Scientific Realism Under Fire

Michele Pizzochero (University of Bath & Harvard University)

13 December 2024, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Structural realism and entity realism are two widely discussed forms of scientific realism that seek to identify those claims within scientific theories that warrant ontological commitment. Broadly, structural realism holds that belief should be accorded to relations, while entity realism (especially in the version articulated by Ian Hacking) endorses belief in the entities susceptible to manipulation. Both views assert that these claims—relations or entities—underlie the empirical success of science and persist amidst theory change. In this talk, I will challenge both structural and entity realism using the historical case of phlogiston, a fire-like element posited by eighteenth-century chemists that was ultimately deemed non-existent. Despite its referential failure, the phlogiston theory was empirically successful, generating genuine predictions and unifying diverse phenomena. Drawing from this episode, I will develop a twofold argument. First, against structural realism, I will argue that the set of empirically successful relations identified within phlogiston theory was not retained in subsequent scientific theories. Second, against entity realism, I will argue that phlogiston, despite its non-existence, enjoyed manipulative success. Overall, these arguments cast doubt on the general applicability of structural and entity realism as reliable guides to track reality in the face of theory change.

Moral Dimensions of Offsetting Luxury Emissions

Stearns Broadhead

6 December 2024, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: This work addresses moral aspects of using carbon offsets for counteracting individuals’ luxury emissions. After introducing and outlining the main topics and terms related to carbon offsetting, it answers three objections that have been leveled against carbon offsetting: objections from the indulgences analogy, objections from the directness of the duty not to harm, and separateness objections. The work argues that advocates for offsetting have resources to defend against these criticisms by pointing to particularities of individual emissions’ harmfulness, as well as the preemptive nature of offsetting. The work then shows that in spite of these defenses there is reason to regard not emitting as a better option because of a host of problems that plague offsetting in its current forms. This work concludes that offsetting enhances individuals’ options for discharging their duty not to harm, but that standards of justice and efficacy need to be adopted.

Francisco Felizol

Praxis-CFUL

Entre rei sagrado e vítima microcósmica, bobo judicial e carrasco executivo: Os vértices antropológicos da soberania ante a ameaça populista

3 December 2024, 17h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+0)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

Em 1975, Foucault entronizava o soberano grotesco como um dos motores do poder. Esta ideia poderá ser melhor compreendida e fundamentada com o auxílio de uma antropologia que detecte as máscaras, sombras e misturas com que, nas sociedades humanas, o poder se costuma revestir. Nesta perspetiva, se, na esteira de Frazer, Hocart e Girard, as origens do poder político parecem remeter ao rei sagrado, também este é imediatamente remetível a outras figuras ou tipos. Sendo rei sagrado já de si potencial vítima (ou vítima adiada, e aí a sua proximidade com o homo sacer e o deuotus) com cariz microcósmico (o que acontece ao seu corpo acontece ao cosmos, ao reino), encontra-se na vizinhança antropológica do que tentaremos perceber como o bobo judicial (no âmbito do riso fertilizante e assassino, apontado, com a criança e o louco, à verdade tão violenta quão inocente) e o carrasco executivo (a também fertilizante execução mortal da de-cisão que o pode assegurar como soberano). Os tabus imobilizadores, a gravitas do rei (ou, hoje, do líder) fazem mais do que moderar os seus movimentos e decisões, sempre perigosos, mais do que conter nele o ambíguo sagrado antropológico (tão salvífico quanto violento): mantêm com ele, aquilo que tentaremos perceber como os outros três vértices da soberania, a vítima microcósmica, o bobo judicial e o carrasco executivo, a distância segura. Contudo, o progressivo colapso destas distâncias e interdições, liberta o sagrado que o rei, em sim deve conter; transborda-se para o palco, senão já para a rua, o trono, o altar, o circo e o patíbulo. Que tudo se acelera e precipita, mais as quatro figuras se aproximam esboçando a figura do soberano grotesco. Quando, desde os fundamentos do poder soberano, este caos sagrado emerge, assistimos a uma perigosa degradação do poder. À medida que, no lugar do poder, ante o avançar do espectáculo igualizado em que se torna a política, se assiste à queda de barreiras e limites, o soberano grotesco e os seus perigos parecem regressar, à direita e à esquerda, na forma do que usamos chamar de populismo. Talvez por esta via, se possa compreender melhor a atracção, aparentemente contemporânea, deste e do líder que lhe dá rosto.

Physicalist, Reductive Definitions of Concepts

Arvid Båve (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

29 November 2024, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: I have previously argued that Bealer’s argument against reductive functionalism does not affect a version of the latter which incorporates a functionalist (or conceptual role) view of contents. That response raises questions about the nature of contents, however. Reductive functionalists clearly cannot take them to be physical, on grounds of multiple realizability. It seems the only option is therefore for them to take contents to be “second-order” entities, i.e., merely token-identical with physical entities but, type-wise, definable in physical terms in some way analogous to the way ordinary mental states are. The big question is then how such definitions might read. To explain how, I first make some assumptions about the nature of contents (propositions and their constituents, which I take to be concepts). They have been defended and discussed in detail in other work. On the basis of these assumptions, reductive definitions of concepts (including propositions) are proposed. A potential problem arises but I argue that there are many satisfying responses to it.

What is it to Use a Word?

Indrek Reiland (University of Viena)

29 November 2024, 12:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: What is it, in producing a noise (mark, bodily movement), to use a word, sentence, or other expression? The most common suggestion is that this has something to do with the speaker’s articulatory intentions: the intention to repeat a previous use (Kaplan 1990) or simply the intention to use a word (Hawthorne & Lepore 2011). On some versions of the view, intention isn’t wholly constitutive; the product (noise etc.) also has to satisfy some conventional standards specifying the canonical articulation, within limits of toleration (Hawthorne & Lepore 2011). In this talk I will offer two ways of working out this idea in detail and defend one of them over the other. On the offered view, to use a word is to intend, in making a noise, to put a rule in force that requires the noise to match the canonical articulation. I will end by showing how this view enables us to make sense of LLM-based chatbots like ChatGPT as using words, even if they lack intentions and other mental states.

Constitutivism in Ethics and Epistemology

University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal

September 4–6, 2025

Constitutivism is the view that the normative standards for something are based in its nature. In ethics, the view is that the standards for human action are based in the nature of our action. In epistemology, the view is that the standards for belief are based in the nature of belief. This conference aims to investigate the promise and power for constitutivism in ethics and epistemology, individually and together. Both papers developing the constitutivist view and those critical of it are welcome.

In addition to the invited speakers, there are 4 open places for speakers. Please submit a long abstract of no more than 1000 words, anonymized for review, to constitutivism.lisboa.2025@gmail.com, no later than January 31st, 2025.

Accommodation and dinners for speakers will be covered by conference funds, but we cannot help with travel.

Papers presented at the conference will be considered for a special issue of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy, who are generously partially funding the conference. Deadline for submission of final drafts of the papers will be December 31st, 2025.

The conference is hosted at the Centre of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon.

Organizers (in alphabetical order):

Luca Ferrero (University of California, Riverside)

Jeremy David Fix (Keble College, University of Oxford)

David Horst (University of Lisbon)

Invited Speakers (in alphabetical order):

Kate Nolfi (University of Virginia)

Hille Paakkunainen (Syracuse University)

T.A. Pendlebury (University of Chicago)

TBA

Structural Essentialism as an Ontology of the Physical World

Tomasz Bigaj (University of Warsaw)

15 November 2024, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: In this talk I will introduce and discuss a structural version of essentialism with respect to the identification of individual physical objects. The adopted approach will be fundamentally generalistic (qualitativistic): the only way to identify a given individual is by reference to its place in a qualitative relational structure designated as “essential”. I will extensively discuss the problem of the multiplicity of alternative identifications of objects in possible scenarios (modality de re) using a broadly Lewisian concept of a counterpart function. Particular emphasis will be put on the possibility of the existence of qualitatively indistinguishable counterpart functions which differ merely haecceitistically, and on the threat such possibility poses to the position of generalism.

How to Start Changing Your Mind

Elise Woodard (King’s College London)

8 November 2024, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Is it ever rational to change your mind based on others changing theirs? This talk answers affirmatively. Changes of mind are doubly epistemically significant. First, they provide compelling reasons for further inquiry. Second, they offer second-order evidence about the existence or quality of first-order evidence. However, critical evaluation is crucial to distinguish meaningful changes from irrelevant ones. By outlining key questions about reported changes and discussing potential pitfalls, we can better identify which changes are epistemically significant. If correct, my proposal highlights mind-changing as a valuable yet overlooked source of information when exploring complex and contentious issues.

This work/event is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310/2020

Sjoerd van Tuinen

Erasmus University Rotterdam

Frogs in the Swamp: A Critique of Menno ter Braak and other Liberal Discourses on Ressentiment

5 November 2024, 17h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+0)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

As the post-2016 boom in the self-diagnostics of toxic liberalism shows, the concept of ressentiment is still one of today’s main ‘ideologemes’ (Jameson). It is an ideologeme because, while having a strong morally disqualifying power, it offers no way out of the political impasse it describes. Here I propose a critique of the 1937 essay by the Dutch writer Menno ter Braak, ‘National Socialism as a Doctrine of Rancor’ (translated and published for the first time in English in Theory, Culture & Society in 2019) as the basis for a wider critique of ‘pastoral’ discourses on ressentiment. First, I argue that ressentiment initially and primarily names a bourgeois phenomenon and problem, and as such is an articulation of what Rancière has aptly called a ‘hatred of democracy’: liberal democracy is held responsible for all social problems as it inherently summons forth a bad infinity of emancipatory struggle (‘fanaticism’, ‘utopism’) that must be disqualified. Second, I show how ressentiment functions as a label for bourgeois self-legitimation: in discerning ressentiment everywhere, a claim is made to good conscience on the basis of either a more rational or a more authentic relation to one’s own ressentiment. It is this esprit de sérieux that culminates in Ter Braak’s hypocritical statement that ‘one will have to begin, for example, by speaking less disparagingly about the “bunch of losers”, because one cannot overestimate the extent of the reservoir of latent rancour.’ Third, I will briefly touch upon ways in which other discourses on ressentiment – those of Nietzsche and of the diplomat as invoked by ter Braak at the outset of his essay – seek to overcome this seriousness and contrast these other discourses with a discourse that is at risk of deepening it – in particular that of Améry.

Gonçalo Marcelo

University of Coimbra

Hermeneutics as Critical Social Theory

29 October 2024, 17h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+0)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

In this talk I will briefly present the fertile intersection between the tradition of philosophical hermeneutics and the task of critical social theory, exploring the possibility of using hermeneutics as a method for social theory. Coming back to Paul Ricœur’s definition of “critical hermeneutics” (in “Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology”, 1973) as reconciling a reinterpretation of cultural heritages with an interest in emancipation, I will attempt to demonstrate how it is precisely in a hermeneutical vein that much of the most fertile and philosophically informed critical social theory of the last decades has been put forward, drawing on examples from Ricœur, Michael Walzer, Charles Taylor, Axel Honneth and Hartmut Rosa. Through its emphasis on traits such as: 1) the first-person perspective; 2) interpretation and the symbolic fabric of social imaginaries; and 3) its connection with selfhood through self-interpretation hermeneutics will thus appear, or so I will argue, as a way to both make sense of the social and push for meaningful social transformation.