The HPhil (History of Philosophy) Research Group of the Centre of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon announces the 2023/24 edition of its permanent seminar on the history of philosophy, devoted to the presentation of conferences by renowned specialists while also creating opportunities to emerging scholars, aiming to promote advanced studies in groundbreaking debates and the permanent training of its academic community.

In this session of the seminar, Yury Arzhanov (University of Salzburg) will present a paper, entitled “Syriac Aristotle: between Alexandria and Baghdad” , (abstract below)

The session will take place on March 7, 2024 at 5 p.m., in the Room C201.J (Room Mattos Romão, Department of Philosophy). Admission is free.

Abstract

The Syriac reception of Aristotle is a rather underexplored episode in the history of philosophy. In spite of our insufficient knowledge of this phenomenon, there is little doubt that Syrian scholars have played a decisive role in the process of transmission of the late ancient philosophical tradition to the Arab world and thus, indirectly, to medieval Europe.  According to the apocryphal story reported by al-Farabi, it was Syrian scholars who became the heirs of the Alexandrian philosophical school after the decline of the latter in the 6th century and who brought this tradition first to Ḥarran and later to Baghdad.  Although this story, which has become known as “from Alexandria to Baghdad” complex of narrative, lacks historical credibility, it still points out to the close connection of the Syriac Aristotelians with Alexandria and their influence on the knowledge of Aristotle in the Arab world.

Combinatory Intensional Logic: Towards a Formal Theory of Meaning

Clarence Lewis Protin (LanCog, Centre of Philosophy, University of Lisbon)

1 March 2024, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: In this talk we give an outline of Combinatory Intensional Logic (CIL), a general framework for a formal theory of natural language meaning and reasoning, including intensional logic. What sets this approach apart is a syntax close to the logico-semantic mechanisms of natural language and being compatible with logical realism, the view that properties, relations and propositions are entities in their own right as well as furnishing the senses of linguistic expressions. CIL models, which formalize a realm of interweavings of senses, are not based on possible world semantics or set-theoretic function spaces. Truth-values and references of senses are extensions determined by states-of-affairs, an idea that goes back to the Stoics. CIL was initially inspired by Bealer’s project in Quality and Concept (1983). It was subsequently found that CIL is a good tool to address the shortcomings and gaps present in Bealer’s approach, in particular with regards to the soundness proofs and the problem of unifying intensional and modal logic. After giving an outline of CIL and the main soundness result, we discuss approaches to classical problems involving definitions, definite descriptions, proper names and other topics relevant to the formalization of natural language.

Existence and Powers in a Dynamic World

Jonathan Tallant (University of Nottingham)

23 February 2024, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: In this talk I look to achieve two ends. The first is to offer some clarificatory and defensive remarks about what we think is required of existence in a genuinely dynamic world. In doing so, I lean on work focused on Existence Presentism, connecting that to work on powers. I suggest that this combination of literatures gives us the wherewithal to differentiate a frozen world, from a dynamic world, and in the process respond to challenges that have been raised for presentism. The talk begins with consideration of the notion of dynamism, drawing out the idea of degrees of dynamism and offering an account of what it takes to make a view more (or less) dynamic. In the second part of the talk I explore how to generate dynamism given recent arguments from Lisa Leininger.

Carmen Madorrán Ayerra

Autonomous University of Madrid

Human Needs: Between Social Foundation and Ecological Ceiling

27 February 2024, 17h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+0)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

We are experiencing a multiple crisis that goes well beyond the economy. It also concerns finance, employment, health, society at large, ecology, energy and democracy. Rather than undergoing a specific crisis, we could say that the present is crisis. A defining feature of this moment is precisely that it is geared to change—once a certain threshold is crossed, business as usual is no longer possible. The social and ecological unsustainability of our present cannot be solved with small adjustments: almost everything will have to change. In this lecture, in order to think about the possibilities of a good life on Earth I would like to focus on the notion of human needs. It is key to assess what we really need in a context of social and ecological unsustainability. This is where the notion and approach of ecological humanities takes significance—with particular attention to the role of philosophy.

José Miranda Justo

Praxis-CFUL

A «Viúva Negra» da Filosofia: Haverá Lugar para Falar de um Conceito de Heterogeneidade em Filosofia?

20 February 2024, 17h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+0)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

Entendendo, em termos deleuzianos, a tarefa própria da filosofia como criação de conceitos,
mas pensando, por outro lado, os conceitos como entidades vivas e em devir constante
dentro de um plano de consistência, no qual se articulam com outros conceitos em
processos transformativos de colaboração/conflito, a minha apresentação visa perguntar se
a noção de heterogeneidade pode ser entendida como um verdadeiro conceito. Para
responder a esta questão darei alguns passos exploratórios. Primeiramente, começarei por
confrontar a heterogeneidade com duas outras figuras da diferença com as quais é
frequentemente confundida: a diversidade e a multiplicidade. Ver-se-á assim qual o modo
de agir próprio das heterogeneidades. Seguidamente, tratar-se-á de mostrar que, em
filosofia, a heterogeneidade, enquanto dispositivo heurístico, permite – em primeiro lugar –
exercer uma vasta quantidade de tarefas eminentemente críticas fundamentalmente
dirigidas contra as nefastas consequências da vocação profundamente «unitarista» da
tradição filosófica. De um modo geral, o tópico da heterogeneidade introduz uma crítica
frontal de todos os mecanismos organicamente redutores no seio das discursividades
filosóficas. De seguida, procurará evidenciar-se que a consideração de um espaço filosófico
para a heterogeneidade permite introduzir no trabalho filosófico dimensões de infinitude
potencial que apontam no sentido de um horizonte irremediavelmente mutante das
investigações nos diversos terrenos da filosofia prática e, ao mesmo tempo, dotado de uma
«abundância» previamente indeterminada. Esta abundância indeterminada abre igualmente
o caminho para uma compreensão da criação do radicalmente novo, designadamente – mas
não apenas – em arte. Finalmente, procurarei responder (provisoriamente) à difícil questão
de saber se a heterogeneidade tem uma ontologia própria ou, ao menos, uma inscrição
ontológica determinada/determinável. A tentativa de encarar este problema levar-me-á por
fim a defender que a heterogeneidade é e não é um conceito filosófico no sentido
introduzido no início da apresentação.

Delusions and the Predictive Mind

Federico Bongiorno (LanCog, Centre of Philosophy, University of Lisbon)

16 February 2024, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: A growing number of studies in both the scientific and the philosophical literature have drawn on a promising framework of brain function (predictive processing) to account for the formation of delusions. This framework has recently come under criticism for its putative inability to explain (i) why agents adopt implausible hypotheses like delusions over none at all, or over more plausible ones, and (ii) how exactly it is that delusions are thought of to begin with. In this talk I shall defend the framework’s explanatory power by way of showing how it can go a long way in helping disentangle these concerns.

Fabienne Brugère

University of Paris 8

From Care Ethics to Care Politics in the Neoliberal Moment?

6 February 2024, 17h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+0)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

Care can be defined in different ways. In English, it refers first and foremost to the banality of “take care”, which is equivalent to “au revoir” or “à bientôt” in French. From the point of view of the activities themselves, we can take care of a child both “to take care of” and “to care about”. We care for a child, we look after him, we are concerned about him. Care begins with interpersonal relationships that seem to combine dispositions and activities, through an anchoring in ordinary life. But, understood as an ethics and then a politics, it becomes institutional, confronted with national and global crises of care: for example, the crisis of the welfare state (Urban Ward, 2020) which empties collective solidarity of its meaning, and the crisis of migrant reception in Western countries, which turns precarious foreigners into unofficial care workers (Hamington, 2010; Morgan, 2020). How can we characterize this transition from banal interpersonal relations to an ethics and a politics at a time when capitalism has taken on the face of the “neoliberal” moment (Foucault, 1979)? How is it possible to combine an ethics and a politics, a care for the self and a care for others (Foucault, 1984; Benhabib, 2004)?

Beyond Juxtaposition: Mixed Inferences and Anti-Collapse

Carlos Benito-Monsalvo (LanCog, Centre of Philosophy, University of Lisbon)

15 December 2023, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Logical localism is a thesis within philosophy of logic according to which the correct application of logic is not topic-neutral, domain-neutral or irrespective of subject-matter. That is, logical localism is the thesis stating that different sets of logical principles, forming various alternative logic systems, are required in order to systematically account for correct reasoning in different domains. However, there is a very straightforward problem for anyone defending a localist thesis, a problem that follows from the fact that we reason across domains. This challenge is known as the problem of mixed inferences. The problem is, very roughly, the following: suppose that there are (at least) two components, within the premises or conclusion of an argument, belonging to different domains whose logics are L₁ and L₂, respectively. Then, which is the criterion of validity for the argument? The approach that I will take consists in trying to solve the problem of mixed inferences (more concretely, the version of the problem raised by Chase Wrenn) by making a finer translation of the arguments and using combination mechanisms as the criterion of validity. Among the alternative methods for combining logics, I will focus on the method of juxtaposition and show that there are some mixed inferences with the logical form of bridge principles that seem to be intuitively valid and that are not validated by juxtaposition, which constitutes an anti-collapse problem for juxtaposition. This limitation is what motivates the improvements on the methods that I propose, as a way of extending juxtaposition and allowing the emergence of the justified bridge principles in the combination mechanisms.

Paolo Furia

University of Turin

The Substantivity of Landscape. Learning from the Andes?

5 December 2023, 16h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+0)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

In this talk will offer some arguments with a view to overcoming an “aestheticized” conception of landscape, which has been prevalent particularly in European and, to some extent, North American philosophical aesthetics. The main feature of such conception is the reduction of the concept of landscape to a construct based on the isolation of the aesthetic properties of a given portion of space from other kinds of properties, such as geographical, political or ecological ones. I will devote the first part of the talk to reconstructing the main pillars of the “aestheticized” conception of landscape, relying on the influential essay by Joachim Ritter (1963) and the criteria identified by Augustin Berque for the identification of so-called “landscape cultures” (2008). In the second part I will focus on some characteristics of the Andean landscape, referring as much to a field experience lived as part of a visiting period at the Universidad Nacional de Huancavelica and the Universidad para el Desarrollo Andino, as to the philosophical, anthropological and geographical debate around the concept of landscape in the Andean “cosmovision.” In the third and last part I will show how the “aestheticized” conception of landscape is inadequate to understand the landscape culture of the Andean world, in which the aesthetic function, far from being denied, is nonetheless found integrated with other dimensions of spatial reality, such as geographical, ethico-political and ecological. Of such insertion of the aesthetic into the ethical and ecological sphere I will try to show, in conclusion, the intimate urgency in the time of the Anthropocene.