Pedro Galvão

Praxis-CFUL, University of Lisbon

O que se segue da Regra de Ouro?

8 April 2025, 17h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+1)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Resumo

A Regra de Ouro, penso, é um princípio constitutivo do próprio ponto de vista moral. O que se segue dela, quando devidamente entendida? Ao abordar esta questão, começarei por propor um subjectivismo acerca de razões normativas, conectado com o Princípio do Espelho – um princípio epistémico que nos diz algo sobre o que é necessário para saber como é estar no lugar alguém. Argumentarei que, livre de restrições ditadas por outros padrões normativos, a Regra de Ouro conduz a uma forma de utilitarismo. Não conduz forçosamente, no entanto, a um utilitarismo dos actos.

Subjectless Certainty

Joshua Rowan Thorpe (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

4 April 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Descartes claims to find certainty in the cogito. Lichtenberg responds: ‘one should say it is thinking, just as one says, it is lightning. To say cogito is already too much as soon as one translates it as I am thinking.’ (Lichtenberg, K 76, translated in Gomes 2024.) Here we have the negative claim that ‘I am thinking’ is not certain. We also have the positive claim that ‘it is thinking’ is certain. The aim of this paper is to assess these claims. I first argue that the negative claim is correct. I also argue that there is something right about the positive claim. We can be certain (only) of the occurrence of something subjectless. However, we should characterise this something in a way that is neutral as to whether it counts as thinking.

Luciana Martinez

HPhil-CFUL

Originality and Taste: Kant on Genius

1 April 2025, 17h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+1)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

In this contribution I intend to develop an interpretation of the Kantian view of genius. From the earliest sources up to the Critique of Judgement, we can identify some variations in Kant’s thinking on this issue. In my view, the most significant variation that occurred during the pre-critical period, and which took place towards the end of the silent decade, is the specification of genius as a feature of art-making. At that time, furthermore, Kant began to mention Shakespeare as a genius in his Anthropology lectures, according to the available notes. I argue that, in relation to the figure of Shakespeare, there is another significant turn in Kant’s thinking about artistic creation. This change is expressed especially in the Critique of Judgement, where Kant omits Shakespeare’s name and, moreover, adds an explanation of the technical aspects of artistic creation. The specific aim of my paper is to justify the claim of this second turn and to explain what it consists of and why it occurs.

O Grupo de Investigação em Filosofia Prática do Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa (Praxis-CFUL) convida à manifestação de interesse de candidatos qualificados para a submissão de candidaturas a bolsas de doutoramento (até 4 anos) financiadas pela Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT), no âmbito do concurso de Bolsas de Doutoramento de 2025. A investigação deverá conduzir à obtenção do grau de Doutor em Filosofia na Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa (FLUL), tendo como instituição de acolhimento o Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa (CFUL).

Os projetos de investigação submetidos a concurso deverão estar alinhados com o âmbito e linhas de investigação atualmente desenvolvidas no grupo Praxis-CFUL [ver aqui]. Os candidatos serão sujeitos a uma triagem inicial, após a qual os selecionados deverão submeter a candidatura diretamente à FCT para obtenção de financiamento [anúncio da FCT]. O Praxis-CFUL prestará apoio no processo de candidatura.

Submissão de manifestações de interesse

Os interessados devem manifestar o seu interesse até 2 de abril de 2025, enviando a seguinte documentação, em inglês ou português:

E-mail: c.filosofia@letras.ulisboa.pt

Assunto: BID 2025 FCT_[Nome do Candidato]

Documentação necessária:

• • Resumo do plano de investigação (400 palavras)
  • Curriculum Vitae (formato PDF)
  • Nome do investigador integrado (Full Member) do Praxis-CFUL com quem gostaria de trabalhar como orientador [ver aqui]

A decisão sobre as candidaturas que o Praxis-CFUL irá apoiar será comunicada no prazo de três dias.

The Many-Objects Interpretation of Relativistic Change

Damiano Costa (Università della Svizzera Italiana)

28 March 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: I explore a new solution to Sattig’s problem of relativistic change. First, I provide a reassessment of the problem, according to which the numerically same object appears to have something as a part in one frame but not at another (i.e. its “corner slices”). Second, I present a new solution that takes this mereological difference seriously, thus entailing that the relevant ordinary object is frame-bound. Finally, while this solution is naturally coupled with four-dimensionalism, I explore the possibility of coupling it with three-dimensionalism in order to provide an answer to Gilmore’s location question.

This work/event is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310/2025, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
(https://doi.org/10.54499/UID/00310/2025)

Søren Mau’s Mute Compulsion: A Marxist Theory of the Economic Power of Capital (Verso, 2023) offers a compelling entry point for examining the exercise of power in our contemporary post-industrial world, moving beyond traditional frameworks of violence and ideology. Bringing together philosophical, economic, historical, and sociological perspectives, the book enriches both the reading experience and the discussions that follow.

This activity is open to researchers and students—whether affiliated with Praxis-CFUL or not—who are interested in a deep analysis of political economy. Sessions will take place on Thursdays (except for Friday, May 2nd) from 12h30 to 14h00 in Room Pedro Hispano (Department of Philosophy).

Working language: English

Co-organizers: Mariana Teixeira (mariana.o.teixeira [at] edu.ulisboa.pt) and Juana Polo López (juana.lopez [at] edu.ulisboa.pt)

More info here!

Program

Session 1 | 27 March

Introduction (pp. 1–19)

Session 2 | 3 April

Part I: 1. Conceptualising Power and Capital + 2. Power and Marxism (pp. 23–69)

Session 3 | 10 April

3. The Social Ontology of Economic Power + 4. The Human Corporeal Organisation (pp. 70–103)

Session 4 | 24 April

5. Metabolic Domination + Part II: 6. Transcendental Class Domination (pp. 104–151)

Session 5 | 2 May

7. Capital and Difference + 8. The Universal Power of Value (pp. 152–199)

Session 6 | 8 May

9. Value, Class, and Competition (pp. 200–221)

Session 7 | 22 May

Part III: 10. The Despotism of Subsumption (pp. 225–252)

Session 8 | 29 May

11. The Capitalist Reconfiguration of Nature + 12. Logistical Power (pp. 253–295)

Session 9 | 5 June

13. Surplus Populations and Crisis + Conclusion (pp. 296-326)

Rodrigo Castro Orellana

Complutense University of Madrid

Neoliberalismo y temporalidad

25 March 2025, 17h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+0)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

Los dispositivos neoliberales modelan la vida como una tarea infinita y acelerada para lograr un futuro que nunca llega o que siempre está en riesgo de desaparecer como consecuencia de las decisiones personales que se tomen. Así se configura un mundo sin exterioridad en donde el porvenir se retrasa sistemáticamente expandiendo el presente hasta convertirlo en una realidad absoluta. La construcción neoliberal del tiempo opera, entonces, como ausencia de novedad y disolución de la percepción del futuro, haciendo que la experiencia de la aceleración coexista con la experiencia de la repetición y de un presente cada vez más lento. Sin embargo, estos procesos resultan inseparables de dinámicas de construcción del espacio, de mecanismos de captura de la subjetividad que operan como atmosferas generadoras de incertidumbre. Nuestro objetivo en esta conferencia será reflexionar sobre estos procesos que caracterizan la temporalidad propia de las sociedades neoliberales.

This work/event is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310/2025, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
(https://doi.org/10.54499/UID/00310/2025)

Necessary in the Highest Degree — Whatever That Means

Cian Dorr (New York University)

21 March 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: There are many reasons to think that the ‘necessity’ in the title and topic of Naming and Necessity is intended to be understood as minimally inclusive, in the sense that whenever it is necessary (tout court) that something is the case, it is also necessary in every other way that it is the case. It is also clear that Kripke believes he has identified a powerful and general technique for arguing for claims of necessity, by appealing to the necessity of identity—a technique that can be applied not just to identities involving proper names, but to “theoretical identifications”, thereby establishing necessity tout court for many facts that Kripke’s immediate predecessors would have classified as merely nomically necessary. But many authors find the modal claims supported by this technique so implausible when ‘necessary’ is read as minimally inclusive that they reject the straightforward interpretation of Kripke as intending such a reading.

            In this talk, I will defend both the straightforward interpretation and the claim that his argumentative technique really does have the power and generality that Kripke attributes to it, for “theoretical identifications” as well as identities involving proper names. My initial focus will be on property identities like ‘The property of being made of gold is the property of being composed of atoms with 79 protons’, as well as related infinitival identities, like ‘To be made of gold is to be composed of atoms with 79 protons’. I will argue that such sentences are plausibly true and support attributions of necessity, even on a minimally inclusive reading of ‘necessary’. This requires rebutting views that either reject such identities, or reject the validity of substituting them into the necessity of identity, on the grounds that this implies false claims involving propositional attitudes such as ‘Everyone who knows that something is made of gold knows that it is composed of atoms with 79 protons’. In response to the proponents of such views, I will sketch a view of speech and attitude verbs as semantically ill-behaved (in a way somewhat reminiscent of quotation). Finally, I will argue that although Kripke’s paradigm “theoretical identifications”—sentences like ‘Water is H₂O’ and ‘Heat is molecular motion’—have readings on which they are not identities of any sort, they also admit readings as equivalent to corresponding infinitival identities (e.g., ‘To be water is to be H₂O’), and are thus equally capable of playing the relevant argumentative role.

This work/event is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310/2025, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
(https://doi.org/10.54499/UID/00310/2025)

The Guise of the Rewarding

Jeremy Pober (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

14 March 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Among empirically sensitive theories of desire, a prominent strain (Arpaly and Schroeder 2014; Schroeder 2004; Pober forthcoming) defines desire in terms of ‘reward’, where ‘reward’ is a technical term derived from its use in the psychology of decision-making. Per these Reward Theories, desires are realized in states of the reward learning system. This system records and constantly updates the reward value of various objects an agent/organism encounters, such that the more rewarding an object type, the more, ceteris paribus, the agent/organism is disposed to behave in ways that support obtaining it. Meanwhile, among other theories of desire, representational, or ‘guise of the good’ theories claim the defining characteristic of desires is that they represent their objects as good in some way. The most influential strain take the vehicle of the representation to be a quasi-perceptual state (Oddie 2005; Tenenbaum 2007). I propose that these two families of views can be fruitfully combined. The core idea is that ‘rewarding’ is understood as a sort of evaluation of goodness, in particular a subjective valuation (Levy and Glimcher 2012), and, in turn, the reward learning system is the vehicle of the evaluations that constitute desire. The resulting ‘Guise of the Rewarding’ view has, I shall argue, advantages over each of its constituents.

Aaron Schuster

Independent Researcher

Involuntary Insubordination and the Borderland between Loneliness and Community: Kafka and Psychoanalysis

18 March 2025, 17h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+0)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

In one of his diary entries, Franz Kafka writes of “the borderland between loneliness and community.” I will argue that this borderland is precisely the domain of psychoanalysis, and that Kafka’s line provides a compelling formulation of what is at stake in the psychoanalytic view of the human being. Humans are creatures of the border, caught between sheer isolation and worldlessness, on the one hand, and their belonging to the community and insertion into the socio-symbolic order, on the other. Symptoms should be conceived as “solutions” that a person (unconsciously) invents for problems that the wider community cannot solve. They save the person from total isolation—from helplessly drowning in their problems—while at the same disconnecting them from the codes and frameworks that organize shared social life. This talk will explore how this borderland forces a reconsideration of freedom. The opposition between autonomy and heteronomy is complicated by voluntary servitude, defined as a willing of unfreedom or an autonomous affirmation of heteronomy. In opposition to this, I will propose an “involuntary insubordination,” a heteronomous autonomy or “freedom from behind,” as the form of freedom theorized by psychoanalysis and portrayed in Kafka’s fiction. Therein lies the warped or ironical optimism of both Freud and Kafka, whose lesson ought to be renewed today: however much the human being willingly accedes to its domination, there insists a certain measure of “unwanted freedom” that testifies to the impossibility of the individual’s smooth integration into society. Symptoms are political insofar as they are not simply disorders (sicknesses) but articulate tensions, gaps, and fault lines in the social order, and express a strange and idiosyncratic freedom.

This activity is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310/2025, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
(https://doi.org/10.54499/UID/00310/2025)