Evidentially Hedged Assertions

Dario Mortini (LOGOS, University of Barcelona)

25 October 2024, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Speakers make evidentially hedged assertions whenever they weaken commitment to what they assert in virtue of disclosing imperfectly reliable sources of evidence in their assertions. A novel and recently influential case for the knowledge norm of assertion appeals to conjunctions of evidentially hedged assertions and knowledge ascriptions. This paper challenges this novel case: I introduce additional conjunctions that cast serious doubt on the presumed robust connection between evidentially hedged assertions and knowledge ascriptions. The upshot calls for a reassessment of this new linguistic evidence for the knowledge norm, and it also highlights noteworthy but underappreciated features of evidentially hedged assertions.

This work/event is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310/2020

Adrian Razvan Sandru

MainenLab – Champalimaud Foundation

Re-presenting the Familiar – The Cognitive and Moral Role of Art in Kant’s Aesthetic Theory

22 October 2024, 17h00 (Lisbon Summer Time — GMT+1)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

Starting from Kant’s statement from his anthropology lectures that “the role of the artist is to present the familiar (das Gewöhnliche) in such a way that it stands out” I will try to reconstruct the role of art in Kantian aesthetic philosophy. I will argue in 4 steps: 1) to present the familiar as standing out means for Kant to present the familiar in such a way that the habitual application of concepts is questioned; 2) the experience of an uncertainty in the application of concepts is treated in the first instance by the subject as displeasure which leads the subject to enter into a reflective process aimed at resolving the cognitive conflict; 3) if the reflective process indicates a possible integration of the new perspective on the familiar it will lead to the experience of pleasure; 4) pleasure will finally open the space for two possible experiences: a) awe at the aesthetic ideas presented by the artwork in question and experienced as a feeling of the possibility of the supersensible and b) reflective awareness of the habitual nature of the subject as well as the possibility of reconstructing this nature into a second moral nature.

Reliability and Closure

Sven Rosenkranz (LOGOS, University of Barcelona)

18 October 2024, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: First, we argue that to make room for the closure of epistemic justification under competent deduction, reliabilists had better endorse the principle that the (unconditional) reliability of a given belief-forming method m implies the (unconditional) reliability of any method of competently deducing the logical consequences of the contents of the beliefs produced by m. Secondly, we undertake to show that this principle of reliability closure fails and that, therefore, reliabilists encounter difficulties in the attempt to accommodate the closure of epistemic justification under competent deduction. To the latter end, we first briefly lay out a theoretical framework in which to think about methods, their outputs, and the ways in which methods may build on others – with methods that are the single-premise closures of other methods being prime examples of such constructions. We then proceed to distinguish different plausible reliability measures, without taking a stand on which is best. Lastly, we develop an argument against reliability closure, by showing that a method may be reliable, while its single-premise closure is not. This argument succeeds irrespective of which of the plausible reliability measure is assumed. We conclude that we should either abandon the idea that epistemic justification is closed under competent deduction, or else abandon reliabilism. (Joint work with Julien Dutant [King’s College London].)

This work/event is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310/2020

Objective Disagreement and Perspectival Differences

Matheus Valente (LanCog, Centre of Philosophy, University of Lisbon)

4 October 2024, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Could rationality require you and I to disagree about something objective like the outcome of a coin toss even if, knowing we’re equally rational, we have transmitted all of our relevant evidence to each other via communication (reaching a point where we have common knowledge that there’s nothing informative left for any of us to say)? It would be surprising if it could, for that would entail a particularly revisionary form of perspectivalism according to which some peers ought to agree to disagree in their worldly credences just because, as they would put it, “I am I, you are you”. Though most would be inclined to repudiate that type of perspectivalism, I’ll develop an argument inspired by Robert Stalnaker’s discussion of the Sleeping Beauty problem to argue that one cannot both repudiate it and side with authors such as David Lewis who subscribe to the Halfer position on that case. By itself, this amounts to an exceptional, and so far unaddressed, challenge to a reputable philosophical view. But the implications of the argument extend beyond this particular case. In particular, it suggests that there’s nothing essentially private or incommunicable about the epistemic import of the ‘I’ and ‘now’.

Inclusivity and dense connectivity: tensions between two democratic ideals

Catarina Dutilh Novaes (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)

2o September 2024, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Two widely discussed liberal democratic ideals are inclusivity and dense connectivity (to ensure extensive interaction among citizens). Inclusivity is a foundational democratic value, based on the idea that all those who are affected by political decisions should have a say on public matters. Dense connectivity as an ideal is reflected in the influential Millian desideratum that all arguments and ideas should receive equal consideration in an epistemic community. In a community where dissenting voices are not heard, dead dogma is likely to prevail, as received opinions are not suitably challenged. By contrast, if arguments and ideas are exposed to the widest range of objections and counterarguments, then the ‘better arguments’ will prevail—or so claims the Millian. In this talk, I argue that the properties of inclusivity and dense connectivity are in fact in tension with each other. I highlight two such tensions, with conceptual tools borrowed from network epistemology and the epistemology of attention: the problem of scale, and the problem of (in)tolerance (drawing on Popper’s paradox of tolerance). The tensions between these two ideals suggest that they cannot be simultaneously fully achieved; I argue that privileging inclusivity over dense connectivity is to be preferred to safeguard democratic institutions.

Argument Rodizio

05 July 2024, 15:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

The Argument Rodizio is a session in which each participant presents a short, desirably surprising, argument in 5-10 minutes, to be discussed in the following 5-10 minutes.

Abstract:

1. Robert Michels – “At the End of Human Inquiry”
2. Ricardo Santos – TBD
3. João C. Miranda – “Why Are You Booing Me? I’m Right!”
4. Hugo Luzio – “Dream Irresponsibility”
5. Ned Markosian – “The Paradox of Suffering”

The Curse of Satisfaction: Paradoxes of Desire

Ronald de Sousa (University of Toronto)

28 June 2024, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Plato was perhaps the first but certainly not the last philosopher to take a dim view of desire. Lust, in particular, offers a model of desire reducible, in Shakespeare’s famous phrase, to ‘expense of spirit in a waste of shame’: and other poets and philosophers have argued that desire is essentially pain, that its object is often not what we think it is, and that satisfaction (in the limited measure in which it is even possible) only makes it worse. This talk begins by distinguishing semantic satisfaction (getting what you thought you wanted) from emotional satisfaction (actually enjoying what you are getting). It discusses some findings of recent brain science and psychology, due to Kent Berridge and others, that show that the natural and expected correlation between wanting something and getting pleasure from it can be disrupted. This helps to explain the phenomenon of ‘dust and ashes’—the absence of emotional satisfaction following semantic satisfaction—as well as other ways in which ‘satisfaction’ can fail to prove satisfying. Such explanations, however, don’t altogether resolve the problem of the ‘curse of satisfaction’.

Biologically Autonomous Teleosemantics

Carl B. Sachs (Marymount University)

14 June 2024, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Teleosemantics remains one of the more promising approaches to naturalizing semantic content. Two long-standing objections to teleosemantics are the normativity objection and the intensionality objection. The normativity objection states that the proper functioning of a cognitive state can only be understood in terms of whether states of that kind are normal or abnormal in a population. The intensionality objection states that teleosemantics can only account for tracking and mapping relations, which are themselves purely extensional. I shall argue that the normativity objection can be addressed by grounding cognitive functions in the organizational approach to biological autonomy, rather than as traits distributed across populations. This approach does not solve the intensionality objection, but it does show that the two objections can be addressed separately.

LanCog is pleased to announce that the 2024 Petrus Hispanus Lectures will be delivered by Professor Susan Schneider (Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton), on June 25th and 27th.

Abstract

The topic of these talks is the Global Brain Hypothesis, according to which, in the near future, humans will become nodes in a distributed information processing network implemented through AI technologies. On this view, the AI ecosystem will feature ‘Emergent hyperintelligences’ arising from ‘megasystems’ of AI services. Humans, as users of AI services, are “nodes” in a larger algorithmic system that I call the computronium.  Eventually, parts of the system, fuelled by advancing generative models, global sensor systems, extensive amounts of users and data (including from brain-machine interfaces), become a ‘Global Brain system’. There may be several global brain systems competing for power (a multipolar system), two foes (a bipolar system), or a single hegemonic Global brain system. This hypothesis has unexplored philosophical implications in a wide range of areas, including: the extended mind, the nature of knowledge, chatbot ‘epistemology’, sentience (is the global brain conscious?), the metaphysics of the part/whole relationship of human nodes and how they relate to the computronium and global brain, and ethical considerations relating to the global brain—how to avoid a dystopia, ways the algorithms manipulate humans and what to do about it.

Lecture I

The Global Brain Argument: Nodes, Computroniums and the AI Megasystem

25 June 2024

16:00 (WET)

Anfiteatro II

Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon

Lecture II

Illusory World Scepticism and the Simulation Argument

27 June 2024

16:00 (WET)

Anfiteatro II

Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon

Free Attendance. No registration required. All welcome!