Becoming Something Else

Elia Zardini (Complutense University of Madrid)

8 May 2026, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: This paper discusses a specific puzzle of change concerning what is the case in the result of change, as when e.g. a lump of clay becomes a statue of a boy. In the result of that change, it would seem that the lump has become the statue, and so that the lump is the statue. However, in what sense can a lump be a statue? After critically reviewing some natural and traditional views on the issue that weaken the sense in which, in the result of the change, the lump is the statue, I develop my own proposal, which vindicates that idea in its strongest sense, while respecting the platitude that nothing can be both a lump and a statue. The proposal starts with the idea that, in the result of the change, the state of affairs that x is the lump is unstable in that it determines the state of affairs that x is the statue. This metaphysical circumstance is then observed to give rise to the logical circumstance that contraction fails. By representing natural-language predications in terms of formal-language restricted universal quantifications, it is subsequently shown that the resulting system provides a theory on which indeed the lump is the statue while nothing can be both a lump and a statue. I close by drawing out some consequences that the proposal has for the notions of predication, existence and identity, and by indicating how it can be extended to deal with several other puzzles in the vicinity.

Concept Learning As Opening a Mental File

Nico Orlandi (University of California, Santa Cruz)

24 April 2026, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Standard accounts of concepts in philosophy and in cognitive psychology hold that we learn a target concept by learning the concepts that constitute it. If this is the only model of learning we have, then only concepts that are complex or structured can be learned. I argue for an alternative to this framework by presenting a proposal for how we learn some atomic concepts. I show that we can learn a concept through descriptions without thinking that the concepts employed in the descriptions constitute the target concept. I develop this idea by using the notion of a mental file and by employing a general externalist explanatory strategy. In the view I develop, some concepts are akin to files in that the descriptions associated with a given concept are means of properly individuating the extension of the concept, and they are also means of connecting a concept to others, but they do not constitute the concept and can be revised or abandoned. I show how this discussion connects to issues in conceptual engineering.

This event is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310/2025, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa (https://doi.org/10.54499/UIDB/00310/2025)

24-25 September 2026

School of Arts and Humanities

University of Lisbon

Speakers:

Katherine Puddifoot (University of Durham)

Jennifer Lackey (Northwestern University)

Lauren Leydon-Hardy (Amherst College)

Carolina Flores (LanCog)

Giada Fratantonio (LanCog)

Eleonora Volta (NOVA)

Rebecca Buxton (University of Bristol)

Organizer: Giada Fratantonio (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

This event is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310/2025, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa (https://doi.org/10.54499/UIDB/00310/2025)

22-24 June 2026

Room A201 Anfiteatro III

School of Arts and Humanities

University of Lisbon

The 2026 LanCog Summer Metaphysics Workshop will be an intensive, three day workshop on metaphysics, and will feature leading scholars from around the world. Attendance is open to all who are interested, but anyone who is planning to attend should register for the workshop through the link below, so that the organizers can make sure there is enough coffee.

The 2026 LSMW will be an in-person event. There will, unfortunately, be no way to attend remotely.

Speakers:

Omobola Badejo (Obafemi Awolowo University)

Brigitte Everett (University of Sydney)

Akiko Frischhut (Sophia University)

Anna Giustina (University of Valencia)

Elton Junior Martins Marques (Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte)

Pedro Merlussi (Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro)

Ricardo Santos (University of Lisbon)

Francisca Silva (University of St. Andrews)

David Yates (University of Lisbon)

TBD

Commentators:

Christabel Cane (University College London)

Jordi Castillo (University of Massachusetts Amherst)

Sharon Casu (University of Fribourg)

Gabriel Malagutti (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

Giorgio Lando (University of L’Aquila)

Min Ohn (University of Massachusetts Amherst)

Jeremy Pober (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

Mafalda Vale (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

Elle Walton (University of Massachusetts Amherst)

TBD

Register for the 2026 LanCog Summer Metaphysics Workshop

Co-Organizers: Ned Markosian (UMass Amherst, LanCog)

                            Hugo Luzio (LanCog, CFUL)

For any information or further queries about the workshop, please contact the organizers at the following email addresses: markosian@umass.edu or hugo.luzio@.edu.ulisboa.pt.

This event is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310/2025, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa (https://doi.org/10.54499/UIDB/00310/2025)

The Neglect of Micro-observers

Ana-Maria Cretu (University of Bristol)

17 April 2026, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: This paper offers an analysis of the epistemic roles of micro-observers, a type of scientific worker hired at the Bristol Nuclear Research Group 1939-1959 to undertake data-handling operations. This paper places micro-observers in their socio-historical and experimental context, whilst examining how they were incorporated into historical and scientific records, and historical-philosophical analyses. We show that extant analyses, not only do not recover their epistemic roles, but further mystify their roles in ways not warranted by experimental practices and processes that can be recovered from the archival data. This examination lends itself to broader philosophical reflections about the epistemology of experiment.

This event is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310/2025, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa (https://doi.org/10.54499/UIDB/00310/2025)

School of Arts and Humanities, University of Lisbon

April 28 2026 16h-18h – Sala A201 Anfiteatro III

April 29 2026 16h-18h – Sala B112.D (near the Library of the Faculty of Arts and Humanities)

Against Intelligence

Tim Crane, Central European University

ABSTRACT

These lectures aim to answer a simple question arising from Alan Turing’s famous 1950 paper, ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’, and to draw some conclusions from this answer. Turing’s paper is often taken as one of the foundational texts of the discipline of Artificial Intelligence (AI), whose birth is usually dated from 1956. But what does Turing actually say about intelligence? Almost nothing: the word ‘intelligence’ occurs only twice in the paper, and ‘intelligent’ only once. So what was Turing really talking about, if not intelligence? And what has this got to do with today’s AI?

LECTURE 1: WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE?

Many recent theoretical discussions of AI have centred around the possibility of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) — an artificial version of the kind of open-ended, general-purpose intelligence that humans are supposed to have. But what exactly is this? AI researchers have offered a number of definitions of AGI: on some of these definitions, AGI has already been achieved, and on others it is still far beyond our reach. What is going on? I argue that the concept of intelligence does not demarcate a cognitive capacity, but rather serves primarily as an evaluative concept, used to classify exercises of cognitive capacities. I show how this way of thinking resolves a number of puzzles about AGI and so-called ’Superintelligence’.

LECTURE 2: WHAT CAN COMPUTERS DO?

Lecture 1 gave the solution to the Turing puzzle: Turing was not really interested in intelligence, but in whether computers can think, and how we could tell. This solution is not just of historical or scholarly interest, but has significant consequences for today’s AI. It makes sense for AI researchers to evaluate the performance of machines as intelligent or not, but it does not make sense for them to investigate the nature of intelligence as such — in the relevant sense, there is no such thing. The question rather should be, what kinds of cognitive tasks can computers perform? This question is both more tractable that the question about intelligence, and more open-ended. I will argue that the discussion of AGI in Lecture 1 gives us the clue how to proceed: every computation involves a specific task, and where there is no task there can be no computation. I apply these ideas to recent speculations about AI consciousness.

The lectures will close with some proposals about how the philosophy of AI can help us with the practical problems that contemporary AI has created.

This event is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310/2025, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa (https://doi.org/10.54499/UIDB/00310/2025)

The Naturefactual: Metaphysical and Normative Aspects

Patrik Engisch (University of Geneva)

10 April 2026, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: We routinely describe artifacts as “natural”—e.g., natural food, remedies, gardens, or wine—but it is philosophically puzzling what this could amount to. Can something be both genuinely natural and genuinely artifactual? And if so, what is at stake in describing artifacts in this way? In this talk, taking natural wine as a paradigm, I argue that we can make sense of so-called “natural artifacts” by introducing the notion of naturefactual artifacts, i.e., artifacts that function as vehicles for the appreciation of nature in the form of natural properties. After clarifying the notions of natural property and artifactuality involved in the notion of naturefactuality, I turn to the normative question of whether naturefactual objects ought to be appreciated in a distinctive way.

This event is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310/2025, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa (https://doi.org/10.54499/UIDB/00310/2025)

Scientific Understanding as Dependency-Grasping

Robert Michels (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

27 March 2026, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Dellsén has recently proposed an account of scientific understanding that extends the well-established dependence-grasping account of objectual understanding. This proposal is attractive because it bridges traditional epistemology and the epistemology of science, combining a central philosophical insight about understanding with sensitivity to the scientific context. In this paper, we raise two objections that challenge the adequacy of this account for scientific practice. First, it fails to ensure that the dependencies one must grasp in order to achieve scientific understanding are appropriately related to scientific models. Second, it overlooks the fact that scientific understanding often involves an awareness of the epistemic limitations of such models. We then propose modifications to Dellsén’s account that address both concerns while preserving its central insights. As a result, we obtain a genuine dependency-grasping account of scientific understanding. (Joint work with Niels Linnemann, University of Geneva.)

This event is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310/2025, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa (https://doi.org/10.54499/UIDB/00310/2025)

Patterns of Truth: Location and Modality

Gabriel Uzquiano (University of Southern California)

20 March 2026, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: When is a proposition true at a location, whether a time, a place or a world? And what is it for a proposition to be true exactly at a given location, as opposed to being true all over or entirely within that location? We develop a unified modal framework for these distinctions designed to capture a family of locational relations for propositions, but we find that exact location is resistant to the treatment. We argue that to be true exactly at a location is not just a matter of what pattern of truth across locations a proposition may exemplify.

This event is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310/2025, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa (https://doi.org/10.54499/UIDB/00310/2025)