HPhil Seminar: March 9, 2023

March 9, 2023

The HPhil (History of Philosophy) Research Group of the Centre of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon announces the 2022/23 edition of its permanent seminar on the history of philosophy, devoted to the presentation of conferences by renowned specialists while also creating opportunities to emerging scholars, aiming to promote advanced studies in groundbreaking debates and the permanent training of its academic community.

In this session of the seminar, Erik Lind (CFUL) will present a paper entitled “Absolute or relative sensations? A Jamesian challenge to Merleau-Ponty’s structural account of perception” (abstract below).

The session will take place on March 9, 2023, at 5PM, in the Room C201.J (Room Mattos Romão, Department of Philosophy). The entrance is free.

 

Abstract

In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty proposes what one could call a “structural” theory of perception. Drawing on Gestalt theory, the French philosopher introduces the notion of “structure” or Gestalt to replace the old empiricist notion of “sensation.” The most primitive perception, we are told, cannot be an absolute sensation but must always and necessarily be a relation or a “whole.” The sensory value of an element participating in a structure would thus be determined by its function within it and varying according to it.

This approach has recently been challenged from a Jamesian perspective. According to the latter, we should take care not to take the causal interdependency of sensations to entail a logical one. On the view of radical empiricism, then, relations are not internal but external. Merleau-Ponty’s account of perception, seemingly committed to the internalist position, would thus fall under the same objections that James formulated against the attempts of certain neo-Hegelian philosophers to reduce sensations to relations.

I propose to take a closer look at this objection and critically examine Merleau-Ponty’s structural view in light of it. Is it possible to defend the primacy of relations over absolute sensations without risking contradiction?