The Problem of Expressive Action in Philosophical Action Theory

Luca Bellini (LMU Munich)

6 June 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: There is a wide range of expressive actions we do. We kick cars that refuse to start, we kiss and talk to pictures, we wreck damage to the belongings of someone who cheated on us, and many others along the same lines. The problem of expressive action is the problem of explaining why we do such bizarre things. According to the received view, these are just actions out of emotion. Instead, I argue they are much more like make-believe games. Having to firstly clarify what makes expressive actions expressive – i.e. what, if anything, they express –, I draw on a hitherto overlooked analogy with both children’s games (e.g. duelling with make-believe swords) and rituals (e.g. burning in effigy) to claim that expressive actions, too, prescribe what is fictionally the case. While furthering our understanding of the role that imagination plays in justifying our conduct, this talk sheds light on the nature of rational agency and the problem of action – the problem of explaining what makes something an action in the first place. In doing so, I aim to show that our standard model of action explanation, encapsulated in the slogan “beliefs and desires cause actions”, has finally run its course.