Argument Rodizio
LANCOG DAY 2022

01 July 2022, 15:00
Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract:
1. Federico Lauria: Desires are not motivational states: The argument of satisfaction conditions.
2. João C. Miranda: Desires are question-sensitive.
3. Gabriel Malagutti: Greco’s dilemma for testimonial knowledge.
4. Domingos Faria: An argument against individualistic accounts of group belief.
5. Diogo Santos: On whether one ought to do what one ought to do.
6. Hugo Luzio: On Human Enhancement at Cryo-Revival.
7. Delia Belleri: Conservatism about concepts: testing the argument.
8. José Mestre: Frege’s objection to Neo-Fregeanism.

The Argument Rodizio is a seminar in which each participant presents a short, desirably surprising, thought provoking and philosophically provocative argument in 5-10 minutes, to be exhaustively (and exhaustingly) discussed in the following 5-10 minutes.

On Wednesday 22 June Hans Christian Öttinger (ETH Zürich) will give a talk titled “A robust approach to quantum field theory: A give-and-take situation for philosophy” (abstract below).

The series of online seminars is organized in the context of the activities of the LanCog Research Group at the Centre of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon, and will focus on the foundations of quantum and spacetime physics.

The meeting will be online on Zoom (17:00-19:00 CEST). If you have not registered yet, you can do so here.

You can address any question to Andrea Oldofredi (aoldofredi@letras.ulisboa.pt).

ABSTRACT:

I present an intuitive and robust mathematical representation of fundamental particle physics based on a novel approach to quantum field theory, which is guided by four carefully motivated metaphysical postulates. More concretely, I explore a dissipative approach to quantum field theory [1] and propose a possible explanation of the Planck scale in quantum gravity. Offering a radically new perspective on this topic, my presentation focuses on the conceptual foundations of quantum field theory and ontological questions [2]. It also suggests a new stochastic simulation technique in quantum field theory which is complementary to existing ones.

[1] H.C. Öttinger, A Philosophical Approach to Quantum Field Theory (Cambridge University Press, 2017).
[2] A. Oldofredi and H.C.Öttinger, The dissipative approach to quantum field theory: conceptual
foundations and ontological implications, Euro Jnl Phil Sci 11, 18 (2021).

Desires don’t have desire-like direction of fit
Bence Nanay (University of Antwerp)

24 June 2022, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Desires are widely, in fact, universally, taken to have, well, desire-like direction of fit. The aim of this paper is to argue that – at least on one important understanding of what direction of fit is – this is not so. I give a two-step argument: The goal state of desires is represented by mental imagery and if the goal state of desires is represented by mental imagery, then desires don’t have world-to-mind (or prescriptive) intrinsic direction of fit. In other words, desires don’t have desire-like direction of fit.

The room has a limited number of seats. Pre-registration is required at <info@lancog.com> until a day before the event.

Monism and Qualitativism
Trevor Teitel (University of Toronto​)

24 June 2022, 11:00 (Lisbon Time – WET) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: This talk is about the relation between two venerable yet revisionary metaphysical doctrines. The monist doctrine says, roughly, that reality is in some sense one. The qualitativist doctrine says, roughly, that reality contains no facts about particular objects, but is rather purely qualitative. In this talk I’ll distinguish various versions of each doctrine, and in each case argue that champions of the monistic doctrine should instead embrace an analogous qualitativist doctrine. I conclude that monists should be qualitativists.

Doing things individually in virtue of doing them together
Thomas Byrne (MIT)

22 June 2022, 11:00 (Lisbon Time – WET) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Just as person A might, e.g., kill person B, so too might A1 and A2 kill B together: if A1 holds B down, while A2 strangles him, then A1 and A2 kill B together. In virtue of them killing B together, it’s also the case that A1 killed B and the case that A2 killed B. Similarly, if A1 lays half the bricks and A2 lays the other half, then A1 and A2 build a wall together; and, in virtue of them building the wall together, it’s also the case that A1 built the wall and A2 built the wall. Those are both examples of A1 and A2 each V-ing in virtue of them V-ing together—and other such examples, abound. I’m interested in the limits of that schema: when is the fact that A1 and A2 (and A3…) , e.g., built the wall together sufficient for it to be the case that A1 built the wall, and when isn’t it?

Three Projects of Social Epistemology
John Greco (Georgetown University)

17 June 2022, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Epistemology engages in at least three projects: The Project of Explanation (What is knowledge?; How is knowledge possible for beings like us?), The Project of Critique (How do we fail epistemically, when we do?), and the Project of Amelioration (How can we improve our epistemic position?). Traditional epistemology has pursued these projects from an individualist perspective — the “we” in our various questions has been understood as “we as individuals.” Social epistemology pursues epistemology’s same projects, but now from a social perspective — the “we” in our various questions can now be understood as a “collective we.” The paper explores social epistemology’s three projects through the lens of social epistemic dependence, or our dependence on other persons and on broader features of the social environment. From this perspective, it is argued, seemingly disparate literatures in social epistemology are in fact fruitfully related.

The room has a limited number of seats. Pre-registration is required at <info@lancog.com> until a day before the event.

The notion of Primitive Ontology (PO) has recently received a great deal of attention in the quantum foundations literature. The PO is the fundamental ontology posited by a certain theory, what is out there in the world which makes the predictions of theory true. Can we make sense of the idea that the PO is indeterminate? And if we do, would this idea be explanatory useful in some way, or would it simply lead us too far from the very reasons we had to posit a PO in the first place? As I will show in this paper, these issues become of crucial importance when it comes to understanding what the ontology of the Mass Density approach to GRW (GRWm) ultimately looks like. Proponents of the PO are never explicit in claiming that the determinacy is a requirement for the notion, yet arguably this is entailed by one of the criteria for a suitable PO, namely its being always well defined in every point in 3D space. I will argue that this requirement is however not satisfied in GRWm. The conclusion I will draw is that the notion of indeterminate PO should be taken seriously, for it is suggested by one the major interpretations of quantum mechanics.

On Wednesday 1 June, Paula Reichert (Ludwig Maximilian University) will give a talk titled “Shape Dynamics and the Big Bang” (abstract below).

The series of online seminars is organized in the context of the activities of the LanCog Research Group at the Centre of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon, and will focus on the foundations of quantum and spacetime physics.

The meeting will be online on Zoom (17:00-19:00 CEST). If you have not registered yet, you can do so here.

You can address any question to Andrea Oldofredi (aoldofredi@letras.ulisboa.pt).

ABSTRACT:
Shape dynamics is a relational theory of gravity in the spirit of Leibniz and Mach. It was developed as an alternative to Newton’s theory with the aim to eliminate absolute space and time from the description. Today’s shape dynamics serves as an alternative to Einstein’s theory of general relativity, where it tracks 4d diffeomorphism invariance for 3d spatial conformal invariance plus relational time. In the first part of this talk, I will introduce the conceptual and mathematical ideas behind shape dynamics and present the way it has developed historically. In the second part of the talk, I will focus on the way it tackles the Big Bang which, in Einstein’s theory, arises as a singularity of zero scale. This does not necessarily affect the shape (that is, conformal or angular) degrees of freedom which might be evolved through the singularity thus providing an eternal one-past-two-futures evolution of our universe.

A perceptual sense of the future
Frédérique de Vignemont (Institut Jean-Nicod)

03 June 2022, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Car drivers and sportspeople are extremely good at predicting if and when an object may impact them, what is known in the literature as time-to-collision. This anticipatory dimension is revealed in the relatively primitive sense of impending collision that we can sometimes experience, typically just a few seconds before being hit, something like “This is going to crash into me!”. For instance, many times in movies (especially in 3D), video games, and in virtual reality, we have the strong impression – though mistaken – that something is going to hit us even though we know that nothing can reach us, seated in our safe living room. How, then, to best characterize this anticipatory form of awareness? Is there a sense in which one can be said to have a perceptual sense of the close future? Here, I shall reply positively, taking as a starting point the phenomenon of amodal completion. It indeed reveals that one can be perceptually aware of more than the visual inputs that one receives. As with most of the literature on perception, the phenomenon of completion has been studied mainly in static scenes, for shape and object, but I shall argue that a similar phenomenon can occur for dynamic events such as motion. I shall then propose that thanks to amodal completion, one is aware of the whole event of the looming of the object towards one’s body, including its possible end that has not happened yet. As a consequence, our perceptual experience is not only about the present, the looming motion unfolding under our eyes. It is also about the future.

The room has a limited number of seats. Pre-registration is required at <info@lancog.com> until a day before the event.

The Agential Stance
Lisa Bortolotti (University of Birmingham)

31 May 2022, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: When young people seek support from mental healthcare practitioners, the encounters may affect the young people’s sense of self, and in particular undermine their sense of agency. For this study, an interdisciplinary team of academics and young people collaboratively analysed video-recorded encounters between young people and mental healthcare practitioners in emergency services. We identified five communication techniques that practitioners can use to avoid undermining the young person’s sense of agency in the clinical encounter. We conceptualise the use of those techniques as the adoption of an agential stance towards the young person. The agential stance consists of: (1) validating the young person’s experiences; (2) legitimising the young person’s choice to seek help; (3) refraining from objectifying the young person; (4) affirming the young person’s capacity to contribute to positive change; (5) involving the young person in the decision-making process.

The room has a limited number of seats. Pre-registration is required at <info@lancog.com> until a day before the event.