Relativism and Retraction
Dan Zeman (University of Warsaw)

08 April 2022, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT+1) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: The argument from retraction (the speech act of “taking back” a previous speech act) has been one of the favorite arguments used by relativists about a variety of natural language expressions (predicates of taste, epistemic modals, moral and aesthetic claims etc.) in support of their view. The main consideration offered is that relativism can, while rival views cannot, account for this phenomenon. For some of the relativists leading the charge, retraction is, in fact, mandatory: a norm of retraction makes it obligatory for an agent to retract a previously unretracted assertion whenever what has been asserted is shown to be currently false. This norm, it is contended, is part and parcel of our behavior as rational agents and distinguishes relativism from other views on the market.
Recently, several considerations – both from the armchair and based on empirical studies – have been offered to undercut the support retraction has been taken to provide relativism. In this paper, I engage with both types of considerations. In relation to the former, I urge relativists to give up the claim that retraction is mandatory, but show that even if they do so there is still a phenomenon to be explained and that the view remains better situated in accounting for it that its rivals. I also show how what seem like problematic cases of retraction can be handled if one embraces a (principled) flexible form of relativism. In relation to the latter, I survey some of the current experimental literature supporting the idea that the folk don’t retract claims involving the target expressions (or that they don’t do in the way envisaged by the relativist) and argue that the experimenters have not paid attention to all the possible perspectives the participants in the experiments could take when responding to the queries. This leads to a way to interpret these results that makes them compatible with flexible relativism, and hence inconclusive when it comes to a more sophisticated version of the view.

The room has a limited number of seats. Pre-registration is required at <info@lancog.com> until a day before the event. Note that this is an in-person event and everyone should wear a mask.

The cognitive life of maps
Roberto Casati (Institut Jean Nicod)

01 April 2022, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT+1) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: The cognitive life of maps is distinct from the life of cognitive maps. But then, there are two senses of ‘the cognitive life of maps’; in the wake of theories of extended cognition, one may claim that maps have a cognitive life of their own. Here we follow a different path, the study of the cognitive engagement with maps. In a sense, maps are temporarily alive for those who design, draw and use them. How can they? What kind of life is it?
I first introduce the main claims about what maps are and how they work – their specific syntax, their peculiar semantics, and their pragmatics. Then I delve into the mechanics of maps as they are used for navigation, the differences and similarities between maps and pictures, and between maps and models. Then, I test the skeletal theory of maps on an enlargement: can we find maplike structures in other cognitive artifacts, and how are these structures specifically maplike? I’ll make the case that clock faces, music notation, writing, organizers (such as calendars), and numeral series are or contain essentially map structures. This enlargement strategy makes a case for the centrality of maps. Missing an understanding of maps, we cannot understand how a number of other crucial cognitive artifacts work.

The room has a limited number of seats. Pre-registration is required at <info@lancog.com> until a day before the event. Note that this is an in-person event and everyone should wear a mask.

Modals and Copulas in Aristotle
Simona Aimar (UCL)

25 March 2022, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: The following sentences

(1) The Queen is necessarily British.

(2) The Queen is possibly Italian.

are modal claims. They contain modals, words that make a sentence express modalities like possibilities and necessities. Claim (1) contains the modal adverb ‘necessarily’ – a necessity modal. Claim (2) contains the modal ‘possibly’ – a possibility modal. This talk asks: How does Aristotle account for modals?
So far, scholars assume that my question is a non-starter. In their view, Aristotle does not account for modals: no such account is present within his reconstruction of modal logic (in the Prior Analytics), or in his account of language (in De Interpretatione). Even the claim that Aristotle has a systematic semantics for natural language is regarded as suspicious.
My talk debunks the suspicion that Aristotle was no semanticist. I reconstruct his theory of modals and show that it stems from a systematic account of language. Just like many contemporary linguists, Aristotle assumes that language is compositional and assertive claims have truth-conditions. Unlike contemporary authors, however, he analyses predications of the form ‘a is F’ as have a tripartite structure: a copula (‘is’) takes scope over two terms (‘a’ and ‘F’). Given this picture, he argues that modals are copula-modifiers, where his modifiers can be modelled as expressing a function that takes an item of a given linguistic type and issues a different item of the same linguistic type. Specifically, modals take a (non-modal) copula as an input and yield a modal copula as their output. I reconstruct his argument for the claim that modals are non-copula modifiers and how it relies on semantic intuitions about negations (a technique also used in contemporary linguistics). Finally, I show how Aristotle’s account guarantees the insight that modals and quantifiers work in a parallel way and accounts for differences in scope. I conclude by raising the question of why (for all we know) Aristotle did not think about higher-order modal claims. Is there room for these in his semantics at all?.

The room has a limited number of seats. Pre-registration is required at <info@lancog.com> until a day before the event. Note that this is an in-person event and everyone should wear a mask.

Barcan Formulas and the Limits of Contingency
Adam Russell Murray (University of Manitoba)

18 March 2022, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Our simplest and best understood theory of first-order metaphysical modality represents individual existence and non-existence as strictly non-contingent. However, these necessitist implications of the simple theory appear to be undermined by robust intuition to the effect that existence and non-existence are largely contingent matters. In this talk, I show how resources familiar from two-dimensional semantics support a novel interpretation of the necessitist’s theoretical commitments. In contrast with existing positions in these debates, the necessitist theory I develop preserves both the simple theory and a non-revisionist metaphysics of individuals, while also explaining much of the intuitive allure of the alternative, contingentist picture.

The room has a limited number of seats. Pre-registration is required at <info@lancog.com> until a day before the event. Note that this is an in-person event and everyone should wear a mask.

An Internal Realist Interpretation of the Primitive Ontology Programme
Andrea Oldofredi (University of Lisbon, LanCog)

11 March 2022, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: New interesting developments and extensions of the Primitive Ontology (PO) programme have been recently proposed in order to defeat Laudan’s Pessimistic Meta-Induction on the one hand, and to provide a theory-independent fundamental atomistic ontology of the world on the other. Against this background, the aim of the talk is twofold: I will firstly discuss the main assumptions behind those arguments according to which the PO programme can overcome Laudan’s induction and offer a scale-invariant ontology, showing possible counterexamples to these claims. Secondly, I will argue that the realism introduced by the PO approach can be consistently interpreted as internal realism, i.e., I will show that the internal realist view can faithfully represent the ontological commitment (and its limits) implied by the acceptance of a given PO theory, capturing also the pluralist stance of this programme as originally conceived by David Bohm and John S. Bell.

The room has a limited number of seats. Pre-registration is required at <info@lancog.com> until a day before the event. Note that this is an in-person event and everyone should wear a mask.

From Metaphilosophy to Semantics
Jonathan Berg (University of Haifa)

4 March 2022, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: I aim to show how a commonly accepted metaphilosophical assumption has important consequences for a hotly debated issue in the philosophy of language. The seemingly innocuous metaphilosophical claim is this: The Principle of Philosophical Thought Experiments – Philosophical theories must be compatible (ceteris paribus) with the intuitions elicited by philosophical thought experiments. The controversial semantic claim it supports is this: Strict Semantics – Every disambiguated sentence has a determinate semantic content, relative to an assignment of contents to its indexical expressions. After considering each of these claims individually, I shall suggest how the first provides evidence for the second.

The room has a limited number of seats. Pre-registration is required at <info@lancog.com> until a day before the event. Note that this is an in-person event and everyone should wear a mask.

Consequences do not trickle down
Diogo Santos (University of Lisbon, LanCog)

25 February 2022, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: I have argued that consequentialists should endorse what I call the No Trickle Down Principle (NTD), which is a restriction on what counts as consequence of an isolated action. In its stronger version NTD states that for any sequence of actions S initiated by an isolated action A, consequences of S are not consequences of A. The adoption of the principle allows for consequentialism to, at the very least, improve its standing when confronted with the classical epistemic objection. Notwithstanding the reasons for NTD, there are seeming unpalatable consequences from endorsing it. I focus on addressing two of these: (i) without further classification, the principle wrongly predicts that some isolated actions do not generate the consequences they actually generate; (ii) the principle entails that permissible isolated actions can initiate impermissible sequences and that impermissible isolated actions can initiate permissible sequences. I address (i) by proposing a distinction between isolated actions and sequence of actions which borrows ideas from the literature on collective action and I assuage the second concern by showing that there is an interesting parallel between NTD and compelling non-reductive approaches to team agency and collective responsibility.

The room has a limited number of seats. Pre-registration is required at <info@lancog.com> until a day before the event. Note that this is an in-person event and everyone should wear a mask.

Blameworthy Belief Without Control. The Case of Fake News Consumption
Tommaso Piazza (University of Pavia, LanCog)

18 February 2022, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Does it ever make sense to contend that one should have believed otherwise than one does? If so, under what conditions can one be so criticized, in particular from an epistemic point of view? First aim of this talk is to propose an answer to these questions by defending an account of doxastic blameworthiness which is consistent with B. Williams’ claim that one cannot believe at will. Second aim of this talk is to apply this account to a concrete case, and to argue, against B. Millar (2019), that at least ordinary social media users can sometimes be criticized for consuming fake news.

The room has a limited number of seats. Pre-registration is required at <info@lancog.com> until a day before the event. Note that this is an in-person event and everyone should wear a mask.

The LanCog Research Group, University of Lisbon, welcomes expressions of interest from suitably qualified candidates interested in applying for fix-term (up to 6 years) research positions funded by the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT) in the following conditions:

The FCT is the Portuguese national funding agency for academic research and development. In 2022, the FCT will fund the hiring of 400 researchers, holders of PhDs at various stages of career, to carry out their activity in research centres throughout Portugal. The selected researchers are hired by the host institution through a framework-contract between the host and the FCT, which guarantees the funding. In the previous edition, 21 positions have gone for philosophers, and LanCog has a very strong record of supporting successful candidates.

The FCT will accept applications between 3 February and 3 March 2022 (17:00 Lisbon time). Candidates will apply online directly to the FCT, but their application must be supported by a host institution.

The application, written in English, must include the following:

–    A research plan, including a description of the main activities to be undertaken, the expected results, as well as an indication of how the research project fits with (at least one of) the goals set out in the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development;

–    A brief description of previous academic and scientific experience, highlighting the main activities and results obtained in the last 5 years;

–    Curriculum vitae;

–    Motivation letter, identifying up to two main contributions of the candidate in the last 5 years and the expected main contributions for the next years;

–    A brief description of the conditions provided by the host institution and of how the proposed research plan fits into the overall strategy of the research centre.

Applications will be assessed by an international panel, according to the following criteria:

–    The candidate’s scientific experience, with emphasis on the last 5 years (60%);

–    The proposed research plan (40%).

Each applicant can submit only one application for one of the following types of positions:

Junior researcher: PhD holders with up to 5 years of post-doctoral experience in the scientific area of application – 2.134,73€ gross wage (c. 1.400-1.500€ net wage for 14 months/year, depending on several specific factors related to the family composition and income);

Assistant researcher: PhD holders with more than 5 and up to 12 years of post-doctoral research, with relevant experience in the scientific area of application and limited scientific independence* – 3.201,39€ gross wage (c. 1.800-1.950€ net wage 14 months/year, depending on several specific factors related to the family composition and income);

Principal researcher: PhD holders with more than 12 years of post-doctoral research, with relevant experience in the scientific area of application and demonstrating scientific independence* for the last 3 years – 3.611,83€ gross wage (c. 2.100-2300€ net wage 14 months/year, depending on several specific factors related to the family composition and income);

Coordinating researcher: PhD holders with more than 12 years of post-doctoral research, holders of an academic title of ‘Agregado’ (or ‘Habilitation’) awarded in Portugal, with relevant experience and demonstrating scientific independence and recognized leadership in the scientific area of application – 4.678,96€ gross wage (c. 2.350-2500€ net wage 14 months/year, depending on several specific factors related to the family composition and income).

*Research independence is demonstrated through scientific competence, originality and international recognition, by experience in doctoral or post-doctoral supervision, or by the competitive research funds attracted at national or international level.

It is the applicant’s responsibility to choose the contract level best suited to their career stage.

It is mandatory to upload the doctoral diploma. In order to comply with the Portuguese legislation concerning the recognition of foreign qualifications, all the doctoral degrees granted by foreign higher education institutions should be duly recognized**. Applicants are advised to visit the website of the Direção-Geral do Ensino Superior (DGES) for further information:https://www.dges.gov.pt/en/pagina/degree-and-diploma-recognition. If possible, the recognition certificate (or proof that one has been requested) should be uploaded together with the diploma. Applications will be considered even if the recognition certificate is not available. However, the recognition must be obtained before signing the contract.

** Cf. Decree-Law No. 66/2018, of 16 August; Portaria No. 33/2019, of 25 January; Portaria No. 43/2020, of 14 February.

More information about the call, including a link to the application portal, is available here.

Interested candidates are invited to contact Dr. Domingos Faria (at domingosfaria@edu.ulisboa.pt), with a brief description of their intended research and current CV no later than 2 February.

Unconscious Mental Imagery Requires Unconscious Mental Qualities
Sam Coleman (University of Hertfordshire)

17 December 2021, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: It is widely agreed that conscious mental imagery features phenomenology, or conscious mental qualities, as I will say. Moreover, conscious imagery is accorded an important role in various sorts of action guidance. Unconscious mental imagery is also widely posited, and is held to share an important neurophysiological basis with conscious imagery (especially in the visual case I focus on). And unconscious imagery is accorded a very similar role in action guidance. But it is almost universally denied that unconscious imagery features mental qualities. I argue that unless we ascribe unconscious mental qualities to unconscious imagery, the behavioural contribution of conscious mental imagery is threatened, indeed, that conscious imagery is rendered epiphenomenal.

The room has a limited number of seats. Pre-registration is required at <info@lancog.com> until a day before the event. Note that this is an in-person event and everyone should wear a mask.