Arvid Båve
I am a philosopher of language, working on the side as a metaphysician. My main interest lies in developing a dispositionalist-inferentialist account of concepts and Fregean, structured propositions. I began writing my dissertation and several papers on deflationism about truth, but also worked early on within pragmatics, both to deal with puzzles about names in attitude-contexts and to account for the interpretation of truth-ascriptions to non-propositions. There have been some intermittent excursions into meta-ethics (where I have presented an expressivist-friendly compositional semantics), metametaphysics (arguing against Sider on vagueness in quantifiers and presenting an improvement of Carnap’s and Thomassons’s versions of ontological deflationism), and, most recently, I have argued that logical validity ought to be identified with mere truth-conduciveness, i.e., as permitting exceptions (largely following, but also deviating on certain details from, Thomas Hofweber’s view).
Selected Publications
Pre-publications pdf’s of my works can be found here.)
(forthc.) “Correctness Conditions for Property Nominalists”, forthcoming in Synthese (published online, open access: https://link.springer.com/
(forthc.) “Features and Bugs in Schnieder’s Theory of Properties”, forthcoming in Erkenntnis (published online, open access: https://link.springer.com/
(forthc.) “Validity as Truth-Conduciveness”, forthcoming in Truth 20/20, edited by Drew Johnson and Adam Podlaskowski, Synthese Library book series, Springer.
(forthc.) “Easy Ontology Made Easier”, forthcoming in Deflationist Conceptions of Abstract Objects, edited by Xavier de Donato-Rodríguez, José L. Falguera, and Concha Martínez-Vidal, Synthese Library book series, Springer.
(forthc.) “Problems with Russellian Act-Type Theories”, forthcoming in Inquiry (special issue on act-type theories of propositions).
2020. “Semantic Dispositionalism without Exceptions”, Philosophical Studies 177 (6), pp. 1751–1771.
2019. “Acts And Alternative Analyses”, The Journal of Philosophy 116 (4), pp. 181–205.
2019. “Truth-Predicates Still Not Like Pronouns: A Reply to Salis”, Philosophia 47 (5), pp. 1421–1429.
2019. “Concept Designation”, American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (4), pp. 331–344.
2018. “Trivial Languages”, Acta Analytica 33 (1), pp. 1–17.
2017. “Self-Consciousness And Reductive Functionalism”, Philosophical Quarterly 67 (266), pp. 1–21.
2015. “Conceptual Role Semantics”, in Oxford Bibliographies Online: Philosophy, edited by Duncan Pritchard, Oxford University Press (updated 2020).
2015. “Charity And Error-Theoretic Nominalism”, Ratio 28 (3), pp. 256–270.
2015. “A Deflationist Error Theory of Properties”, Dialectica 69 (1), pp. 23–59.
2013. “Formulating Deflationism”, Synthèse 190 (15), pp. 3287–3305.
2013. “Compositional Semantics for Expressivists”, Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253), pp. 633–659.
2012. “On Using Inconsistent Expressions”, Erkenntnis 77 (1), pp. 133–148.
2011. “How to Precisify Quantifiers”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (1), pp. 103–111.
2010. “Deflationism And the Primary Truth Bearer”, Synthèse 173 (3), pp. 281–297.
2009. “Why Is a Truth-Predicate Like a Pronoun?”, Philosophical Studies 145 (2), pp. 297–310.
2009. “A Deflationary Theory of Reference”, Synthèse 169 (1), pp. 51–73.
2008. “A Pragmatic Defense of Millianism”, Philosophical Studies 138 (2), pp. 271–289.
2007. “Meaning as a Normative Concept: An interview with Allan Gibbard” (with Gunnar Björnsson), Theoria 78 (3), pp. 190–205.
2006. Deflationism: A Use-Theoretic Analysis of the Truth-Predicate, doctoral dissertation, Stockholm, Almqvist & Wiksell International.