Author: cful

Argument Rodizio

27 June 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

The Argument Rodizio is a session in which each participant presents a short, desirably surprising, argument in 5-10 minutes, to be discussed in the following 5-10 minutes. The argument should be as clearly stated as possible and written on the board or displayed on the computer.
 

Here’s the lineup for this year’s session:

1. Jeremy Pober:”Either Mind-Brain Reduction is True, or Reduction Doesn’t Matter”
2. Quentin Ruyant: “We Need Quantum Physics to Understand Consciousness (and Conversely)”
3. Bruno Jacinto: “Numbers All the Way”
4. Arvid Båve: “A Simple Argument for S5”
5. Matheus Valente: “One Winner, Two Losers”
6. Carolina Flores: “The Paradox of Security”
7. Sanna Hirvonen: “The Hiddenness of Dishes, or Can We Ever Know What We Eat?”
8. Robert Michels: “Philosophy is Art”

From Spacetime in Physics to Space and Time in Human Experience

Thomas Sattig (University of Tübingen)

20 June 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: The development of the physics of space and time is a story of alienation. Today we face a deep gap between the way humans experience space and time and the way space and time are understood in contemporary physics. In the world of human experience, space and time are very different: space organizes things in a static way, while time organizes things in a dynamic way. In the world of contemporary physics, however, space and time are very similar: space and time form aspects of a single spacetime that organizes all things in a static way. It is a significant task of contemporary philosophy to bridge the gap between the physics of spacetime and the human experience of space and time. This talk will describe the gap and outline a path of reconciliation.

The Problem of Expressive Action in Philosophical Action Theory

Luca Bellini (LMU Munich)

6 June 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: There is a wide range of expressive actions we do. We kick cars that refuse to start, we kiss and talk to pictures, we wreck damage to the belongings of someone who cheated on us, and many others along the same lines. The problem of expressive action is the problem of explaining why we do such bizarre things. According to the received view, these are just actions out of emotion. Instead, I argue they are much more like make-believe games. Having to firstly clarify what makes expressive actions expressive – i.e. what, if anything, they express –, I draw on a hitherto overlooked analogy with both children’s games (e.g. duelling with make-believe swords) and rituals (e.g. burning in effigy) to claim that expressive actions, too, prescribe what is fictionally the case. While furthering our understanding of the role that imagination plays in justifying our conduct, this talk sheds light on the nature of rational agency and the problem of action – the problem of explaining what makes something an action in the first place. In doing so, I aim to show that our standard model of action explanation, encapsulated in the slogan “beliefs and desires cause actions”, has finally run its course.

Ana Miranda Mora

Utrecht University

Rage against Violence: An Affective Conceptualization of Feminist Resistance

3 June 2025, 17h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+1)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

This paper explores the philosophical significance of rage as an affective force in practices of political resistance, challenging prevailing accounts that dismiss or marginalize the role of emotions in politics. Drawing on contemporary affect theory and feminist political philosophy, the paper situates rage not merely as a reaction to injustice but as a constitutive element in forming political subjectivity and collective action. By distinguishing rage from ressentiment and violence, I argue that rage can embody a form of political praxis against structural violence. Rather than viewing affect as irrational or apolitical, this conceptualization frames rage as a generative and intelligible response to the lived experience of domination. The paper thus contributes to ongoing debates on the role of emotions in political agency, offering a re-evaluation of resistance that foregrounds affective life as an embodied and affective response to systemic injustice.

This activity is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310/2025, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
(https://doi.org/10.54499/UID/00310/2025)

Filipe Nobre Faria

NOVA University Lisbon

Liberalismo em Crise? Desafios Demográficos e o Declínio da Confiança Social

20 May 2025, 17h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+1)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

A comunicação examina dois desafios fundamentais enfrentados pelas sociedades liberais modernas: o declínio da natalidade e a erosão da confiança social. Estes problemas são analisados em função dos princípios centrais do liberalismo, como a liberdade individual e a igualdade. Embora estes princípios visem promover inovação e prosperidade, podem também enfraquecer os laços sociais e fomentar normas culturais que dificultam a coesão comunitária. No caso da natalidade, serão abordados fatores como a urbanização, a mudança de valores culturais e a valorização da autonomia individual, que reduzem o incentivo à formação de famílias e contribuem para o envelhecimento populacional. Quanto à confiança social, a comunicação explorará como a mobilidade populacional, a diversidade cultural e a fragmentação social enfraquecem os laços de confiança entre os cidadãos. Por fim, a apresentação analisará as causas destes problemas ao nível dos valores que sustentam as sociedades liberais, os fatores que os reforçam e os possíveis cenários para a evolução destas sociedades.

Grasping Models as Epistemic Tools: From Scientific Representation to Engineering Design

Michael Poznic (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology)

16 May 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Models can be used for different kinds of projects in scientific or engineering contexts. Representational uses haven been predominantly discussed in philosophy of science. Next to such uses, the perspective on models as designs is equally important. What is common to most if not all target-directed modeling projects is that grasping the models is a first step to use the respective models for understanding their target phenomena. This talk sketches an account of grasping models that is primarily tailored to approaches that focus on objectual understanding. A central element is the evaluation of the models in terms of their direction-of-fit to their targets. Whether other epistemic achievements can be spelled out with such an account of grasping is something that the proposal does not preclude. An open question is the relevance for exploratory or other uses of models that are not directed at representing or designing targets.

This activity is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310/2025, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
(https://doi.org/10.54499/UID/00310/2025)

Know-How, Action and Proximity

Adam Carter (University of Glasgow)

2 May 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Few theses at the intersection of action theory and epistemology have more adherents than the Simple View, according to which, if an agent φ-s intentionally, then she knows how to φ. That view struggles, however, to account for cases of intentional actions performed in novel circumstances, or when facing novel tasks. We propose to reject the Simple View and instead explain the relationship between intentional action and know-how by appeal to proximity, a relation encoding the extent to which the means for one task (ψ) can be co-opted to reliably succeed in another (φ). According to our Proximity View, if an agent φ-s intentionally, then she knows how to ψ, where ψ is sufficiently proximal to φ. Not only does the Proximity View explain intentional actions performed when facing novel circumstances or tasks, but it also illuminates both the process of learning by doing and the luck that action per se tolerates. (Joint work with Tim Kearl [Flagler College].)

This activity is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310/2025, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
(https://doi.org/10.54499/UID/00310/2025)

Ricardo Mendoza-Canales

Praxis-CFUL, University of Lisbon

What Is An Act of Resistance?

29 April 2025, 17h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+1)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

In his conference “What Is the Creative Act?,” Gilles Deleuze defines the work of art as counter-information, closely linking artistic creation with the act of resistance. Both, he argues, short-circuit established positions and hegemonic discourses propagated by systems of communication and information. In this paper, I argue that Gilbert Simondon operates as a kind of gravitational force in Deleuze’s formulation—an invisible yet active presence whose influence has remained largely unacknowledged. To unpack the enigma of Deleuze’s definition, I proceed in three steps. First, I offer a close reading of the conference to trace the train of thought that binds together the creative act, the work of art, and the act resistance as counter-information. Second, I turn to Giorgio Agamben’s commentary on the conference to examine his interpretation of resistance as inoperativity, focusing in particular on his brief but suggestive reference to Simondon. Finally, I return to Simondon’s cybernetics-inspired account of signification. For Simondon, resistance involves the significative inscription of action and emotion within the broader, reticular structure of the transindividual—a form of signification capable of resonating collectively across time. Any human act that expresses itself creatively through material concretion carries within it a potentiality capable of continuing to transform—through resonance—both the individual and their milieu. I conclude by suggesting that Deleuze’s definition of the work of art as an act of resistance implicitly relies on Simondon’s philosophical framework—particularly his account of ontogenesis as a fundamentally informational process.

Shai Tubali

University of Leeds

Will Humans Ever Become Conscious? Jiddu Krishnamurti’s Thought About AI as a Fresh Perspective on Current Debates

22 April 2025, 17h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+1)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

Discussions about AI often center on whether machines can think, understand, or even become conscious. However, in our fascination with AI’s capabilities, we overlook a more pressing question: What happens to human consciousness when machines replicate and outperform our cognitive functions? Drawing on Jiddu Krishnamurti’s radical insights, this talk shifts the debate from AI’s potential consciousness to the mechanization of human thought. The Indian philosopher and spiritual teacher saw AI not as an existential threat but as a mirror reflecting our own conditioned, repetitive mental patterns. If thinking is merely an accumulation of experience, memory, and knowledge, then AI’s rapid processing power forces us to ask: Is our intelligence truly intelligent, or is it merely mechanical? Krishnamurti’s challenge is not to fear AI’s progress but to recognize the urgency of cultivating a non-mechanical mind—one that transcends habitual thought and awakens a deeper intelligence. This talk explores how AI compels us to reconsider the nature of human awareness and whether we can move beyond programmed cognition to discover a consciousness that no machine could ever replicate. Instead of asking whether AI will ever become conscious, we must ask: Will we?