Constitutivism in Ethics and Epistemology

University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal

September 4–6, 2025

Constitutivism is the view that the normative standards for something are based in its nature. In ethics, the view is that the standards for human action are based in the nature of our action. In epistemology, the view is that the standards for belief are based in the nature of belief. This conference aims to investigate the promise and power for constitutivism in ethics and epistemology, individually and together. Both papers developing the constitutivist view and those critical of it are welcome.

In addition to the invited speakers, there are 4 open places for speakers. Please submit a long abstract of no more than 1000 words, anonymized for review, to constitutivism.lisboa.2025@gmail.com, no later than January 31st, 2025.

Accommodation and dinners for speakers will be covered by conference funds, but we cannot help with travel.

Papers presented at the conference will be considered for a special issue of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy, who are generously partially funding the conference. Deadline for submission of final drafts of the papers will be December 31st, 2025.

The conference is hosted at the Centre of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon.

Organizers (in alphabetical order):

Luca Ferrero (University of California, Riverside)

Jeremy David Fix (Keble College, University of Oxford)

David Horst (University of Lisbon)

Invited Speakers (in alphabetical order):

Kate Nolfi (University of Virginia)

Hille Paakkunainen (Syracuse University)

T.A. Pendlebury (University of Chicago)

TBA

Structural Essentialism as an Ontology of the Physical World

Tomasz Bigaj (University of Warsaw)

15 November 2024, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: In this talk I will introduce and discuss a structural version of essentialism with respect to the identification of individual physical objects. The adopted approach will be fundamentally generalistic (qualitativistic): the only way to identify a given individual is by reference to its place in a qualitative relational structure designated as “essential”. I will extensively discuss the problem of the multiplicity of alternative identifications of objects in possible scenarios (modality de re) using a broadly Lewisian concept of a counterpart function. Particular emphasis will be put on the possibility of the existence of qualitatively indistinguishable counterpart functions which differ merely haecceitistically, and on the threat such possibility poses to the position of generalism.

How to Start Changing Your Mind

Elise Woodard (King’s College London)

8 November 2024, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Is it ever rational to change your mind based on others changing theirs? This talk answers affirmatively. Changes of mind are doubly epistemically significant. First, they provide compelling reasons for further inquiry. Second, they offer second-order evidence about the existence or quality of first-order evidence. However, critical evaluation is crucial to distinguish meaningful changes from irrelevant ones. By outlining key questions about reported changes and discussing potential pitfalls, we can better identify which changes are epistemically significant. If correct, my proposal highlights mind-changing as a valuable yet overlooked source of information when exploring complex and contentious issues.

This work/event is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310/2020

Sjoerd van Tuinen

Erasmus University Rotterdam

Frogs in the Swamp: A Critique of Menno ter Braak and other Liberal Discourses on Ressentiment

5 November 2024, 17h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+0)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

As the post-2016 boom in the self-diagnostics of toxic liberalism shows, the concept of ressentiment is still one of today’s main ‘ideologemes’ (Jameson). It is an ideologeme because, while having a strong morally disqualifying power, it offers no way out of the political impasse it describes. Here I propose a critique of the 1937 essay by the Dutch writer Menno ter Braak, ‘National Socialism as a Doctrine of Rancor’ (translated and published for the first time in English in Theory, Culture & Society in 2019) as the basis for a wider critique of ‘pastoral’ discourses on ressentiment. First, I argue that ressentiment initially and primarily names a bourgeois phenomenon and problem, and as such is an articulation of what Rancière has aptly called a ‘hatred of democracy’: liberal democracy is held responsible for all social problems as it inherently summons forth a bad infinity of emancipatory struggle (‘fanaticism’, ‘utopism’) that must be disqualified. Second, I show how ressentiment functions as a label for bourgeois self-legitimation: in discerning ressentiment everywhere, a claim is made to good conscience on the basis of either a more rational or a more authentic relation to one’s own ressentiment. It is this esprit de sérieux that culminates in Ter Braak’s hypocritical statement that ‘one will have to begin, for example, by speaking less disparagingly about the “bunch of losers”, because one cannot overestimate the extent of the reservoir of latent rancour.’ Third, I will briefly touch upon ways in which other discourses on ressentiment – those of Nietzsche and of the diplomat as invoked by ter Braak at the outset of his essay – seek to overcome this seriousness and contrast these other discourses with a discourse that is at risk of deepening it – in particular that of Améry.

Gonçalo Marcelo

University of Coimbra

Hermeneutics as Critical Social Theory

29 October 2024, 17h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+0)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

In this talk I will briefly present the fertile intersection between the tradition of philosophical hermeneutics and the task of critical social theory, exploring the possibility of using hermeneutics as a method for social theory. Coming back to Paul Ricœur’s definition of “critical hermeneutics” (in “Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology”, 1973) as reconciling a reinterpretation of cultural heritages with an interest in emancipation, I will attempt to demonstrate how it is precisely in a hermeneutical vein that much of the most fertile and philosophically informed critical social theory of the last decades has been put forward, drawing on examples from Ricœur, Michael Walzer, Charles Taylor, Axel Honneth and Hartmut Rosa. Through its emphasis on traits such as: 1) the first-person perspective; 2) interpretation and the symbolic fabric of social imaginaries; and 3) its connection with selfhood through self-interpretation hermeneutics will thus appear, or so I will argue, as a way to both make sense of the social and push for meaningful social transformation.

Evidentially Hedged Assertions

Dario Mortini (LOGOS, University of Barcelona)

25 October 2024, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Speakers make evidentially hedged assertions whenever they weaken commitment to what they assert in virtue of disclosing imperfectly reliable sources of evidence in their assertions. A novel and recently influential case for the knowledge norm of assertion appeals to conjunctions of evidentially hedged assertions and knowledge ascriptions. This paper challenges this novel case: I introduce additional conjunctions that cast serious doubt on the presumed robust connection between evidentially hedged assertions and knowledge ascriptions. The upshot calls for a reassessment of this new linguistic evidence for the knowledge norm, and it also highlights noteworthy but underappreciated features of evidentially hedged assertions.

This work/event is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310/2020

Adrian Razvan Sandru

MainenLab – Champalimaud Foundation

Re-presenting the Familiar – The Cognitive and Moral Role of Art in Kant’s Aesthetic Theory

22 October 2024, 17h00 (Lisbon Summer Time — GMT+1)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

Starting from Kant’s statement from his anthropology lectures that “the role of the artist is to present the familiar (das Gewöhnliche) in such a way that it stands out” I will try to reconstruct the role of art in Kantian aesthetic philosophy. I will argue in 4 steps: 1) to present the familiar as standing out means for Kant to present the familiar in such a way that the habitual application of concepts is questioned; 2) the experience of an uncertainty in the application of concepts is treated in the first instance by the subject as displeasure which leads the subject to enter into a reflective process aimed at resolving the cognitive conflict; 3) if the reflective process indicates a possible integration of the new perspective on the familiar it will lead to the experience of pleasure; 4) pleasure will finally open the space for two possible experiences: a) awe at the aesthetic ideas presented by the artwork in question and experienced as a feeling of the possibility of the supersensible and b) reflective awareness of the habitual nature of the subject as well as the possibility of reconstructing this nature into a second moral nature.

Reliability and Closure

Sven Rosenkranz (LOGOS, University of Barcelona)

18 October 2024, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: First, we argue that to make room for the closure of epistemic justification under competent deduction, reliabilists had better endorse the principle that the (unconditional) reliability of a given belief-forming method m implies the (unconditional) reliability of any method of competently deducing the logical consequences of the contents of the beliefs produced by m. Secondly, we undertake to show that this principle of reliability closure fails and that, therefore, reliabilists encounter difficulties in the attempt to accommodate the closure of epistemic justification under competent deduction. To the latter end, we first briefly lay out a theoretical framework in which to think about methods, their outputs, and the ways in which methods may build on others – with methods that are the single-premise closures of other methods being prime examples of such constructions. We then proceed to distinguish different plausible reliability measures, without taking a stand on which is best. Lastly, we develop an argument against reliability closure, by showing that a method may be reliable, while its single-premise closure is not. This argument succeeds irrespective of which of the plausible reliability measure is assumed. We conclude that we should either abandon the idea that epistemic justification is closed under competent deduction, or else abandon reliabilism. (Joint work with Julien Dutant [King’s College London].)

This work/event is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310/2020

Objective Disagreement and Perspectival Differences

Matheus Valente (LanCog, Centre of Philosophy, University of Lisbon)

4 October 2024, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Could rationality require you and I to disagree about something objective like the outcome of a coin toss even if, knowing we’re equally rational, we have transmitted all of our relevant evidence to each other via communication (reaching a point where we have common knowledge that there’s nothing informative left for any of us to say)? It would be surprising if it could, for that would entail a particularly revisionary form of perspectivalism according to which some peers ought to agree to disagree in their worldly credences just because, as they would put it, “I am I, you are you”. Though most would be inclined to repudiate that type of perspectivalism, I’ll develop an argument inspired by Robert Stalnaker’s discussion of the Sleeping Beauty problem to argue that one cannot both repudiate it and side with authors such as David Lewis who subscribe to the Halfer position on that case. By itself, this amounts to an exceptional, and so far unaddressed, challenge to a reputable philosophical view. But the implications of the argument extend beyond this particular case. In particular, it suggests that there’s nothing essentially private or incommunicable about the epistemic import of the ‘I’ and ‘now’.

Inclusivity and dense connectivity: tensions between two democratic ideals

Catarina Dutilh Novaes (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)

2o September 2024, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Two widely discussed liberal democratic ideals are inclusivity and dense connectivity (to ensure extensive interaction among citizens). Inclusivity is a foundational democratic value, based on the idea that all those who are affected by political decisions should have a say on public matters. Dense connectivity as an ideal is reflected in the influential Millian desideratum that all arguments and ideas should receive equal consideration in an epistemic community. In a community where dissenting voices are not heard, dead dogma is likely to prevail, as received opinions are not suitably challenged. By contrast, if arguments and ideas are exposed to the widest range of objections and counterarguments, then the ‘better arguments’ will prevail—or so claims the Millian. In this talk, I argue that the properties of inclusivity and dense connectivity are in fact in tension with each other. I highlight two such tensions, with conceptual tools borrowed from network epistemology and the epistemology of attention: the problem of scale, and the problem of (in)tolerance (drawing on Popper’s paradox of tolerance). The tensions between these two ideals suggest that they cannot be simultaneously fully achieved; I argue that privileging inclusivity over dense connectivity is to be preferred to safeguard democratic institutions.