Doing things individually in virtue of doing them together
Thomas Byrne (MIT)

22 June 2022, 11:00 (Lisbon Time – WET) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Just as person A might, e.g., kill person B, so too might A1 and A2 kill B together: if A1 holds B down, while A2 strangles him, then A1 and A2 kill B together. In virtue of them killing B together, it’s also the case that A1 killed B and the case that A2 killed B. Similarly, if A1 lays half the bricks and A2 lays the other half, then A1 and A2 build a wall together; and, in virtue of them building the wall together, it’s also the case that A1 built the wall and A2 built the wall. Those are both examples of A1 and A2 each V-ing in virtue of them V-ing together—and other such examples, abound. I’m interested in the limits of that schema: when is the fact that A1 and A2 (and A3…) , e.g., built the wall together sufficient for it to be the case that A1 built the wall, and when isn’t it?

Three Projects of Social Epistemology
John Greco (Georgetown University)

17 June 2022, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Epistemology engages in at least three projects: The Project of Explanation (What is knowledge?; How is knowledge possible for beings like us?), The Project of Critique (How do we fail epistemically, when we do?), and the Project of Amelioration (How can we improve our epistemic position?). Traditional epistemology has pursued these projects from an individualist perspective — the “we” in our various questions has been understood as “we as individuals.” Social epistemology pursues epistemology’s same projects, but now from a social perspective — the “we” in our various questions can now be understood as a “collective we.” The paper explores social epistemology’s three projects through the lens of social epistemic dependence, or our dependence on other persons and on broader features of the social environment. From this perspective, it is argued, seemingly disparate literatures in social epistemology are in fact fruitfully related.

The room has a limited number of seats. Pre-registration is required at <info@lancog.com> until a day before the event.

The notion of Primitive Ontology (PO) has recently received a great deal of attention in the quantum foundations literature. The PO is the fundamental ontology posited by a certain theory, what is out there in the world which makes the predictions of theory true. Can we make sense of the idea that the PO is indeterminate? And if we do, would this idea be explanatory useful in some way, or would it simply lead us too far from the very reasons we had to posit a PO in the first place? As I will show in this paper, these issues become of crucial importance when it comes to understanding what the ontology of the Mass Density approach to GRW (GRWm) ultimately looks like. Proponents of the PO are never explicit in claiming that the determinacy is a requirement for the notion, yet arguably this is entailed by one of the criteria for a suitable PO, namely its being always well defined in every point in 3D space. I will argue that this requirement is however not satisfied in GRWm. The conclusion I will draw is that the notion of indeterminate PO should be taken seriously, for it is suggested by one the major interpretations of quantum mechanics.

On Wednesday 1 June, Paula Reichert (Ludwig Maximilian University) will give a talk titled “Shape Dynamics and the Big Bang” (abstract below).

The series of online seminars is organized in the context of the activities of the LanCog Research Group at the Centre of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon, and will focus on the foundations of quantum and spacetime physics.

The meeting will be online on Zoom (17:00-19:00 CEST). If you have not registered yet, you can do so here.

You can address any question to Andrea Oldofredi (aoldofredi@letras.ulisboa.pt).

ABSTRACT:
Shape dynamics is a relational theory of gravity in the spirit of Leibniz and Mach. It was developed as an alternative to Newton’s theory with the aim to eliminate absolute space and time from the description. Today’s shape dynamics serves as an alternative to Einstein’s theory of general relativity, where it tracks 4d diffeomorphism invariance for 3d spatial conformal invariance plus relational time. In the first part of this talk, I will introduce the conceptual and mathematical ideas behind shape dynamics and present the way it has developed historically. In the second part of the talk, I will focus on the way it tackles the Big Bang which, in Einstein’s theory, arises as a singularity of zero scale. This does not necessarily affect the shape (that is, conformal or angular) degrees of freedom which might be evolved through the singularity thus providing an eternal one-past-two-futures evolution of our universe.

A perceptual sense of the future
Frédérique de Vignemont (Institut Jean-Nicod)

03 June 2022, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Car drivers and sportspeople are extremely good at predicting if and when an object may impact them, what is known in the literature as time-to-collision. This anticipatory dimension is revealed in the relatively primitive sense of impending collision that we can sometimes experience, typically just a few seconds before being hit, something like “This is going to crash into me!”. For instance, many times in movies (especially in 3D), video games, and in virtual reality, we have the strong impression – though mistaken – that something is going to hit us even though we know that nothing can reach us, seated in our safe living room. How, then, to best characterize this anticipatory form of awareness? Is there a sense in which one can be said to have a perceptual sense of the close future? Here, I shall reply positively, taking as a starting point the phenomenon of amodal completion. It indeed reveals that one can be perceptually aware of more than the visual inputs that one receives. As with most of the literature on perception, the phenomenon of completion has been studied mainly in static scenes, for shape and object, but I shall argue that a similar phenomenon can occur for dynamic events such as motion. I shall then propose that thanks to amodal completion, one is aware of the whole event of the looming of the object towards one’s body, including its possible end that has not happened yet. As a consequence, our perceptual experience is not only about the present, the looming motion unfolding under our eyes. It is also about the future.

The room has a limited number of seats. Pre-registration is required at <info@lancog.com> until a day before the event.

The Agential Stance
Lisa Bortolotti (University of Birmingham)

31 May 2022, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: When young people seek support from mental healthcare practitioners, the encounters may affect the young people’s sense of self, and in particular undermine their sense of agency. For this study, an interdisciplinary team of academics and young people collaboratively analysed video-recorded encounters between young people and mental healthcare practitioners in emergency services. We identified five communication techniques that practitioners can use to avoid undermining the young person’s sense of agency in the clinical encounter. We conceptualise the use of those techniques as the adoption of an agential stance towards the young person. The agential stance consists of: (1) validating the young person’s experiences; (2) legitimising the young person’s choice to seek help; (3) refraining from objectifying the young person; (4) affirming the young person’s capacity to contribute to positive change; (5) involving the young person in the decision-making process.

The room has a limited number of seats. Pre-registration is required at <info@lancog.com> until a day before the event.

Are delusions pathological beliefs?
Lisa Bortolotti (University of Birmingham)

27 May 2022, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: For many philosophers, delusions are pathological beliefs, due to their being both harmful and caused by a dysfunction. In this talk, I put pressure on the account of delusions as harmful malfunctioning beliefs (Miyazono 2019). No delusions might be able to satisfy the malfunction criterion and some delusions might fail to satisfy the harmfulness criterion when such criteria are interpreted narrowly as criteria for pathological beliefs. In the end, I raise a general concern about attributing pathological status to single beliefs out of context, and gesture towards the idea of pathology as a failure of agency that can only be identified by considering the person as a whole.

The room has a limited number of seats. Pre-registration is required at <info@lancog.com> until a day before the event.

On Wednesday 25 May Vera Matarese (University of Bern) will give a talk titled “Quantum Fictionalism”.

The series of online seminars is organized in the context of the activities of the LanCog Research Group at the Centre of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon, and will focus on the foundations of quantum and spacetime physics.

The meeting will be online on Zoom (17:00-19:00 CEST). If you have not registered yet, you can do so here.

You can address any question to Andrea Oldofredi (aoldofredi@letras.ulisboa.pt).

ABSTRACT:
Quantum mechanics is arguably our most successful physical theory, and yet the debate on its ontology is still far from offering a definite answer. On the one hand, representationalists claim that quantum states directly represent quantum beables, on the other hand, anti-representationalists interpret quantum states only prescriptively or instrumentally. Much effort was put into refining and evaluating these two unsatisfactory camps, rather than offering new alternatives. This paper proposes, articulates, and defends a fictionalist view which accounts for the nature of quantum objects, and which combines elements of the representationalist and of the anti-representationalist camps. The core idea is that quantum objects do not physically exist, since they exist qua fictional entities, and yet, they have an explanatory power that underwrites the kind of explanations normally given by representationalists.

Frames affecting central debates within analytic philosophy of language
Zsófia Zvolenszky (Institute of Philosophy, Eötvös Univesity)

20 May 2022, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: The cognitive linguist George Lakoff focuses on frames affecting political discourse: when tax cuts were labelled “tax relief”, a frame was invoked according to which taxes are an undesirable, negative burden, an affliction; and relief from taxes is a desirable, positive outcome; and whoever relieves that burden is a hero. When the label “tax relief” — as though it was neutral — was adopted across the American political spectrum, it created a tilted playing field that worked against proponents of tax increases (who favored increasing funding for education, healthcare, social services, or championed an additional tax for the wealthy). To level the playing field, and prevent being cast as anti-heroes, proponents of tax increases need to reframe the debate, by, among other things, switching to neutral labels, advises Lakoff. After all, most often without us knowing it, framing shapes affects how we see the world, by invoking memories, feelings, emotions, associations, opinions, preferences, images, thereby affecting, in turn, our decision-making.
Meanwhile, framing is plausibly present, while unrecognized, in discourse of all sorts, including academic discourse across disciplines, among them philosophy, and, within that, philosophy of language. Meanwhile, frames aren’t much discussed within analytic philosophy of language, which has, historically, focused on truth conditions, propositional content, information expressed by linguistic utterances. Notice that this very approach invokes a kind of frame about what is and isn’t the subject matter of linguistic theorizing! I will provide case studies about how unreflected-upon aspects of framing within philosophy of language have been hindering debates: preventing, delaying for long, needed reframing in debates ranging from presuppositions, proper names to fictional discourse, to slurs and pejoratives. These case studies will illustrate ways in which unreflected-upon frames have had lasting influence, remaining operative and delimiting within philosophical debates. These, in turn, presents counterexamples to a proposal of Elisabeth Camp’s (“Perspectives and Frames in Pursuit of Ultimate Understanding” 2019) who holds that a chosen frame’s role diminishes, disappears in later stages of inquiry; as details are understood, theories transcend initially introduced frames as being oversimplified.

The room has a limited number of seats. Pre-registration is required at <info@lancog.com> until a day before the event.

Robustness and evolution in climate models: some notes
Luís Estevinha Rodrigues (Federal University of Ceará)

23 May 2022, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: The IPCC Sixth Assessment Report on climate change (late 2021, early 2022) submits an even grimmer picture of the current anthropogenic global warming than its predecessor. It is unclear, however, at least to most of us, non-experts, if the models used to shape the Sixth report were improved. On closer inspection, the patterns and thresholds at work in this evaluation don’t seem to have changed much, if anything, comparatively to the previous one. It seems that climatologists and other scientists enrolled in the process of writing the Sixth report decided to just improve empirical data and keep the same models. I think the lack of substantial model improvement might be a worry for the robustness (Levins 1966) of future climate reports. In this talk, I submit some notes to illustrate the lack of climate model’s evolution. I do not wish to draw any skeptical anti-global warming stance from these notes. Nevertheless, I believe this can be fuel to support pessimistic inductions about theories of climate change and global warming.

The room has a limited number of seats. Pre-registration is required at <info@lancog.com> until a day before the event.