Author: cful

Irene Viparelli

University of Évora

“Diferença Marxiana” e Singularidade de L. Althusser

14 November 2023, 16h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+0)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

A publicação póstuma dos manuscritos de L. Althusser tem acarretado uma Renaissance dos estudos dedicados ao filosofo francês. Neste contexto, a presente intervenção visa em primeiro lugar apresentar os principais enfoques da mais recente bibliografia sobre Althusser. De acordo com Montag (Althusser and His Contemporaries. Philosophy’s Perpetual War, Duke University Press, 2013) há duas abordagens produtivas ao pensamento de Althusser: por um lado, a publicação dos escritos sobre o “materialismo aleatório” tem permitido leituras que tendem a inserir a reflexão althusseriana no contexto filosófico da época, destacando a proximidade com o horizonte pós-estruturalista. Seria, assim, a pertença à especifica “conjuntura teórica francesa” que garantiria o persistente interesse teórico do pensamento de Althusser. Por outro lado, a publicação dos textos políticos sobre a “crise do marxismo” tem originado interpretações que fazem da reflexão de Althusser uma “intervenção na conjuntura política”; uma resposta teórica aos problemas colocados pelo estalinismo e pela “crise do marxismo”. Nesse quadro, o interesse da teoria de Althusser seria, no fundo, enraizado na sua indissolúvel inatualidade. A presente intervenção procura apresentar uma diferente hipótese de leitura que, mantendo organicamente ligadas as dimensões teórico-filosófica e política, visa realçar a especificidade da posição de Althusser relativamente ao horizonte pós-estruturalista, i. e., uma “diferença marxiana” que representa a singularidade do seu pensamento.

Darian Meacham

Maastricht University

Why potatoes aren’t institutions? Or why institutions might help the phenomenology of technology

31 October 2023, 16h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+0)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

In this talk I have a fairly straightforward aim. I ask whether the phenomenological concept of “Institution” (Stiftung), which sometimes goes under the translation (into both French and English) foundation or establishment, can help to better articulate how phenomenology or phenomenological method can contribute to the philosophical examination of technology. I think that the answer is yes. Nonetheless, it is not clear from the outset that the concept of institution as developed in the phenomenological tradition and then further in certain branches of political theory can be rendered easily as a method or tool in the philosopher of technology’s quiver. The application of phenomenological method in the philosophy of technology under the umbrella of post-phenomenology has also come under recent criticism for being insufficiently attentive to questions of broader historical and political context (Cressman 2020), a classic critique of phenomenology, and as being insufficiently phenomenological (Ritter 2021). The aim here is not to intervene in these debates about the merits and shortcomings of post-phenomenological method in the philosophy of technology or whether post-phenomenology is sufficiently phenomenological but rather to understand how the concept of institution transformed phenomenological analysis and how this might be of some use in approaching the question of technology from a phenomenological perspective. Looking at institution in this way may also shed some light on the concept itself and help us to understand it’s limitations.

Conceptual Engineering in Inferentialist Terms

Metodiy Apostolov (LanCog, Centre of Philosophy, University of Lisbon)

27 October 2023, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: In a recent paper Jorem and Löhr (2022) criticize Herman Cappelen’s Austerity Framework (2018) for not providing a good rationale for doing conceptual engineering. They go on to suggest that Inferentialist semantics as developed by Sellars (1954) and Brandom (1994) provides a good rationale for the practice, therefore conceptual engineering is in the business of improving our inferential devices. I will examine the criticism and its extent over strict representationalist theories of conceptual engineering. I will argue that even if the inferentialist take on conceptual content provides a good rationale for engaging in the practice, this does not constitute a sufficient reason to pick it over other alternatives, e.g. functionalist accounts. Finally, I will discuss some advantages of the broad inferentialist approach to conceptual engineering and use it to propose an alternative reading of a particular case of metalinguistic disputes, i.e., metalinguistic negotiation.

Tiago Carvalho

U Porto

Já Está Arranjado? Do Estatuto e Sentido da Reparação de Artefactos

24 October 2023, 16h00 (Lisbon Summer Time — GMT+1)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

O título da minha comunicação baseia-se em larga medida no capítulo escrito para um livro ainda no prelo sobre manutenção e reparação de artefactos e infra-estruturas. A ideia ao longo da apresentação será explorarmos como a reparação de um artefacto levanta várias questões metafísicas e epistémicas. Será que reparar implica restaurar a função própria de um certo artefacto? E o que implica saber reparar um artefacto? Há alguma relação entre o saber científico e tecnológico necessário à construção de um artefacto e o saber necessário à respectiva reparação? Pode haver uma ciência da reparação? Para tentar responder a estas questões utilizarei conceitos da pós-fenomenologia e de teorias metafísicas da função de artefactos de forma a avançar com uma teoria geral da reparação que coloca a ênfase no sentido que um certo artefacto cumpre no mundo da vida dos seus utilizadores. Pretendo também estabelecer como a natureza do saber necessário à reparação é um saber prático, tácito e altamente contextualizado, mas precisamente por isso, um saber frágil e precário. A reparação é uma acção hermenêutica que abre a caixa negra do artefacto e põe em jogo a sua ambiguidade, i.e., e a forma como as intenções e as formas de vida dos utilizadores interagem com as intenções dos fautores dos artefactos. Essa ambiguidade é por sua vez posta em evidência através da forma como a transferência de artefactos entre diferentes culturas gera diferentes interpretações sobre a sua função.

Testimony and Expressive Behaviour

Matthew Parrott (University of Oxford)

20 October 2023, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: People often directly tell us about their thoughts, feelings, and desires. This common practice has led some philosophers to claim that testimony can be a fundamental way of knowing about others’ minds. In this talk, I shall argue that this claim is plausible only if we assume a certain conception of testimony, one which aligns it very closely with perception. By contrast, I shall argue that if we were to adopt a different conception of testimony, such as Richard Moran’s ‘assurance view’, then our acquiring testimonial knowledge of someone else’s mind would epistemically depend upon our having non-testimonial knowledge of their mental states. More specifically, I shall claim that this latter knowledge is based on a person’s expressive behaviours. Although one might naturally think this is either perceptual or inferential, in the final part of this talk, I develop an alternative framework for explaining how expressive behaviours ground our ordinary knowledge of others’ minds.

Pietro Gori

IFILNOVA

Questões da Metafísica e Prática de Ação em William James

17 October 2023, 16h00 (Lisbon Summer Time — GMT+1)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

A palestra focar-se-á na obra Alguns problemas de filosofia de William James, publicada póstuma em 1911 e em que James liga numa visão unitária as reflexões desenvolvidas após a publicação dos Principles of Psychology. Colocando o Homem no centro da interrogação filosófica enquanto único verdadeiro princípio de significância do referido da experiência, James delineia uma concepção segundo a qual as questões de metafísica só podem ser colocadas no contexto duma filosofia da ação, para poderem ser relevantes. Isto é, o nível da praxis é que doa sentido ao trabalho teórico, para James, pois qualquer compromisso epistêmico reflete-se, de facto, nas escolhas que são feitas no nosso dia-a-dia. Consequentemente, o trabalho crítico da filosofia – orientada pragmaticamente, como é óbvio – torna-se extremamente importante, pois é justamente esse trabalho que, tocando nos alicerces da nossa mundividência, fundamenta uma prática de ação e até pode orientar as nossas vidas.

Can AI Help Humeans? The Laws of Nature Debate in Light of Automated Scientific Discovery

Robert Michels (LanCog, Centre of Philosophy, University of Lisbon)

13 October 2023, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: According to the standard Humean theory of the laws of nature, Lewis’s Best System Analysis, laws of nature have this status at least partly as the result of an optimal trade-off between scientific values such as simplicity and descriptive strength. This idea has recently come under pressure, since — as authors like Roberts and Woodward have pointed out — there might, pace what Humeans like to suggest, be no such trade-off in the way laws of nature are identified in the natural sciences. Recent developments in the field of automated scientific discovery, in particular regarding symbolic regression, promise to provide Humeans with an answer to this challenge and, as we will argue, might even allow them to in turn put pressure on rival theories of the laws of nature: Symbolic regression gives us a method for (re-)discovering laws which closely matches the Humean picture of what makes a law of nature a law of nature and in particular crucially involves a trade-off between simplicity and descriptive strength. In this paper, we discuss whether Humeans can indeed rely on symbolic regression to bolster their theory of laws of nature. (This is joint work with Niels Linnemann [University of Geneva].)

On Being in Two Places at Once

Gabriel Uzquiano (University of South California)

6 October 2023, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: We will discuss the question of whether a material object may be in two places at once. More precisely, the question is whether one and the same material object may have more than one exact location. This is not all that plausible when it comes to spatial location. Many dismiss the hypothesis that a material object may have more than one exact spatial location at a given time as plainly incoherent. However, the stakes are higher when it comes to temporal location. For one way to interpret the thesis that material objects endure through time is as the hypothesis that material objects are exactly located at every time at which they exist. The purpose of this talk is to argue for the coherence of multilocation.

Nota de pesar: O Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa manifesta o seu profundo pesar perante a morte do Professor Tomas Calvo Martinez, membro associado do CFUL, e associa-se ao luto e à dor sentida pela família e amigos mais próximos.

Deprivation and Historical Closeness: A Reply

Diogo Santos (LanCog, Centre of Philosophy, University of Lisbon)

29 September 2023, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: The aim of the paper is to address three recent objections made by Yi (2022) against our strategy of using what we’ve called “Historical Condition” in our analysis of what it is required to be deprived of some value due to a late birth or early death in Miguel & Santos (2020). Yi claims that the Historical Condition (i) is unduly restrictive, for according to it many cases that deprivationists believe are deprivations due to early deaths aren’t; (ii) it makes a problematic prediction, since even our preferred example doesn’t appear to count as a deprivation of value due to a late birth and (iii) it’s theoretically untenable, since it implies a problematic principle. In the paper I show that these objections are misguided for they appear to rely on a misinterpretation of the Historical Condition and the dialectical role it plays in the discussion.