New Mechanism, Reduction and Emergence in Physics, Chemistry and Biology
14-15 October 2021 | online

First Steps in the Philosophy of Paradoxicality
Elia Zardini (LanCog and Universidad Complutense de Madrid)

08 October 2021, 11:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT+1) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: According to the traditional definition of paradoxicality, in a paradox apparently true premises apparently entail an apparently false conclusion. I argue that the traditional definition is too narrow, in that prominent types of paradoxes also have versions that conclude to an obviously true conclusion but that are nonetheless paradoxical. After drawing out an interesting corollary of this fact, I criticise a couple of alternative proposals (that in a paradox apparently a priori premises apparently entail an apparently a posteriori conclusion; that in a paradox anything (in the relevant range of propositions) apparently entails everything (in the relevant range of propositions)) as both too narrow and too strict. I then propose my own characterisation, according to which in a paradox, apparently, even if the conclusion failed to hold, the premises would be true and the argument form would be valid. I explain in what sense this account is not a reductive definition; in which directions the account can be extended to cover various other paradoxical phenomena and how the account can be understood as the metaphysical ground for a plausible epistemological claim about paradoxicality.

A Priori and A Posteriori: The Case of Proof
Timothy Williamson (University of Oxford)

08 October 2021, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT+1) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Knowledge by mathematical proof is normally considered a paradigm of the a priori. However, when the process of checking a written proof is analysed, it turns out to depend on sophisticated forms of perceptual pattern recognition—indeed this is closely related to the nature of formal proof. If one checks the proof in one’s head rather than on paper, the process is similar: checking it in one’s head is the offline version of the online process of checking it on paper. Little sense can be made of the injunction to separate the content of a proof from its form. The case of mathematical proof supports the conclusion that the a priori and the a posteriori are only superficially different. This is not a form of empiricism: it does not abolish the a priori but accounts for it in an evolutionarily plausible way.

Free Attendance, but preregistration required: https://cful.letras.ulisboa.pt/lancog/registrations/

Ontological Disputes, Reference and the Limits of Charity
Delia Belleri (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

01 October 2021, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT+1) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Eli Hirsch argues that certain ontological disputes are merely verbal: the principle of charity should compel each party to interpret the other side as speaking truly in a different language. Hirsch adopts an “intensional” method of language interpretation, which maps sentences (in context) onto sets of possible worlds, but which assigns no role to reference. I argue that this method leads to an overly uncharitable portrayal of the disputes at issue – whereby ontologists can only argue about syntax. Lack of charity stems from the fact that this portrayal likely fails to uphold the self-conception of the disputants – and particularly what I will call “the weak self-conception”. As a result, Hirsch’s deflationism falls victim of the same principle of charity that informs it.

Free Attendance, but preregistration required: https://cful.letras.ulisboa.pt/lancog/registration/

We invite those interested to take part in the Reading Group on Multipropositionalism, jointly organized by Claudia Picazo (UNED) and Laura Delgado (LanCog – University of Lisbon). Our tentative time slot would be Thursdays at 12pm CET and the first meeting would be on October 14^th. Thereafter we will meet on alternate Thursdays for about 5 sessions in total – see tentative schedule and readings below. The group will be held online.

We are happy to consider alternative time slots that will fit better the participant’s schedules. If you are interested in joining us (or have any other question, or suggestion) please send us an email (claudia.picazo@gmail.com, or laqueveque@edu.ulisboa.pt).

Also, feel free to share this with other people or groups to which you feel it may be of interest.

Tentative Schedule

14.10.21 Davies, Alex (forthcoming). ‘A (contingent) content-parthood analysis of indirect speech reports’. Mind and Language.

28.04.21 Viebahn, Emanuel (2019). Semantic Pluralism (chapter 4). Frankfurt, Germany: Klostermann.

11.11.21 TBA

25.11.21 TBA

09.12.21 TBA

Possible Readings

. Clapp, Lenny & Lavalle Terrón, Armando (2019). ‘Multipropositionalism and Necessary a Posteriori identity Statements’. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (4):902-934.

. Corazza, Eros (2012). ‘Same‐Saying, Pluri‐Propositionalism, and Implicatures’. Mind and Language 27 (5):546-569.

. Diaz-Legaspe, Justina; Liu, Chang & Stainton, Robert J. (2020). ‘Slurs and register: A case study in meaning pluralism’. Mind and Language 35 (2):156-182.

. Grzankowski, Alex & Buchanan, Ray (forthcoming). ‘Content Pluralism’. Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

. Nowak, Ethan & Michaelson, Eliot (forthcoming). ‘Meta-Metasemantics, or the Quest for the One True Metasemantics’. Philosophical Quarterly.

. Michaelson, Eliot (forthcoming). ‘Speaker’s Reference, Semantic Reference, Sneaky Reference’. Mind and Language

. Murday, Brendan (2014). ‘Definite Descriptions and Semantic Pluralism’. Philosophical Papers 43 (2):255-284.

. Sullivan, Arthur (2013). ‘Multiple propositions, contextual variability, and the semantics/pragmatics interface’. Synthese 190 (14):2773-2800.

. Stojanovic, Isidora (no date). ‘Two Problems of Overgeneration for the Reflexive-Referential Theory’.

Are functions properties?
José Mestre (St Andrews/Stirling and LanCog)

24 September 2021, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT+1) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Robert Trueman has recently argued for Fregean realism. Fregean realism is the view that properties are not objects, but functions. Properties exist (hence ‘realism’), but only as values of second or higher-order variables (hence ‘Fregean’). The view promises to dissolve a number of traditional problems in the metaphysics of properties. Contra Trueman, I argue that functions are not properties. Russell’s inept critique of Frege in the Principles of Mathematics should nonetheless help us to see why. It turns out that neither of the founding fathers held a view sometimes associated with both.

Free Attendance, but preregistration required: https://cful.letras.ulisboa.pt/lancog/registration/

We are happy to announce that, to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the journal Disputatio, Prof. Timothy Williamson (Oxford) will give a lecture on “Degrees of Freedom: Is Good Philosophy Bad Science?” on October 7th, at 16h00 Lisbon time (UTC/GMT+1h).

The lecture is hosted by the LanCog group, at the Centre of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon. The session will have a hybrid format. Everyone is welcome to attend, either in presence at Faculdade de Letras, Anfiteatro III, or online. Registration is required, either way. To reserve a seat in the room or to receive the zoom-link, please email c.filosofia@letras.ulisboa.pt

More information will soon be provided.

The editors of Disputatio,

Ricardo Santos & Elia Zardini

Probing the Mind of God: Divine Beliefs and Credences
Elizabeth Jackson (Ryerson University) & Justin Mooney (University of Massachusetts Amherst)

25 June 2021, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT+1) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia) & on Zoom

Abstract: Although much has been written about divine beliefs (usually in the context of work on divine knowledge), virtually nothing has been said about divine credences. In this essay we comparatively assess four possible views on divine credences: (1) God has only beliefs, not credences; (2) God has both beliefs and credences; (3) God has only credences, not beliefs; and (4) God has neither credences nor beliefs, only knowledge. We weigh the costs and benefits of these four views. We’ll also point to ways this discussion might bear on the question of the nature of human beliefs and credences.

Free Attendance, but preregistration required: https://cful.letras.ulisboa.pt/lancog/registration/

The Right to An Explanation: A Social-Epistemic Approach
Emma Gordon & Adam Carter (University of Glasgow)

18 June 2021, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT+1) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia) & on Zoom

Abstract: The 2018 GDPR ensures data subjects with two kinds of epistemic rights — viz., a right to be forgotten and a right to an explanation. The former concerns one’s online digital trail, and the latter concerns the right one has to an explanation when one is subject to purely automated decisions that significantly affect them. Both of these newly framed rights are epistemically under-described in the GDPR and are the subject of legal debate. Our talk uses the resources of social epistemology to make progress in unpacking the second of these epistemic rights — viz., the right to an explanation — and we will defend a specific view of what is necessary to plausibly satisfy this right. Central to our positive view is that an adequate formulation of the right should be articulated not in terms of true belief, nor in terms of knowledge, but in terms of understanding.

Free Attendance, but preregistration required: https://cful.letras.ulisboa.pt/lancog/registration/

Abstract: Recently, there has been a resurgence of interest in the view that in perception, subjects bear an epistemically significant cognitive relation directly to particulars that is importantly different from thinking truths about a particular. Some call this relation ‘acquaintance.’ A question in the theory of acquaintance is whether the relation can be naturalized—that is, whether we can account for its nature relying exclusively on the objects and relations countenanced by the natural sciences. I propose to make some progress on this question by examining acquaintance’s normative profile. By ‘normative profile,’ I mean the characterization of acquaintance presupposed by our evaluative judgments about the relation. I argue, first, that acquaintance seems to exhibit intrinsic epistemic value. Moreover, acquaintance appears valuable for a singular subject and in virtue of the unmediated cognitive contact with a perceived object it affords. Finally, in being epistemically good for the subject in this way, the acquaintance relation ‘stands out’ from relations in its vicinity. A naturalistic reduction of acquaintance (and perception, more generally) fails to preserve these evaluatively apparent characteristics of acquaintance. Acquaintance, naturalized, puts the perceived object at a distance from an essentially disunified subject, and the relation seems one among many similar relations. Hence, if perception/acquaintance must be naturalized, we must accept not just that our intuitions about acquaintance are illusory, but that our situation is not as valuable (or valuable in the same way) as our epistemic intuitions present it as being.