Some Problems of Normal Form in Logical Metainferentialism

Bogdan Dicher (University of the Witwatersrand)

28 November 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: In “Logical Metainferentialism” (Ergo, forthcoming), Dicher and Paoli develop a theory of harmony for metainferential calculi in the FDE family, including ST. They identify a certain normal form—called there structurally atomic–analytic synthetic (SAAS) normal form—as the mark of harmony. A proof is in SAAS normal form iff it is structurally atomic (the structural rules apply to/produce only atomic formulae) and analytic–synthetic (all applications of elimination rules precede all applications of introduction rules). In “Sequent Calculi for First-Order ST” (JPhiLog, 2024), Paoli and Prenosil introduce a sequent calculus for ST employing generalized elimination rules for the quantifiers. In this talk, I present a calculus for ST in which all elimination rules are in general form, and I discuss which normal forms can be identified for this calculus and their significance for metainferential harmony.

Prime Numbers and Periodical Cicadas: The Case for Mathematical Platonism?

Luca Caiti (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

21 November 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: In his “Are There Genuine Mathematical Explanations of Physical Phenomena?” (2005), Alan Baker proposed an indispensable mathematical explanation for a peculiar biological case: the prime-numbered life-cycles of North American periodical cicadas. Following his “Explanatory Indispensability Argument” (EIA), we should then be ontologically committed to mathematical entities. In this paper, I criticize that view on two main grounds. First, I show that both the alleged indispensability and the explanatory structure Baker offers are fundamentally flawed. In doing so, I draw upon recent biological findings and analyze the discussion in the scientific literature, including a new theory for the phenomenon in question—the so-called “internal-clock theory”. Accordingly, if we take the cicada case study and the EIA, it actually follows the exact opposite of what Baker argued: that his mathematical explanation is not indispensable and that we should not be committed to the existence of mathematical objects. Second, I examine the EIA’s general stance and outline possible ways to reject it, regardless of the indispensability of Baker’s mathematical explanation. Consequently, we shouldn’t endorse such an ontological commitment, even if Baker’s mathematical explanation were indispensable—let alone given that it is not.

Some Problems of Normal Form in Logical Metainferentialism

Bogdan Dicher (University of the Witwatersrand)

28 November 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: In “Logical Metainferentialism” (Ergo, forthcoming), Dicher and Paoli develop a theory of harmony for metainferential calculi in the FDE family, including ST. They identify a certain normal form—called there structurally atomic–analytic synthetic (SAAS) normal form—as the mark of harmony. A proof is in SAAS normal form iff it is structurally atomic (the structural rules apply to/produce only atomic formulae) and analytic–synthetic (all applications of elimination rules precede all applications of introduction rules). In “Sequent Calculi for First-Order ST” (JPhiLog, 2024), Paoli and Prenosil introduce a sequent calculus for ST employing generalized elimination rules for the quantifiers. In this talk, I present a calculus for ST in which all elimination rules are in general form, and I discuss which normal forms can be identified for this calculus and their significance for metainferential harmony.

Against Norms of Knowledge

David Papipneau (King’s College London)

14 November 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Intuitive support for norms of knowledge (governing assertion, belief and action) comes largely from lottery-like cases in which high confidence is causally unconnected with the facts at issue. I shall argue against knowledge norms precisely because of what they advise in such cases. Where they make a difference, they lead us astray. (I shall also consider the role knowledge plays in our emotional engagement with the world, and show that this too lends no support to knowledge norms.)

This activity is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310/2025, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
(https://doi.org/10.54499/UID/00310/2025)

What is Purely Epistemic Normativity, and Why? A Study in Wolfian Epistemology

Richard Pettigrew (University of Bristol)

7 November 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: What is the distinction between what we ought to believe simpliciter and what we ought to believe epistemically speaking, and why do we draw that distinction? I motivate this question through a series of examples, consider various existing answers, and find them wanting. Then I propose and explore an alternative based on a version of Susan Wolf’s rule consequentialism transposed to the epistemic realm: the norms that determine what we ought to do epistemically speaking are those such that broad adherence to them across your epistemic community would give the best results from an epistemic point of view. I argue that norms that exhort us to believe only what we ought to believe epistemically speaking follow from this Wolfian version of epistemic rule consequentialism. In a coda, I offer an alternative account of the function of knowledge ascriptions that improves on Edward Craig’s.

This activity is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310/2025, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
(https://doi.org/10.54499/UID/00310/2025)

A Puzzle Concerning Reason and the Emotions

Ram Neta (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill)

31 October 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Each of the following theses enjoys some support in recent philosophical discussions: (1) emotions, like judgments and resolutions, can be exercises of rational agency, and held in light of various considerations that seem to the agent to support them; (2) emotions, unlike judgments or resolutions, cannot constitute our drawing the conclusion of some reasoning; (3) any exercise of rational agency, held in light of considerations that seem to support it, can constitute our drawing the conclusion of reasoning from those same considerations. Proponents of thesis (1) (e.g., Olivia Bailey, Rachel Achs) have sought to argue against thesis (2). Proponents of thesis (2) (e.g., Conner Schultz, Nate Sharadin) have sought to argue against thesis (1). In this paper, I defend both theses (1) and (2), and give an explanation of why thesis (3) is false. This explanation will shed light on how inference differs from other forms of reasons-responsiveness.

This activity is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310/2025, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
(https://doi.org/10.54499/UID/00310/2025)

The Overcoming of Dynamical Explanations by Geometrical Explanations in Three Scientific Revolutions

Mauro Dorato (Università degli studi Roma Tre)

24 October 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: According to Kuhn, scientific revolutions are characterized by a radical change in the phenomena that are thought to require an explanation. In my talk, I will illustrate this thesis by arguing that three revolutions in the history of spacetime physics share two related patterns that can be summarized as follows: (i) pre-revolutionary dynamical explanations have been replaced by post-revolutionary structural explanations postulating new “natural” states of motion; (ii) this postulation has been made possible by the discovery of anthropomorphic projections over the physical world. In the last part of my talk, I will try to investigate whether this scheme can also be applied to quantum mechanics.

This activity is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310/2025, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
(https://doi.org/10.54499/UID/00310/2025)

Tasting Together

Giulia Martina (University of Nottingham)

17 October 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Experiences such as cooking and eating together or participating in a wine tasting suggest that we can attend together to the flavours of foods and drinks. But is joint attention to flavour really possible? This talk focuses on two challenges from the case of flavour that existing accounts of joint attention do not address. First, the object question. How can we have the same object of attention if, as in most cases of tasting together, we are not literally tasting the same particular object? Second, the attention coordination question. Since the things we taste may not be public objects we can point to and follow with our gaze, how can we monitor and affect how the other attends to the object? I will argue that a form of joint attention can be established independently of vision, and that communication-based accounts of joint attention are especially well-suited to explain this. However, we need to move beyond the visual model and take seriously the distinctive structure of taste and flavour experiences.

This activity is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310/2025, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
(https://doi.org/10.54499/UID/00310/2025)

Upper Logicist Ordinals

Bruno Jacinto (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

10 October 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Ordinals are commonly identified with particular kinds of sets. This identification is, however, highly implausible. Accordingly, in this talk I develop an “upper logicist” characterization of ordinals inspired by (i) Cantor’s view that ordinals are abstractions of well-orderings, and (ii) Russell’s view that such abstractions are higher-order entities. After reviewing important challenges to abstractionist characterizations of ordinals, and to Florio & Leach-Krouse’s (2017) recent logicism about ordinals, I will show that the upper logicist characterization does not fall prey to those challenges. I will conclude by sketching how my characterization paves the way for a defense of Upper Logicism – in the sense of (Jacinto 2024) – about ordinals as well as about sets.

The Substrate Flexibility of Consciousness

Jeremy Pober (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

3 October 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: In this joint work with Eric Schwitzgebel, we present a novel argument for the substrate flexibility of consciousness: the claim that consciousness can be instantiated in systems made of different substances (e.g., Chalmers 1996; Bostrom 2003). A common (e.g., Cao 2022; Block 2023; Seth 2025) way of investigating substrate flexibility has been by asking whether a fine-grained functional equivalent to a human brain that is somehow composed very differently, (e.g.,) of Silicon, would also be conscious. We believe the question is the wrong way to go about investigating the topic. The pull of the functional equivalence framing is that functional equivalence to us is sufficient for consciousness: a creature’s being functionally equivalent to us is a good reason to attribute consciousness to it. Functional equivalence is not, however, necessary, and therefore not the only good reason to attribute consciousness to a creature. We provide independent reason to attribute consciousness to creatures with different substrates: the Copernican Principle of Consciousness (Schwitzgebel and Pober, under review).This principle states that we should not assume ourselves as humans special with respect to consciousness among creatures of equivalent behavioral (or functional) sophistication. As long as the extent to which a creature exhibits sophistication is not somehow essentially linked to its substrate, we have no reason to think that consciousness is substrate inflexible.