torno da Filosofia do Jardim em Rosario Assunto, ou o jardim, sempre!

17 May 2022, 17h00 (Lisbon Summer Time — GMT+1)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy) | School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

Ao longo de cerca de meio século, Rosario Assunto (1915-1994) tomou em mãos a tarefa de pensar a beleza e a centralidade da estética, não só para a filosofia, mas para a vida humana em toda a sua amplitude. O seu pensamento, frequentemente em confronto com as posições dominantes, debruçou-se sobre vários temas e períodos, tendo sempre como fim compreender as múltiplas formas como se dá a relação do homem consigo mesmo e com o mundo – donde a sua crítica acutilante a determinados traços da modernidade, em clara ruptura com o primado da beleza. A filosofia do jardim de Assunto é, simultaneamente, o ápice dessa “batalha de ideias” e o trabalho que lhe mereceu maior reconhecimento, resgatando-o do seu isolamento e atestando a sua actualidade. Na sua reflexão o jardim assume-se como o fiel da balança da relação entre o homem e a sua base natural, abrindo portas a perspectivar o jardim como lugar de ensaio para a recuperação de uma relação homem-natureza regida pela sensatez e harmonia. Para tal, partiremos de duas questões preliminares: 1) o que significa filosofar sobre o jardim; 2) porquê tomar o jardim como objecto de estudo.

On Wednesday, 11 May, Antonio Vassallo (Warsaw University of Technology) and Pedro Naranjo (Warsaw University of Technology) will give a talk titled “A Proposal for a Metaphysics of Self-Subsisting Structures” (abstract below).

The series of online seminars is organized in the context of the activities of the LanCog Research Group at the Centre of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon, and will focus on the foundations of quantum and spacetime physics.

The meeting will be online on Zoom (17:00-19:00 CEST). If you have not registered yet, you can do so here.

You can address any question to Andrea Oldofredi (aoldofredi@letras.ulisboa.pt).

ABSTRACT:
We present a new metaphysical framework for physics that is conceptually clear, ontologically parsimonious, and empirically adequate. This framework relies on the notion of self-subsisting structure, a set of fundamental physical elements whose individuation and behavior are described in purely relational terms, without any need for a background spacetime. Although the specification of the fundamental aspects of the ontology depends on the particular physical domain considered–and is thus susceptible to scientific progress–the structural features of the framework are preserved through theory change. The kinematics and dynamics of these self-subsisting structures are technically implemented using the theoretical framework of Pure Shape Dynamics, which provides an entirely relational physical description of a system in terms of the intrinsic geometry of a suitably defined Riemannian space, called shape space.

Justified belief for Gnostics
Julien Dutant (King’s College London)

13 May 2022, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: According the Lockean view, it is justified to believe P iff it’s rational to have a high credence in P. A theory of degrees of justification fits this view well: the degree to which one is justified in believing P is one’s rational credence in P. On that theory degrees of justification obey the probability axioms. I give reasons to prefer an alternative, the “probable knowledge” view, according to which it is justified to believe P iff it’s rational to have a high credence that one knows P (or is in a position to know P). A theory of degrees of justification fits that view well: the degree of which one is justified in believing P is one’s rational credence that one knows (or is in a position to know) P. On that theory, degrees of justification typically violate the probability axioms. I explore their shape; in particular, I show that under the assumption that knowledge obeys the normal logic KT, degrees of justification turn out to be Belief functions (aka Dempster-Shafer belief functions).

The room has a limited number of seats. Pre-registration is required at <info@lancog.com> until a day before the event.

Christian Lotz

Michigan State University

Categories in Phenomenology and Critical Theory. On Heidegger and Lukács

10 May 2022, 17h00 (Lisbon Summer Time — GMT+1)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy) | School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

The rejection of a foundational political economy in contemporary “official” critical theory leads to an empiricist and skeptical framework in which, ultimately, the social reality or the society is an arbitrarily established sum of acts and events, which, as such, do not form an actuality [Wirklichkeit]. There can be acts and events in such a social theory, but in the strict sense it would not even be a theory of society because there is no object of such a theory. To grasp society as an object means that it presupposes a unity as objectivity in its categorial form. Kant — and Marx ! — argue that the conditions of the experience of objects are at the same time the conditions of the objects of that experience. An objective theory of society (i.e., one that is not simply the subject’s construction) is a theory in which the categorial organization of social reality is to be found in the social reality, without being metaphysically or logically deducted. Instead, the categorial organization must be phenomenologically revealed. The concept of category is not only important for Lukács, but also, as a short look into the (German) intellectual network in European philosophy at the beginning of the 20th Century shows, for all prominent schools, insofar as the question of how to understand the concept of category is central for their attempts to escape metaphysics. For example, phenomenologists ranging from Husserl to Heidegger were concerned with a reinterpretation of the concept of categories, insofar as these thinkers try to rescue it from what they conceive as its subjective background in Kant. On the one hand, we find attempts to re-interpret categories as something that transcend the positioning of the transcendental subject as something that is somehow given in life (Lask), but on the other hand, we find attempts to turn categories into units of meaning [Sinn] and “regional” frames (Husserl); and, finally, we also find the attempt to re-interpret categories through a hermeneutic lens, such as in Dilthey’s categories of life synthesis  [Lebenszusammenhang] and in Heidegger, who transforms “categories” into what he famously calls “existentialia” in Being and Time. On a side note, we find the problem of categories also addressed as a crucial problem in other philosophers and sociologists, such as Bloch, Durkheim, Maus, Piaget, and Hartmann. In my talk, I will offer reflections on the concept of category in Lukács and Heidegger in order to move at least closer to what I conceive of as the most crucial methodological problem in critical theory; namely, how to generate the basic concepts of a theory of society that must, in order to be established successfully as the true theory of society, claim that it is objective. Accordingly, I submit that the concept of category is a crucial steppingstone towards a theory of social concept-formation.

Modern Arguments for Fatalism
Ricardo Santos (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

06 May 2022, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Fatalism is one of the traditional metaphysical problems in philosophy. Among other things, a fatalist believes that whatever happens could not have failed to happen, hence could not have been avoided. While some people have scorned the view as prescientific and primitive, and the known arguments for it as pure sophisms, many analytic philosophers have thought that there are arguments for fatalism that are quite challenging and worth careful examination. Some of them have even tried to come up with new and stronger fatalistic arguments. In this talk, I will distinguish several forms that arguments for fatalism can take and I will review them, trying to make clear what are the main available options for responding and their more general consequences.

The room has a limited number of seats. Pre-registration is required at <info@lancog.com> until a day before the event.

Titus Stahl

University of Groningen

Ideals without Idealization: Why Critical Theories Need a Reference to an Ideal Society

3 May 2022, 17h00 (Lisbon Summer Time — GMT+1)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy) | School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

In contemporary liberal political theory, “ideal theorists” argue that we can only fix the meaning of our most important political concepts by reference to an imagined ideal state of affairs, and that we therefore, to some extent, have to engage in Utopian thinking. Traditionally, critical theories from Marx to the Frankfurt School as well as some contemporary critical theorists like Charles Mills, are highly skeptical towards this affirmative use of idealization, using arguments that often seem similar to those of current political realists. In my paper, I make three arguments: First, I show that the critical theory tradition offers a range of anti-Utopian arguments that draw on the historical situatedness of our political reason which do not coincide with those of political realism. Second, I argue that most of the arguments of critical theorists fail to make a principled case only against context-free idealization, but not against ideal theorizing as such. Third, I argue that the method of immanent critique that is specific to critical theory, allows for a conception of an ideal state of affairs that emerges from its diagnosis of social contradictions. On the basis of these three arguments I argue that critical theories can (and should) incorporate some aspects of ideal theorizing and its Utopian reference to a better society.

Conversational Internalism
João Miranda (University of Lisbon, LanCog)

29 April 2022, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Access internalism is the view that only items that one is aware of are available to justify beliefs. Conversational internalism, the view to be defended in this paper, is the kind of access internalism that argues that the reason why access is required, is not because it is in itself epistemologically relevant, but because it is necessary for conversations. Internal access gets its epistemological relevance from conversations because the ability to adequately intervene in conversations is what is required to make a belief justified, and you can’t adequately intervene in a conversation without being aware of what you’re conversing. I start by distinguishing internalistic from externalistic approaches to epistemology, setting the stage for the discussion. I then present my theory, and an argument for it. Characterizing conversations – the relevant kind of conversations – as things that can be represented as sequences of ordered pairs Question→Answer, allows for contrastivism (Snedegar, 2017) to provide an explanation of how a belief can get justified through conversation and contextualism about justification (inspired by Lewis, 1996) to provide a more refined view of how the theory can account for shifts in the strength of justificatory demands from one conversation to another. I conclude by showing how the theory handles some main objections to internalism (such as those that concern an agent’s capacity to store enough reasons and the strength of the epistemological demands for justification), in particular by arguing that it fares better against those objections than traditional internalistic alternatives.

The room has a limited number of seats. Pre-registration is required at <info@lancog.com> until a day before the event.

Sofia Miguens

University of Porto

Os abismos que existem entre nós – Cora Diamond e o relativismo em ética

19 April 2022, 17h00 (Lisbon Summer Time — GMT+1)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy) | School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

A partir do livro de Cora Diamond, Reading Wittgenstein With Anscombe. Going On to Ethics (2019), procurarei explicitar as razões por que uma posição wittgensteiniana em ética não é necessariamente relativista. Darei especial atenção ao exemplo de Diamond, o pensamento ’Slavery is unjust and insupportable’. Na obra de Diamond a caso da escravatura é o sucessor do caso da vida animal (The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy, 2008). Em ambos os casos há pessoas que pensam, ou pensaram, como natural aquilo que para outras é simplesmente impensável: ter como escravos outros humanos, ou alimentarmo-nos de outros animais. Em ambos os casos existe, segundo Diamond, uma distância entre o que é pensado por uns e o que é pensado por outros que está para além do desacordo argumentativo. Diamond apresenta uma proposta de análise de tais abismos entre nós (gulfs between us) que faz um trabalho importante em ética.

Relativism and Retraction
Dan Zeman (University of Warsaw)

08 April 2022, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT+1) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: The argument from retraction (the speech act of “taking back” a previous speech act) has been one of the favorite arguments used by relativists about a variety of natural language expressions (predicates of taste, epistemic modals, moral and aesthetic claims etc.) in support of their view. The main consideration offered is that relativism can, while rival views cannot, account for this phenomenon. For some of the relativists leading the charge, retraction is, in fact, mandatory: a norm of retraction makes it obligatory for an agent to retract a previously unretracted assertion whenever what has been asserted is shown to be currently false. This norm, it is contended, is part and parcel of our behavior as rational agents and distinguishes relativism from other views on the market.
Recently, several considerations – both from the armchair and based on empirical studies – have been offered to undercut the support retraction has been taken to provide relativism. In this paper, I engage with both types of considerations. In relation to the former, I urge relativists to give up the claim that retraction is mandatory, but show that even if they do so there is still a phenomenon to be explained and that the view remains better situated in accounting for it that its rivals. I also show how what seem like problematic cases of retraction can be handled if one embraces a (principled) flexible form of relativism. In relation to the latter, I survey some of the current experimental literature supporting the idea that the folk don’t retract claims involving the target expressions (or that they don’t do in the way envisaged by the relativist) and argue that the experimenters have not paid attention to all the possible perspectives the participants in the experiments could take when responding to the queries. This leads to a way to interpret these results that makes them compatible with flexible relativism, and hence inconclusive when it comes to a more sophisticated version of the view.

The room has a limited number of seats. Pre-registration is required at <info@lancog.com> until a day before the event. Note that this is an in-person event and everyone should wear a mask.