An Internal Realist Interpretation of the Primitive Ontology Programme
Andrea Oldofredi (University of Lisbon, LanCog)

11 March 2022, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: New interesting developments and extensions of the Primitive Ontology (PO) programme have been recently proposed in order to defeat Laudan’s Pessimistic Meta-Induction on the one hand, and to provide a theory-independent fundamental atomistic ontology of the world on the other. Against this background, the aim of the talk is twofold: I will firstly discuss the main assumptions behind those arguments according to which the PO programme can overcome Laudan’s induction and offer a scale-invariant ontology, showing possible counterexamples to these claims. Secondly, I will argue that the realism introduced by the PO approach can be consistently interpreted as internal realism, i.e., I will show that the internal realist view can faithfully represent the ontological commitment (and its limits) implied by the acceptance of a given PO theory, capturing also the pluralist stance of this programme as originally conceived by David Bohm and John S. Bell.

The room has a limited number of seats. Pre-registration is required at <info@lancog.com> until a day before the event. Note that this is an in-person event and everyone should wear a mask.

From Metaphilosophy to Semantics
Jonathan Berg (University of Haifa)

4 March 2022, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: I aim to show how a commonly accepted metaphilosophical assumption has important consequences for a hotly debated issue in the philosophy of language. The seemingly innocuous metaphilosophical claim is this: The Principle of Philosophical Thought Experiments – Philosophical theories must be compatible (ceteris paribus) with the intuitions elicited by philosophical thought experiments. The controversial semantic claim it supports is this: Strict Semantics – Every disambiguated sentence has a determinate semantic content, relative to an assignment of contents to its indexical expressions. After considering each of these claims individually, I shall suggest how the first provides evidence for the second.

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Consequences do not trickle down
Diogo Santos (University of Lisbon, LanCog)

25 February 2022, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: I have argued that consequentialists should endorse what I call the No Trickle Down Principle (NTD), which is a restriction on what counts as consequence of an isolated action. In its stronger version NTD states that for any sequence of actions S initiated by an isolated action A, consequences of S are not consequences of A. The adoption of the principle allows for consequentialism to, at the very least, improve its standing when confronted with the classical epistemic objection. Notwithstanding the reasons for NTD, there are seeming unpalatable consequences from endorsing it. I focus on addressing two of these: (i) without further classification, the principle wrongly predicts that some isolated actions do not generate the consequences they actually generate; (ii) the principle entails that permissible isolated actions can initiate impermissible sequences and that impermissible isolated actions can initiate permissible sequences. I address (i) by proposing a distinction between isolated actions and sequence of actions which borrows ideas from the literature on collective action and I assuage the second concern by showing that there is an interesting parallel between NTD and compelling non-reductive approaches to team agency and collective responsibility.

The room has a limited number of seats. Pre-registration is required at <info@lancog.com> until a day before the event. Note that this is an in-person event and everyone should wear a mask.

Blameworthy Belief Without Control. The Case of Fake News Consumption
Tommaso Piazza (University of Pavia, LanCog)

18 February 2022, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Does it ever make sense to contend that one should have believed otherwise than one does? If so, under what conditions can one be so criticized, in particular from an epistemic point of view? First aim of this talk is to propose an answer to these questions by defending an account of doxastic blameworthiness which is consistent with B. Williams’ claim that one cannot believe at will. Second aim of this talk is to apply this account to a concrete case, and to argue, against B. Millar (2019), that at least ordinary social media users can sometimes be criticized for consuming fake news.

The room has a limited number of seats. Pre-registration is required at <info@lancog.com> until a day before the event. Note that this is an in-person event and everyone should wear a mask.

The LanCog Research Group, University of Lisbon, welcomes expressions of interest from suitably qualified candidates interested in applying for fix-term (up to 6 years) research positions funded by the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT) in the following conditions:

The FCT is the Portuguese national funding agency for academic research and development. In 2022, the FCT will fund the hiring of 400 researchers, holders of PhDs at various stages of career, to carry out their activity in research centres throughout Portugal. The selected researchers are hired by the host institution through a framework-contract between the host and the FCT, which guarantees the funding. In the previous edition, 21 positions have gone for philosophers, and LanCog has a very strong record of supporting successful candidates.

The FCT will accept applications between 3 February and 3 March 2022 (17:00 Lisbon time). Candidates will apply online directly to the FCT, but their application must be supported by a host institution.

The application, written in English, must include the following:

–    A research plan, including a description of the main activities to be undertaken, the expected results, as well as an indication of how the research project fits with (at least one of) the goals set out in the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development;

–    A brief description of previous academic and scientific experience, highlighting the main activities and results obtained in the last 5 years;

–    Curriculum vitae;

–    Motivation letter, identifying up to two main contributions of the candidate in the last 5 years and the expected main contributions for the next years;

–    A brief description of the conditions provided by the host institution and of how the proposed research plan fits into the overall strategy of the research centre.

Applications will be assessed by an international panel, according to the following criteria:

–    The candidate’s scientific experience, with emphasis on the last 5 years (60%);

–    The proposed research plan (40%).

Each applicant can submit only one application for one of the following types of positions:

Junior researcher: PhD holders with up to 5 years of post-doctoral experience in the scientific area of application – 2.134,73€ gross wage (c. 1.400-1.500€ net wage for 14 months/year, depending on several specific factors related to the family composition and income);

Assistant researcher: PhD holders with more than 5 and up to 12 years of post-doctoral research, with relevant experience in the scientific area of application and limited scientific independence* – 3.201,39€ gross wage (c. 1.800-1.950€ net wage 14 months/year, depending on several specific factors related to the family composition and income);

Principal researcher: PhD holders with more than 12 years of post-doctoral research, with relevant experience in the scientific area of application and demonstrating scientific independence* for the last 3 years – 3.611,83€ gross wage (c. 2.100-2300€ net wage 14 months/year, depending on several specific factors related to the family composition and income);

Coordinating researcher: PhD holders with more than 12 years of post-doctoral research, holders of an academic title of ‘Agregado’ (or ‘Habilitation’) awarded in Portugal, with relevant experience and demonstrating scientific independence and recognized leadership in the scientific area of application – 4.678,96€ gross wage (c. 2.350-2500€ net wage 14 months/year, depending on several specific factors related to the family composition and income).

*Research independence is demonstrated through scientific competence, originality and international recognition, by experience in doctoral or post-doctoral supervision, or by the competitive research funds attracted at national or international level.

It is the applicant’s responsibility to choose the contract level best suited to their career stage.

It is mandatory to upload the doctoral diploma. In order to comply with the Portuguese legislation concerning the recognition of foreign qualifications, all the doctoral degrees granted by foreign higher education institutions should be duly recognized**. Applicants are advised to visit the website of the Direção-Geral do Ensino Superior (DGES) for further information:https://www.dges.gov.pt/en/pagina/degree-and-diploma-recognition. If possible, the recognition certificate (or proof that one has been requested) should be uploaded together with the diploma. Applications will be considered even if the recognition certificate is not available. However, the recognition must be obtained before signing the contract.

** Cf. Decree-Law No. 66/2018, of 16 August; Portaria No. 33/2019, of 25 January; Portaria No. 43/2020, of 14 February.

More information about the call, including a link to the application portal, is available here.

Interested candidates are invited to contact Dr. Domingos Faria (at domingosfaria@edu.ulisboa.pt), with a brief description of their intended research and current CV no later than 2 February.

Unconscious Mental Imagery Requires Unconscious Mental Qualities
Sam Coleman (University of Hertfordshire)

17 December 2021, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: It is widely agreed that conscious mental imagery features phenomenology, or conscious mental qualities, as I will say. Moreover, conscious imagery is accorded an important role in various sorts of action guidance. Unconscious mental imagery is also widely posited, and is held to share an important neurophysiological basis with conscious imagery (especially in the visual case I focus on). And unconscious imagery is accorded a very similar role in action guidance. But it is almost universally denied that unconscious imagery features mental qualities. I argue that unless we ascribe unconscious mental qualities to unconscious imagery, the behavioural contribution of conscious mental imagery is threatened, indeed, that conscious imagery is rendered epiphenomenal.

The room has a limited number of seats. Pre-registration is required at <info@lancog.com> until a day before the event. Note that this is an in-person event and everyone should wear a mask.

‘Actually, Scratch That’: A Tour into the Illocutionary Fabric of Retraction
Laura Caponetto (Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, Milan)

03 December 2021, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Just as we can do things with words, so too we can use words to take back what we did in speaking. Political history is filled with such ‘u-turns’. Consider, for example, Nigel Farage’s ‘unresignation’ in May 2015, or Al Gore’s decision to ‘unconcede’ to George W. Bush in 2000. Retraction maneuvers are common currency and play a significant role in our discursive practices, as well as in our social and political lives. Still, very little attention has been paid among speech act theorists to how retraction works. By expanding upon previous work (Caponetto 2020) and engaging with recent contributions to the topic (e.g. Kukla & Steinberg 2021), I set out to unpack the illocutionary fabric of retraction – i.e. the illocutionary category it belongs to, its felicity conditions, the normative changes it effects. I construe retraction as a higher-order speech act whose definitional function is to cancel the deontic update enacted by some previous, lower-order speech act. After identifying its general (definitional) felicity conditions, I pause on the special felicity conditions for retracting specific illocutionary types. I conclude by saying something on “I-never-said-that!” kind of moves and how they differ from retractions.

The room has a limited number of seats. Pre-registration is required at <c.filosofia@letras.ulisboa.pt> until a day before the event. Note that this is an in-person event and everyone should wear a mask.

Awareness of Universals
Alex Grzankowski (Birkbeck, University of London)

26 November 2021, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: A number of intentionalists (many of whom are also physicalists) about consciousness hold that when one hallucinates, one is aware of an uninstantiated universal. According to some commentators, this is an odd view, if not an absurd one. In this talk, I’ll spell out how intentionalists ought to think about this claim and explain the ways in which it is in keeping with a story about other intentional states (such as propositional desire) that relate their subjects to abstracta. A kind of confusion, I speculate, has been driven by failing to attend to a familiar ambiguity found in intensional transitive verb constructions.

The room has a limited number of seats. Pre-registration is required at <c.filosofia@letras.ulisboa.pt> until a day before the event. Note that this is an in-person event and everyone should wear a mask.

Scientific Fictional Properties and Their Explanatory Power
Vera Matarese (University of Bern)

19 November 2021, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT) | Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: According to what I call the “orthodox view”, we should grant the existence of scientific properties like mass, charge, spin, because they have explanatory power. Without them, indeed, we would be unable to explain particle trajectories. In this talk, I will articulate a “fictionalist view” that regards these properties to be mere scientific fictions. Fictionalists have two options. The first is to deny, like Super-Humeans, that scientific properties have explanatory power. The second is to admit that they have explanatory power, but deny that, in virtue of this, we should grant them existence. I will take this second route. The challenge will then be to clarify how fictional properties can be explanatorily powerful without being part of our ontology.

The room has a limited number of seats. Pre-registration is required at <c.filosofia@letras.ulisboa.pt> until a day before the event. Note that this is an in-person event and everyone should wear a mask.