Subjectless Certainty

Joshua Rowan Thorpe (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

4 April 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Descartes claims to find certainty in the cogito. Lichtenberg responds: ‘one should say it is thinking, just as one says, it is lightning. To say cogito is already too much as soon as one translates it as I am thinking.’ (Lichtenberg, K 76, translated in Gomes 2024.) Here we have the negative claim that ‘I am thinking’ is not certain. We also have the positive claim that ‘it is thinking’ is certain. The aim of this paper is to assess these claims. I first argue that the negative claim is correct. I also argue that there is something right about the positive claim. We can be certain (only) of the occurrence of something subjectless. However, we should characterise this something in a way that is neutral as to whether it counts as thinking.