Testimony and Expressive Behaviour

Matthew Parrott (University of Oxford)

20 October 2023, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: People often directly tell us about their thoughts, feelings, and desires. This common practice has led some philosophers to claim that testimony can be a fundamental way of knowing about others’ minds. In this talk, I shall argue that this claim is plausible only if we assume a certain conception of testimony, one which aligns it very closely with perception. By contrast, I shall argue that if we were to adopt a different conception of testimony, such as Richard Moran’s ‘assurance view’, then our acquiring testimonial knowledge of someone else’s mind would epistemically depend upon our having non-testimonial knowledge of their mental states. More specifically, I shall claim that this latter knowledge is based on a person’s expressive behaviours. Although one might naturally think this is either perceptual or inferential, in the final part of this talk, I develop an alternative framework for explaining how expressive behaviours ground our ordinary knowledge of others’ minds.

Pietro Gori

IFILNOVA

Questões da Metafísica e Prática de Ação em William James

17 October 2023, 16h00 (Lisbon Summer Time — GMT+1)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

A palestra focar-se-á na obra Alguns problemas de filosofia de William James, publicada póstuma em 1911 e em que James liga numa visão unitária as reflexões desenvolvidas após a publicação dos Principles of Psychology. Colocando o Homem no centro da interrogação filosófica enquanto único verdadeiro princípio de significância do referido da experiência, James delineia uma concepção segundo a qual as questões de metafísica só podem ser colocadas no contexto duma filosofia da ação, para poderem ser relevantes. Isto é, o nível da praxis é que doa sentido ao trabalho teórico, para James, pois qualquer compromisso epistêmico reflete-se, de facto, nas escolhas que são feitas no nosso dia-a-dia. Consequentemente, o trabalho crítico da filosofia – orientada pragmaticamente, como é óbvio – torna-se extremamente importante, pois é justamente esse trabalho que, tocando nos alicerces da nossa mundividência, fundamenta uma prática de ação e até pode orientar as nossas vidas.

Can AI Help Humeans? The Laws of Nature Debate in Light of Automated Scientific Discovery

Robert Michels (LanCog, Centre of Philosophy, University of Lisbon)

13 October 2023, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: According to the standard Humean theory of the laws of nature, Lewis’s Best System Analysis, laws of nature have this status at least partly as the result of an optimal trade-off between scientific values such as simplicity and descriptive strength. This idea has recently come under pressure, since — as authors like Roberts and Woodward have pointed out — there might, pace what Humeans like to suggest, be no such trade-off in the way laws of nature are identified in the natural sciences. Recent developments in the field of automated scientific discovery, in particular regarding symbolic regression, promise to provide Humeans with an answer to this challenge and, as we will argue, might even allow them to in turn put pressure on rival theories of the laws of nature: Symbolic regression gives us a method for (re-)discovering laws which closely matches the Humean picture of what makes a law of nature a law of nature and in particular crucially involves a trade-off between simplicity and descriptive strength. In this paper, we discuss whether Humeans can indeed rely on symbolic regression to bolster their theory of laws of nature. (This is joint work with Niels Linnemann [University of Geneva].)

On Being in Two Places at Once

Gabriel Uzquiano (University of South California)

6 October 2023, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: We will discuss the question of whether a material object may be in two places at once. More precisely, the question is whether one and the same material object may have more than one exact location. This is not all that plausible when it comes to spatial location. Many dismiss the hypothesis that a material object may have more than one exact spatial location at a given time as plainly incoherent. However, the stakes are higher when it comes to temporal location. For one way to interpret the thesis that material objects endure through time is as the hypothesis that material objects are exactly located at every time at which they exist. The purpose of this talk is to argue for the coherence of multilocation.

Nota de pesar: O Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa manifesta o seu profundo pesar perante a morte do Professor Tomas Calvo Martinez, membro associado do CFUL, e associa-se ao luto e à dor sentida pela família e amigos mais próximos.

Deprivation and Historical Closeness: A Reply

Diogo Santos (LanCog, Centre of Philosophy, University of Lisbon)

29 September 2023, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: The aim of the paper is to address three recent objections made by Yi (2022) against our strategy of using what we’ve called “Historical Condition” in our analysis of what it is required to be deprived of some value due to a late birth or early death in Miguel & Santos (2020). Yi claims that the Historical Condition (i) is unduly restrictive, for according to it many cases that deprivationists believe are deprivations due to early deaths aren’t; (ii) it makes a problematic prediction, since even our preferred example doesn’t appear to count as a deprivation of value due to a late birth and (iii) it’s theoretically untenable, since it implies a problematic principle. In the paper I show that these objections are misguided for they appear to rely on a misinterpretation of the Historical Condition and the dialectical role it plays in the discussion.

The LanCog group at the University of Lisbon and the Philosophy of Physics group at Warsaw University of Technology are happy to announce the launch of the online Lisbon-Warsaw reading group in the philosophy of physics.

The reading group will meet on Zoom monthly to discuss newly published papers or work-in-progress drafts on timely and relevant topics. The meetings will consist of an extended Q&A session with the authors. The goal is to provide the participants with an occasion to actively engage with state-of-the-art research in the philosophy and foundations of physics.

In the first meeting, Flavio del Santo (University of Geneva) will join us to discuss his paper “Potentiality realism: A realistic and indeterministic physics based on propensities.” The meeting will be on 11 October (17:00-19:00 CEST).

To participate and receive a copy of the paper, please register here.

You can address any query to Antonio Vassallo (antonio.vassallo@pw.edu.pl)

The organizers,

Andrea Oldofredi

Davide Romano

Antonio Vassallo

Sceptical, Complacent, Critical: How Should the Conceptual Engineer Engage with Concepts?

Delia Belleri (LanCog, Centre of Philosophy, University of Lisbon)

15 September 2023, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Conceptual engineering is a method dealing with the assessment and revision of conceptual representations. It operates on the assumption that concepts are often defective and in need of improvement. This assumption can, however, lead to a form of “representational scepticism”. Scepticism is, in turn, depicted by some theorists as if it was the only alternative to uncritical acceptance of our conceptual representations (“representational complacency”). In this talk, I argue that it is not. The conceptual engineer can hold a form of “critical conservatism” about concepts. Critical conservatism emphasizes context-sensitivity, sensitivity to a variety of epistemic and non-epistemic considerations, as well as the exercise of skills that help the thinker evaluate conceptual flaws that can and cannot be tolerated. As such, is it a more nuanced position than representational scepticism, which, however, is still compatible with the conceptual engineer’s expected special sensitivity to conceptual flaws (and ways to fix them).

Congratulations to Hugo Luzio, who has just won the Essay Prize of the Portuguese Philosophical Society!

More info: https://www.spfil.pt/premio_2022_resultado 

LanCog Day 2023

Argument Rodizio

30 June 2023, 15:30 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

The Argument Rodizio is a session in which each participant presents a short, desirably surprising, argument in 5-10 minutes, to be discussed in the following 5-10 minutes.

Abstract:

1. Robert Michels – “Why friends of the fuzzy theory of vagueness need not be worried about the objection from penumbral connections”
2. Bruno Jacinto – “On diagonalization”
3. Diogo Santos – “A Kripkean-like argument for evaluatives”
4. Gabriel Malagutti – “Defending the steadfast view through group epistemology”
5. Gabriel Lee – “An argument against the grandfather paradox”
6. Anabela Dias – “Change does not require dynamic time”
7. Luke Kersten – “If you wouldn’t eat Bobby, why are you eating Bobby?”