We invite those interested to take part in the Reading Group on Multipropositionalism, jointly organized by Claudia Picazo (UNED) and Laura Delgado (LanCog – University of Lisbon). Our tentative time slot would be Thursdays at 12pm CET and the first meeting would be on October 14th. Thereafter we will meet on alternate Thursdays for about 5 sessions in total – see tentative schedule and readings below. The group will be held online.

We are happy to consider alternative time slots that will fit better the participant’s schedules. If you are interested in joining us (or have any other question, or suggestion) please send us an email (claudia.picazo@gmail.com, or laqueveque@edu.ulisboa.pt).

Also, feel free to share this with other people or groups to which you feel it may be of interest.

Tentative Schedule

14.10.21 Davies, Alex (forthcoming). ‘A (contingent) content-parthood analysis of indirect speech reports’. Mind and Language.

28.04.21 Viebahn, Emanuel (2019). Semantic Pluralism (chapter 4). Frankfurt, Germany: Klostermann.

11.11.21 TBA

25.11.21 TBA

09.12.21 TBA

 

Possible Readings

. Clapp, Lenny & Lavalle Terrón, Armando (2019). ‘Multipropositionalism and Necessary a Posteriori identity Statements’. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (4):902-934.

. Corazza, Eros (2012). ‘Same‐Saying, Pluri‐Propositionalism, and Implicatures’. Mind and Language 27 (5):546-569.

. Diaz-Legaspe, Justina; Liu, Chang & Stainton, Robert J. (2020). ‘Slurs and register: A case study in meaning pluralism’. Mind and Language 35 (2):156-182.

. Grzankowski, Alex & Buchanan, Ray (forthcoming). ‘Content Pluralism’. Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

. Nowak, Ethan & Michaelson, Eliot (forthcoming). ‘Meta-Metasemantics, or the Quest for the One True Metasemantics’. Philosophical Quarterly.

. Michaelson, Eliot (forthcoming). ‘Speaker’s Reference, Semantic Reference, Sneaky Reference’. Mind and Language

. Murday, Brendan (2014). ‘Definite Descriptions and Semantic Pluralism’. Philosophical Papers 43 (2):255-284.

. Sullivan, Arthur (2013). ‘Multiple propositions, contextual variability, and the semantics/pragmatics interface’. Synthese 190 (14):2773-2800.

. Stojanovic, Isidora (no date). ‘Two Problems of Overgeneration for the Reflexive-Referential Theory’.

Are functions properties?
José Mestre (St Andrews/Stirling and LanCog)

24 September 2021, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT+1) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Robert Trueman has recently argued for Fregean realism. Fregean realism is the view that properties are not objects, but functions. Properties exist (hence ‘realism’), but only as values of second or higher-order variables (hence ‘Fregean’). The view promises to dissolve a number of traditional problems in the metaphysics of properties. Contra Trueman, I argue that functions are not properties. Russell’s inept critique of Frege in the Principles of Mathematics should nonetheless help us to see why. It turns out that neither of the founding fathers held a view sometimes associated with both.

Free Attendance, but preregistration required: https://cful.letras.ulisboa.pt/lancog/registration/

We are happy to announce that, to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the journal Disputatio, Prof. Timothy Williamson (Oxford) will give a lecture on “Degrees of Freedom: Is Good Philosophy Bad Science?” on October 7th, at 16h00 Lisbon time (UTC/GMT+1h).

 

The lecture is hosted by the LanCog group, at the Centre of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon. The session will have a hybrid format. Everyone is welcome to attend, either in presence at Faculdade de Letras, Anfiteatro III, or online. Registration is required, either way. To reserve a seat in the room or to receive the zoom-link, please email c.filosofia@letras.ulisboa.pt

 

More information will soon be provided.

The editors of Disputatio,

Ricardo Santos & Elia Zardini

Probing the Mind of God: Divine Beliefs and Credences
Elizabeth Jackson (Ryerson University) & Justin Mooney (University of Massachusetts Amherst)

25 June 2021, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT+1) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia) & on Zoom

Abstract: Although much has been written about divine beliefs (usually in the context of work on divine knowledge), virtually nothing has been said about divine credences. In this essay we comparatively assess four possible views on divine credences: (1) God has only beliefs, not credences; (2) God has both beliefs and credences; (3) God has only credences, not beliefs; and (4) God has neither credences nor beliefs, only knowledge. We weigh the costs and benefits of these four views. We’ll also point to ways this discussion might bear on the question of the nature of human beliefs and credences.

Free Attendance, but preregistration required: https://cful.letras.ulisboa.pt/lancog/registration/

The Right to An Explanation: A Social-Epistemic Approach
Emma Gordon & Adam Carter (University of Glasgow)

18 June 2021, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT+1) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia) & on Zoom

Abstract: The 2018 GDPR ensures data subjects with two kinds of epistemic rights — viz., a right to be forgotten and a right to an explanation. The former concerns one’s online digital trail, and the latter concerns the right one has to an explanation when one is subject to purely automated decisions that significantly affect them. Both of these newly framed rights are epistemically under-described in the GDPR and are the subject of legal debate. Our talk uses the resources of social epistemology to make progress in unpacking the second of these epistemic rights — viz., the right to an explanation — and we will defend a specific view of what is necessary to plausibly satisfy this right. Central to our positive view is that an adequate formulation of the right should be articulated not in terms of true belief, nor in terms of knowledge, but in terms of understanding.

Free Attendance, but preregistration required: https://cful.letras.ulisboa.pt/lancog/registration/

Abstract: Recently, there has been a resurgence of interest in the view that in perception, subjects bear an epistemically significant cognitive relation directly to particulars that is importantly different from thinking truths about a particular. Some call this relation ‘acquaintance.’ A question in the theory of acquaintance is whether the relation can be naturalized—that is, whether we can account for its nature relying exclusively on the objects and relations countenanced by the natural sciences. I propose to make some progress on this question by examining acquaintance’s normative profile. By ‘normative profile,’ I mean the characterization of acquaintance presupposed by our evaluative judgments about the relation. I argue, first, that acquaintance seems to exhibit intrinsic epistemic value. Moreover, acquaintance appears valuable for a singular subject and in virtue of the unmediated cognitive contact with a perceived object it affords. Finally, in being epistemically good for the subject in this way, the acquaintance relation ‘stands out’ from relations in its vicinity. A naturalistic reduction of acquaintance (and perception, more generally) fails to preserve these evaluatively apparent characteristics of acquaintance. Acquaintance, naturalized, puts the perceived object at a distance from an essentially disunified subject, and the relation seems one among many similar relations. Hence, if perception/acquaintance must be naturalized, we must accept not just that our intuitions about acquaintance are illusory, but that our situation is not as valuable (or valuable in the same way) as our epistemic intuitions present it as being.

Kinds, Objects, and Essences
David Papineau (King’s College London)

11 June 2021, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT+1) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia) & on Zoom

Abstract: Kripke’s Naming and Necessity reintroduced the traditional distinction between the essential and accidental properties of things. Many philosophers view this distinction with suspicion. I shall show, however, that the observable structure of natural kinds itself picks out certain kind properties as essential. I shall also consider whether a corresponding explanation can be given for the essentiality of origin and constitution for persisting objects.

Free Attendance, but preregistration required: https://cful.letras.ulisboa.pt/lancog/registration/

Faultlessness and multidimensionality
Diogo Santos (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

04 June 2021, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT+1) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia) & on Zoom

Abstract: Many have pointed out that non-evaluative vague predicates can give rise to faultless disagreements. This sort of faultlessness has to do with the gradable nature of vague predicates. This fact is usually not interpreted as undermining the claim that evaluative predicates (which are also gradable) give rise to faultlessness in a different way, because, when it comes to evaluatives, (i) intuitions of faultlessness persist even when the predicates are in a comparative form and (ii) only constructions of evaluative predicates under find are acceptable. While (i) justifies the claim that evaluative faultless disagreements are not due to gradability or vagueness, (ii) suggests that evaluative faultless disagreements occur due to experiencer/judge sensitivity. In this paper I argue that (i) and (ii) do not motivate the claim that evaluative and non-evaluative predicates generate faultlessness via different mechanisms. I argue that a reasonable explanation for faultlessness in the comparative form is due to multidimensionality and not specifically due to experiencer/judge sensitivity. I further argue that, if this is right, then evaluative and non-evaluative predicates give rise to faultless disagreements via similar linguistic mechanisms. I conclude with some remarks on the implications of the latter claim.

Free Attendance, but preregistration required: https://cful.letras.ulisboa.pt/lancog/registration/