HPhil Seminar: May 8, 2025
The HPhil (History of Philosophy) Research Group of the Centre of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon announces the 2024/25 edition of its permanent seminar on the history of philosophy, devoted to the presentation of conferences by renowned specialists while also creating opportunities to emerging scholars, aiming to promote advanced studies in groundbreaking debates and the permanent training of its academic community.
In this session of the seminar, Élodie Djordjevic (Université Paris II) will present a paper, entitled “How should we think about the state (and public law)? Elements of Hegel’s conception of the state and his critique of Kant”. (abstract below)
The session will take place on May 8, 2025 at 5 p.m., in the Room C201.J (Room Mattos Romão, Department of Philosophy). Admission is free.
Abstract
The starting point for my paper is Hegel’s rejection of Kant’s conception of law, which can be summarised by saying that, in Hegel’s view, Kant fails to conceive of anything other than private law and is therefore incapable of truly conceiving of the state. Indeed, as I will attempt to show, through the concept of free will and its development, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right also elaborates a distinction between private law and public law, and this distinction is, for Hegel, fundamental to understanding what the state really is and not confusing it with civil society. Thus, the objective that ‘drives’ my paper is also, in reality, to better define the Hegelian concept of the state, to show its originality and fruitfulness, based on the conception of the social on the one hand and public law on the other, which are linked to it. However, if the section entitled ‘Abstract Law’* in Grundlinien clearly sets out the grammar and principles of private law based on its core concept of personality (and with it the concepts of property and contract), what are, first of all, the ‘principles’ or grammar of public law? Where are they set out? How, then, can we conceive of a ‘different’ type of law from that which complies with the principles of formal law set out in the section on ‘Abstract Law’? How do we arrive at such a thing (where does it come from?) that is so decisive in avoiding the pitfall of confusion between civil society and the state, confusion and reduction that are harmful in every respect, particularly because, in Hegel’s view, this is where the political sphere proper lies? A perhaps more direct and controversial question follows from these first two groups of questions: can the state be understood (strictly) in legal terms, or at least without significantly ‘distorting’ the type of law whose grammar is given in the section on ‘abstract law’? In a word: what is this thing called the state? It is to these questions that I would like to offer some answers here, beginning by examining how and in what way civil society can provide a setting for the full development of the principles of private law (I), then examining the reasons why Hegel rejects the idea that this type of law can be constitutive or generative of the state (II), before finally highlighting some aspects of the (positive) concepts of the state and the constitution in order to identify some features of how something like public law can be determined in the Hegelian context (III).
* Actually, the standard English translation for this first part of the Grundlinien (« Das abstrakte Recht ») is “Abstract Right”. However, I find this translation highly problematic from a conceptual point of view, and therefore prefer to retain “Abstract Law”.
This activity is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310/2025, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa (https://doi.org/10.54499/UID/00310/2025)
