Are functions properties?
José Mestre (St Andrews/Stirling and LanCog)
24 September 2021, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT+1) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)
Abstract: Robert Trueman has recently argued for Fregean realism. Fregean realism is the view that properties are not objects, but functions. Properties exist (hence ‘realism’), but only as values of second or higher-order variables (hence ‘Fregean’). The view promises to dissolve a number of traditional problems in the metaphysics of properties. Contra Trueman, I argue that functions are not properties. Russell’s inept critique of Frege in the Principles of Mathematics should nonetheless help us to see why. It turns out that neither of the founding fathers held a view sometimes associated with both.
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