Seminar Series in Analytic Philosophy 2025-26: Session 6

A Puzzle Concerning Reason and the Emotions

Ram Neta (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill)

31 October 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Each of the following theses enjoys some support in recent philosophical discussions: (1) emotions, like judgments and resolutions, can be exercises of rational agency, and held in light of various considerations that seem to the agent to support them; (2) emotions, unlike judgments or resolutions, cannot constitute our drawing the conclusion of some reasoning; (3) any exercise of rational agency, held in light of considerations that seem to support it, can constitute our drawing the conclusion of reasoning from those same considerations. Proponents of thesis (1) (e.g., Olivia Bailey, Rachel Achs) have sought to argue against thesis (2). Proponents of thesis (2) (e.g., Conner Schultz, Nate Sharadin) have sought to argue against thesis (1). In this paper, I defend both theses (1) and (2), and give an explanation of why thesis (3) is false. This explanation will shed light on how inference differs from other forms of reasons-responsiveness.