Are functions properties?
José Mestre (St Andrews/Stirling and LanCog)

24 September 2021, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT+1) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Robert Trueman has recently argued for Fregean realism. Fregean realism is the view that properties are not objects, but functions. Properties exist (hence ‘realism’), but only as values of second or higher-order variables (hence ‘Fregean’). The view promises to dissolve a number of traditional problems in the metaphysics of properties. Contra Trueman, I argue that functions are not properties. Russell’s inept critique of Frege in the Principles of Mathematics should nonetheless help us to see why. It turns out that neither of the founding fathers held a view sometimes associated with both.

Free Attendance, but preregistration required: https://cful.letras.ulisboa.pt/lancog/registration/

We are happy to announce that, to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the journal Disputatio, Prof. Timothy Williamson (Oxford) will give a lecture on “Degrees of Freedom: Is Good Philosophy Bad Science?” on October 7th, at 16h00 Lisbon time (UTC/GMT+1h).

The lecture is hosted by the LanCog group, at the Centre of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon. The session will have a hybrid format. Everyone is welcome to attend, either in presence at Faculdade de Letras, Anfiteatro III, or online. Registration is required, either way. To reserve a seat in the room or to receive the zoom-link, please email c.filosofia@letras.ulisboa.pt

More information will soon be provided.

The editors of Disputatio,

Ricardo Santos & Elia Zardini

Concurso para atribuição de duas (02) Bolsas de Iniciação à Investigação

Bolsas de Iniciação à Investigação no âmbito do Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa (CFUL), com a referência UIDB/FIL/00310/2020, financiadas por fundos nacionais através da FCT/MCTES

Prazo de submissão: 13 de Julho, 2021

Concurso para atribuição de duas (02) Bolsas de Investigação 

Bolsas de Investigação para estudante de Mestrado, no âmbito do Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa (CFUL), com a referência UIDB/FIL/00310/2020, financiadas por fundos nacionais através da FCT/MCTES

Prazo de submissão: 13 de Julho, 2021

Mais informações aqui

Tender open for the award of 2 Scholarship for MA students (Bolsa de Iniciação à Investigação). This grant is funded by Portuguese national funds through Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, under Project Centre of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon (CFUL) ref. # UIDB/FIL/00310/2020

https://euraxess.ec.europa.eu/jobs/655976

Deadline: 13th July 2021

Tender open for the award of 2 Scholarship for MA students  (Bolsa de Investigação) Investigação). This grant is funded by Portuguese national funds through Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, under Project Centre of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon (CFUL) ref. # UIDB/FIL/00310/2020

https://euraxess.ec.europa.eu/jobs/656089

Deadline: 13th July 2021

Probing the Mind of God: Divine Beliefs and Credences
Elizabeth Jackson (Ryerson University) & Justin Mooney (University of Massachusetts Amherst)

25 June 2021, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT+1) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia) & on Zoom

Abstract: Although much has been written about divine beliefs (usually in the context of work on divine knowledge), virtually nothing has been said about divine credences. In this essay we comparatively assess four possible views on divine credences: (1) God has only beliefs, not credences; (2) God has both beliefs and credences; (3) God has only credences, not beliefs; and (4) God has neither credences nor beliefs, only knowledge. We weigh the costs and benefits of these four views. We’ll also point to ways this discussion might bear on the question of the nature of human beliefs and credences.

Free Attendance, but preregistration required: https://cful.letras.ulisboa.pt/lancog/registration/

The Right to An Explanation: A Social-Epistemic Approach
Emma Gordon & Adam Carter (University of Glasgow)

18 June 2021, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT+1) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia) & on Zoom

Abstract: The 2018 GDPR ensures data subjects with two kinds of epistemic rights — viz., a right to be forgotten and a right to an explanation. The former concerns one’s online digital trail, and the latter concerns the right one has to an explanation when one is subject to purely automated decisions that significantly affect them. Both of these newly framed rights are epistemically under-described in the GDPR and are the subject of legal debate. Our talk uses the resources of social epistemology to make progress in unpacking the second of these epistemic rights — viz., the right to an explanation — and we will defend a specific view of what is necessary to plausibly satisfy this right. Central to our positive view is that an adequate formulation of the right should be articulated not in terms of true belief, nor in terms of knowledge, but in terms of understanding.

Free Attendance, but preregistration required: https://cful.letras.ulisboa.pt/lancog/registration/

CFUL will soon open 2 calls for Fellowships:

• ​Iniciation to Research fellowship for MA Student (Bolsa de Iniciação à Investigação) – 2 positions available

Applicants must present proof of acceptance, enrolment or intention to enrol in the master’s Degre in Philosophy at FLUL and ​intend to carry out research activities, aiming at the beginning of their scientific training, integrated in one of the research groups of the Centre of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon.

• ​Research fellowships for MA student (Bolsas de Investigação – Mestrado) – 2 positions available

Applicants must present proof of acceptance, enrolment or intention to enrol in the master’s Degre in Philosophy at FLUL and intend to carry out research activities leading to the award of a Master’s Degree in one of the research groups of the Centre of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon.

Anticipated publication of calls: June 2021

Anticipated beginning date: September 2021

More information soon

Kinds, Objects, and Essences
David Papineau (King’s College London)

11 June 2021, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT+1) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia) & on Zoom

Abstract: Kripke’s Naming and Necessity reintroduced the traditional distinction between the essential and accidental properties of things. Many philosophers view this distinction with suspicion. I shall show, however, that the observable structure of natural kinds itself picks out certain kind properties as essential. I shall also consider whether a corresponding explanation can be given for the essentiality of origin and constitution for persisting objects.

Free Attendance, but preregistration required: https://cful.letras.ulisboa.pt/lancog/registration/

Disputatio has been ranked in Q1 by the latest Scimago Journal Ranking.

More info here: https://www.letras.ulisboa.pt/pt/noticias/1695-revista-disputatio-sobe-ao-q1-do-scimago-journal-ranking​

Faultlessness and multidimensionality
Diogo Santos (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

04 June 2021, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT+1) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia) & on Zoom

Abstract: Many have pointed out that non-evaluative vague predicates can give rise to faultless disagreements. This sort of faultlessness has to do with the gradable nature of vague predicates. This fact is usually not interpreted as undermining the claim that evaluative predicates (which are also gradable) give rise to faultlessness in a different way, because, when it comes to evaluatives, (i) intuitions of faultlessness persist even when the predicates are in a comparative form and (ii) only constructions of evaluative predicates under find are acceptable. While (i) justifies the claim that evaluative faultless disagreements are not due to gradability or vagueness, (ii) suggests that evaluative faultless disagreements occur due to experiencer/judge sensitivity. In this paper I argue that (i) and (ii) do not motivate the claim that evaluative and non-evaluative predicates generate faultlessness via different mechanisms. I argue that a reasonable explanation for faultlessness in the comparative form is due to multidimensionality and not specifically due to experiencer/judge sensitivity. I further argue that, if this is right, then evaluative and non-evaluative predicates give rise to faultless disagreements via similar linguistic mechanisms. I conclude with some remarks on the implications of the latter claim.

Free Attendance, but preregistration required: https://cful.letras.ulisboa.pt/lancog/registration/