Although FLUL’s doors are open again, whenever possible contact with CFUL’s secretariat should remain virtual.

For matters that need to be dealt with in person, the office will be open during the following hours:

Outside these hours, if need be, you can schedule an appointment by email or phone.

CONCURSO PARA A ATRIBUIÇÃO DE UMA BOLSA DE INVESTIGAÇÃO (BI) NO ÂMBITO DO PROJECTO “EMERGÊNCIA NAS CIÊNCIAS NATURAIS” (PTDC/FER-HFC/30665/2017), FINANCIADO POR FUNDOS NACIONAIS ATRAVÉS DA FCT, DA FACULDADE DE LETRAS DA UNIVERSIDADE DE LISBOA

Após a avaliação das candidaturas admitidas, o júri deliberou por maioria a seguinte seriação:

A Acta n.º 2 com a verificação e aplicação do método de selecção de candidatos e apresentação do projecto de lista de ordenação (*) pode ser consultada em https://www.letras.ulisboa.pt/pt/investigacao/bolsas-flul

(*) Da Proposta de Lista de Classificação Final Ordenada podem os(as) candidatos/as reclamar no prazo de 10 dias úteis contados a partir da sua publicação (11 a 24 de agosto 2020).

The Centre of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon is glad to announce the opening of an international selection contest for a postdoctoral position for the exercise of research activity in the scientific area of Philosophy under the employment contract in public functions for a fixed term for a period of three years, with a view to

(1 ) to develop with diligence all the activities necessary to carry out the scientific project provided for in paragraph d) of point 8.2 below and

(2) to participate actively and actively in the activities of the research group of the Center of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon in which it will become integrated, financed by national funds through FCT / MCTES.

The announcement as published in «Diário da República» can be found here.

Job description and further information at ERACAREERS, here

Bolsa de Emprego Público here

Application forms (in Portuguese and English) available here

The selection process is open until July 10th.

Informamos que o Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa (CFUL) abriu os seguintes concursos:

1. Concurso para atribuição de uma (01) Bolsa de Investigação (estudantes inscritos num doutoramento) no âmbito do projeto Emergência nas Ciências Naturais (PTDC/FER-HFC/30665/2017), financiado por fundos nacionais através da FCT. (Ref.ª BI_Emergencia nas Ciências Naturais (EITNS)_jun20)

The Iberoamerican Logic Seminar is a collective effort of the main Logic and Philosophy of Logic groups in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Spain, Mexico and Portugal.

You can find the abstracts and the schedule of the past and upcoming talks following this link:

http://ba-logic.com/seloi/#schedule

Wécio Pinheiro Araújo

Universidade Federal da Paraíba

A crítica do valor no livro terceiro d’O Capital: Marx e a atualidade do conceito de capital fictício

10 March 2020, 18:00 h

Room B6 – Library Building

Faculty of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract/Resumo

Esta apresentação consiste em uma leitura imanente de parte do livro terceiro d’O Capital, no
que diz respeito especificamente ao conceito de capital fictício (fiktives Kapital) e como este se
constitui a partir do sistema financeiro de crédito e daquilo que Marx denominou de negócios
fictícios (Scheingeschäften). Apresenta o conceito de virtualidade real para tentar contribuir na
compreensão do processo global de produção capitalista, e seu movimento fetichista estabelecido
como uma contradição entre conteúdo e forma na constituição das relações sociais sob a forma do
valor (Wertform) autonomizada. Relaciona a leitura imanente do livro terceiro com outros textos
marxianos e, de maneira sincrônica, problematiza como ficam as formulações de Marx no que tange
à contemporaneidade da era digital, com o propósito de demonstrar a atualidade da crítica marxiana
diante do tempo presente.

The Centre of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon (CFUL) welcomes expressions of interest from candidates who want to apply for a PhD grant (up to 4 years) funded by the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT) under the Individual Call for PhD Research Scholarships.

The FCT will accept applications until 28 April 2020 (17:00 Lisbon Time). Candidates will have to apply directly to FCT, but if they want to carry out their doctoral research at CFUL, they must first secure the support of one of the CFUL’s members who are also staff at the Department of Philosophy. The selected sponsor will have to act as the main supervisor for the candidate’s PhD research. The application, written in English or Portuguese, must include the following:

• • • Detailed research plan;
    • Curriculum vitae (on the CIÊNCIAVITAE platform);
    • Motivation letter;
    • Two recommendation letters.

CFUL is interested in hosting high-quality doctoral students in a wide range of areas in History of Philosophy, Analytic Philosophy and Practical Philosophy.

Interested candidates are invited to contact CFUL’s vice-director, Domingos Faria (at domingosfaria@campus.ul.pt), with a brief description of their intended research and current CV no later than March 22.

For more information about CFUL, please visit our website: http://cful.letras.ulisboa.pt/

More information about the call, including a link to the application portal, is available here: https://www.fct.pt/apoios/bolsas/concursos/individuais2020.phtml.en

–

Jennifer Lackey

Northwestern University

The Epistemology of Groups

21 February 2020, 16:00

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Groups are often said to believe, know, and do things. For instance, we talk about the Catholic Church believing that the Pope is infallible, the U.S. government knowing that greenhouse gases emitted by human activities are the primary driver of climate change, and Iran firing two missiles at a Ukranian passenger plane that crashed in Tehran. But how should we understand a group’s believing, knowing, or doing something? Two answers are generally given to this question. According to summativism, a group’s states or actions are understood simply in terms of the states or actions of individual members. In contrast, non-summativism holds that a group’s states or actions are over and above, or otherwise distinct from, those of its members. While I argue that neither view is, strictly speaking, correct, I also show that epistemic states and actions come apart in how much they depend on group members. In particular, there is a far tighter connection between what a group believes or knows and what its individual members believe or know than there is between what a group does and what its members do. This has important implications for our attributions of moral and legal responsibility to groups, such as corporations and institutions.

Paulo Faria

Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul

Content, Context, and Logical Form

19 February 2020, 11:00

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Judgments about the validity of at least some elementary inferential patterns (say modus ponens) are a priori if anything is. Yet a number of empirical conditions must in each case be satisfied in order for a particular inference to instantiate this or that inferential pattern. We may on occasion be entitled to presuppose that such conditions are satisfied (and the entitlement may even be a priori), yet only experience could tell us whether this was indeed the case. Hence a peculiar vulnerability of our capacity to recognize logical form: whenever content is (no matter to what extent) context-dependent, logical form is apt to evade recognition. That fact has rightly been perceived as a source of incompatibility between anti-individualism (or content externalism) and first person authority. I argue that, no matter whether anti-individualism is true, empirical assumptions will often underlie judgments about the logical form of inferences, thus making it the case that such judgments are defeasible in the face of contrary empirical evidence. I argue further that such assumptions should not be construed as tacit premises in enthymematic reasoning. I round off the discussion offering a characterization, which draws on Wittgenstein’s treatment of so-called ‘hinge propositions’, of the peculiar status of such empirical assumptions.