Raimundo Henriques

LANCOG, University of Lisbon

Architectural Functionalism and Wittgenstein

15 March 2019, 16:00

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Intuitively, the austerity of Wittgenstein’s house (1926-28) can be explained by the naïve functionalist hypothesis (NFH), according to which, for all x, if x is a constituent of the house, then x has a specific function. This hypothesis allows for an interesting connection between the house and the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921), but the analogy breaks down for lack of support in architectural theory. Architectural functionalism will, hence, be considered in its own terms. Three clarifications will be provided, yielding the existence of (at least) eight different theses designated by ‘functionalism’. It will be argued that atomistic functionalism—the kind suggested by the NFH—is either dependent upon the highly problematic notion of ‘structure’ or must be made subsidiary to functionalism about whole buildings (rather than parts of them)—holistic functionalism. Two objections to holistic functionalism will be presented and answered. It will be argued that, with some qualifications, this sort of functionalism is a good candidate to explain Wittgenstein’s architectural endeavors.