HPhil Seminar: May 7, 2026
May 7, 2026
5:00pm
The HPhil (History of Philosophy) Research Group of the Centre of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon announces the 2025/26 edition of its permanent seminar on the history of philosophy, devoted to the presentation of conferences by renowned specialists while also creating opportunities to emerging scholars, aiming to promote advanced studies in groundbreaking debates and the permanent training of its academic community.
In this session of the seminar, Alessandro Salice (University College Cork) will present a paper, entitled “Objective Appearances and Phenomenological Realism”. (abstract below)
The session will take place on May 7, 2026 at 5 p.m., in the Room 201.J (Room Mattos Romão, Department of Philosophy). Admission is free
Abstract
This talk addresses two central problems in the phenomenology of perception: (i) what are illusions? and (ii) how is it that, despite only partial aspects of a perceived object being given to me, I nevertheless perceive the object as a whole?
Phenomenologists inspired by Husserl typically approach these problems by appealing to the idea that appearances are subjective—that is, that they are (or can be understood in terms of) experiences. On this view, illusion is a perceptual error, and perceptual completion is a cognitive achievement. After highlighting three limitations of this approach, I introduce a radically different conception of appearance developed by phenomenological realists such as Beck, Reinach, and Scheler.
According to these authors, appearances are not subjective but objective. I explicate the notion of objective appearance as a relation of a distinctive kind, and I argue that—on the basis of this alternative framework—the two problems can be reframed and resolved as follows: (i) illusions are not perceptual errors but doxastic ones; and (ii) the problem of perceptual completion is dissolved, since a phenomenology of perception that operates with objective appearances does not generate it in the first place. In conclusion, I suggest that, because the view of objective appearances avoids the limitations of the Husserlian account, it is to be preferred.
