Author: cful

The LanCog group at the University of Lisbon and the Philosophy of Physics group at Warsaw University of Technology are happy to announce the launch of the online Lisbon-Warsaw reading group in the philosophy of physics.

The reading group will meet on Zoom monthly to discuss newly published papers or work-in-progress drafts on timely and relevant topics. The meetings will consist of an extended Q&A session with the authors. The goal is to provide the participants with an occasion to actively engage with state-of-the-art research in the philosophy and foundations of physics.

In the first meeting, Flavio del Santo (University of Geneva) will join us to discuss his paper “Potentiality realism: A realistic and indeterministic physics based on propensities.” The meeting will be on 11 October (17:00-19:00 CEST).

To participate and receive a copy of the paper, please register here.

You can address any query to Antonio Vassallo (antonio.vassallo@pw.edu.pl)

The organizers,

Andrea Oldofredi

Davide Romano

Antonio Vassallo

Sceptical, Complacent, Critical: How Should the Conceptual Engineer Engage with Concepts?

Delia Belleri (LanCog, Centre of Philosophy, University of Lisbon)

15 September 2023, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Conceptual engineering is a method dealing with the assessment and revision of conceptual representations. It operates on the assumption that concepts are often defective and in need of improvement. This assumption can, however, lead to a form of “representational scepticism”. Scepticism is, in turn, depicted by some theorists as if it was the only alternative to uncritical acceptance of our conceptual representations (“representational complacency”). In this talk, I argue that it is not. The conceptual engineer can hold a form of “critical conservatism” about concepts. Critical conservatism emphasizes context-sensitivity, sensitivity to a variety of epistemic and non-epistemic considerations, as well as the exercise of skills that help the thinker evaluate conceptual flaws that can and cannot be tolerated. As such, is it a more nuanced position than representational scepticism, which, however, is still compatible with the conceptual engineer’s expected special sensitivity to conceptual flaws (and ways to fix them).

Congratulations to Hugo Luzio, who has just won the Essay Prize of the Portuguese Philosophical Society!

More info: https://www.spfil.pt/premio_2022_resultado 

LanCog Day 2023

Argument Rodizio

30 June 2023, 15:30 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

The Argument Rodizio is a session in which each participant presents a short, desirably surprising, argument in 5-10 minutes, to be discussed in the following 5-10 minutes.

Abstract:

1. Robert Michels – “Why friends of the fuzzy theory of vagueness need not be worried about the objection from penumbral connections”
2. Bruno Jacinto – “On diagonalization”
3. Diogo Santos – “A Kripkean-like argument for evaluatives”
4. Gabriel Malagutti – “Defending the steadfast view through group epistemology”
5. Gabriel Lee – “An argument against the grandfather paradox”
6. Anabela Dias – “Change does not require dynamic time”
7. Luke Kersten – “If you wouldn’t eat Bobby, why are you eating Bobby?”

Novels and Symphonies as Concrete Artifacts

Ned Markosian (University of Massachusetts Amherst)

23 June 2023, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Most philosophers take works of art such as novels and symphonies to be abstract types that are discovered rather than created by the artists associated with them. Recently, a growing minority position has emerged, according to which these works of art are abstract artifacts – non-concrete, repeatable objects that are brought into existence by authors and composers. In this talk, I will defend a more radical proposal, according to which works of art like novels and symphonies are concrete artifacts – non-repeatable, physical objects or events that are created by writers and composers.

Identity Labels as Tools for Building Agency

Carolina Flores (University of California, Irvine)

23 June 2023, 11:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Identity labels (‘mother’, ‘non-binary’, ‘BIPOC’, ‘queer’) are pervasively used. At the same time, their use makes many people uncomfortable. Identity labels can seem reductive and limiting, constraining our agency in undesirable ways. Against these worries, we will argue that employing identity labels can be distinctively liberatory—when we employ them in flexible or playful ways. To argue for this, we offer a novel account of the cognitive role of identity labels as identity-centric frames, not mere categorization devices. Specifically, identity labels lead us to attend, explain, and evaluate in terms of social identities, shaping how we characterize groups and their members. With this cognitive role in sight, we diagnose common complaints about identity labels as being in fact complaints about the rigid use of identity labels. In contrast, switching between identity labels one applies to oneself in an open-ended way can express, enhance, and scaffold individual and collective agency in ways that are otherwise hard to achieve. As a consequence, we should not avoid identity labels. At a structural level, we would be well-served by the production and dissemination of a wide range of identity labels, and by social norms that encourage their flexible employment and make room for play. (This is joint work with Elisabeth Camp (Rutgers).)

Graduate students or early career researchers (within three years of receiving a doctoral degree) are invited to apply for the 6th PLM Masterclass, to be held at the Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon, on 23–24 November 2023. The Masterclass will be devoted to the work of Professor Elisabeth Pacherie (Institut Jean Nicod). 8–10 participants will be presenting papers on Elisabeth Pacherie’s work, to be commented by her, followed by general discussion. Papers may be submitted on any of the topics on which Professor Pacherie has been working (e.g. agency, intentionality, consciousness, perception, the psychopathology of agency, belief and self-consciousness). Each student’s talk will take up a 30-minute slot.

Prof. Pacherie will also present new research in her keynote lecture.

Participation in the Masterclass will be free of charge, but students will have to fund their own travel and living expenses in Lisbon.

To apply, please submit an anonymised abstract of no more than 1000 words (in pdf format), as an attachment to an email to be sent to mcplm23_at_gmail.com.

Both the abstract and the body of the email should contain the title of the presentation.

The deadline for sending applications is 15 July 2023. Applicants will be notified regarding acceptance by the beginning of September 2023.

Feel free to email requests for further information at mcplm23_at_gmail.com.

The Masterclass is organised by LanCog (Language, Mind and Cognition Group at the University of Lisbon), which is a member of PLM (Philosophy of Language and Mind Network), a consortium of European philosophy departments and research centers with special expertise in the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind. The purpose of the network is to further philosophy of language and mind broadly construed and to provide a platform for cooperation between members, primarily in research, but also in research training.

Emotions Embodied: Old Debates and New Frontiers

Jesse Prinz (CUNY Graduate Center)

9 June 2023, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Historically, the central debates about emotions concerned the role of cognition: are emotions thoughts of some kind or can they arise without thinking? In the 20th century, this evolved into a debate between appraisal theories and embodied theories. In the 20th century, we’ve seen new ways to reconcile these old divides. The resulting theories and mounting evidence have given proponents of embodiment renewed hope. Recently, however, attempts to reconcile cognitive and embodied theories have been challenged. On the one hand, there are critics who think bodily responses are not adequate to explain emotions, and, on the other hand, there are some who think that earlier embodied theories do not fully appreciate the role of the body in emotions. This presentation recommends an embodied theory that builds on the lessons of these old and new debates.

Are Emotions Epistemically Redundant?

Laura Silva (Université Laval)

2 June 2023, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Debate regarding the epistemic role of emotions focusses on whether emotions can provide justification for evaluative beliefs. A prevalent objection to the view that emotions can do so stems from the observation that, as emotions are reason-responsive attitudes themselves, it seems that those very reasons that stand in justificatory relations to emotions, stand also in justificatory relations to evaluative beliefs. The Redundancy Objection claims that emotions are epistemically redundant in the justification of evaluative beliefs, for the very reasons that stand in support of an emotion can justify the relevant evaluative belief directly. Existing responses to this objection fail to secure emotions a non-redundant epistemic role. I develop a novel response to the Redundancy Objection that should be preferred. I argue that emotions enjoy a distinctive relation to their reasons such that it is rarely the case that reasons for emotion are also able to justify relevant evaluative beliefs directly.

Filipe Campello

Federal University of Pernambuco

O que vem depois das críticas decoloniais?

30 May 2022, 17h00 (Lisbon Summer Time — GMT+1)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

O papel de experiências subjetivas e emoções na crítica social não é imune a ambiguidades. Ao longo de abordagens associadas ao debate decolonial, vemos a tendência em direção a narrativas (inter)subjetivas como forma de resistência contra supostas noções de universalidade e racionalidade que seriam, na verdade, excludentes — o problema de quem é reconhecido como capaz de falar em nome da razão. Enquanto tenta-se superar o que foi chamado de injustiça epistêmica, permanece em disputa se conceitos como objetividade, universalidade ou verdade ainda podem ser relevantes, especialmente diante de contextos de relativismo moral, notícias falsas, negação da ciência, etc. Nesta palestra, quero abordar essas tensões, discutindo como críticas decoloniais —de forma mais propositiva, como é possível encontrar em pensamentos ameríndios— podem contribuir para a ampliação da nosso vocabulário e imaginação política. Argumento que tais cosmovisões, por um lado, colocam em questão as imagens e narrativas que temos à nossa disposição. Aqui, o horizonte semântico que articula nossas práticas também nos convida a viver de forma imaginativa e esteticamente, com diferentes maneiras de ser e falar o mundo. Por outro lado, esse esforço também pode ser visto como um esforço em direção a um pluriversalismo, sem com isso se deva abdicar de um terreno comum para crítica.