Are delusions pathological beliefs?
Lisa Bortolotti (University of Birmingham)
27 May 2022, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)
Abstract: For many philosophers, delusions are pathological beliefs, due to their being both harmful and caused by a dysfunction. In this talk, I put pressure on the account of delusions as harmful malfunctioning beliefs (Miyazono 2019). No delusions might be able to satisfy the malfunction criterion and some delusions might fail to satisfy the harmfulness criterion when such criteria are interpreted narrowly as criteria for pathological beliefs. In the end, I raise a general concern about attributing pathological status to single beliefs out of context, and gesture towards the idea of pathology as a failure of agency that can only be identified by considering the person as a whole.
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