The Portuguese Epistemology Group (PEG) was set up by Giada Fratantonio, Joshua Rowan Thorpe, and David Horst, to foster the study of epistemology in Portugal.
 
The PEG runs a seminar series, workshops, and conferences.
 

The PEG Seminar convenes in term time, on Fridays at 13:00 – 15:00, in person at the Universidade de Lisboa.

Autumn 2025 Seminar Schedule

26th September

“Disquotation and Silence”, Josh Thorpe (talk)

3rd October 

No seminar

10th October

Chapter of Maria Lasonen-Aarnio’s forthcoming book (discussion)

17th October

“On the Evocation Norm of Questioning”, Giada Fratantonio (talk)

24th October 

Social Role Epistemology, Jesper Kallestrup (talk)

31st October

Chapter of Maria Lasonen-Aarnio’s forthcoming book (discussion)

7th November

Title TBD, Francesca Scapinello (talk)

14th November 

Title TBD, Nuno Venturinha (talk)

21 November

“Epistemic Teleology and the Seperateness of Propositions”, Berker (discussion)

28th November 

“Narrative Epistemology”, Fraser (discussion)

5th December

“Joint attention as a joint communicative action” Felipe León (talk)

12th December

“We Have Positive Epistemic Duties”, McGrath (discussion)

19th December 

“What is the Lichtenberg objection?”, Josh Thorpe (talk)

For updates, see the PEG’s website.

Topics, Focus, and Relevance Properties in First-Order Relevant Logic

Nicholas Ferenz (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

26 September 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: In this joint work with Andrew Tedder, we investigate the problem of providing relevance properties for first order relevant logics by expanding on recent work concerning relevance as topical in propositional relevant logics. We propose a theory of topic for first order languages in general, relying on the use of focus markers in an extension of the usual first order language. Such an enrichment of the language and conceptual apparatus of a logic provides avenues into the problem of identifying relevance properties for first-order relevant logics.

This event is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa.

Argument Rodizio

27 June 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

The Argument Rodizio is a session in which each participant presents a short, desirably surprising, argument in 5-10 minutes, to be discussed in the following 5-10 minutes. The argument should be as clearly stated as possible and written on the board or displayed on the computer.
 

Here’s the lineup for this year’s session:

1. Jeremy Pober:”Either Mind-Brain Reduction is True, or Reduction Doesn’t Matter”
2. Quentin Ruyant: “We Need Quantum Physics to Understand Consciousness (and Conversely)”
3. Bruno Jacinto: “Numbers All the Way”
4. Arvid Båve: “A Simple Argument for S5”
5. Matheus Valente: “One Winner, Two Losers”
6. Carolina Flores: “The Paradox of Security”
7. Sanna Hirvonen: “The Hiddenness of Dishes, or Can We Ever Know What We Eat?”
8. Robert Michels: “Philosophy is Art”

From Spacetime in Physics to Space and Time in Human Experience

Thomas Sattig (University of Tübingen)

20 June 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: The development of the physics of space and time is a story of alienation. Today we face a deep gap between the way humans experience space and time and the way space and time are understood in contemporary physics. In the world of human experience, space and time are very different: space organizes things in a static way, while time organizes things in a dynamic way. In the world of contemporary physics, however, space and time are very similar: space and time form aspects of a single spacetime that organizes all things in a static way. It is a significant task of contemporary philosophy to bridge the gap between the physics of spacetime and the human experience of space and time. This talk will describe the gap and outline a path of reconciliation.

This activity is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310/2025, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
(https://doi.org/10.54499/UID/00310/2025)

The Problem of Expressive Action in Philosophical Action Theory

Luca Bellini (LMU Munich)

6 June 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: There is a wide range of expressive actions we do. We kick cars that refuse to start, we kiss and talk to pictures, we wreck damage to the belongings of someone who cheated on us, and many others along the same lines. The problem of expressive action is the problem of explaining why we do such bizarre things. According to the received view, these are just actions out of emotion. Instead, I argue they are much more like make-believe games. Having to firstly clarify what makes expressive actions expressive – i.e. what, if anything, they express –, I draw on a hitherto overlooked analogy with both children’s games (e.g. duelling with make-believe swords) and rituals (e.g. burning in effigy) to claim that expressive actions, too, prescribe what is fictionally the case. While furthering our understanding of the role that imagination plays in justifying our conduct, this talk sheds light on the nature of rational agency and the problem of action – the problem of explaining what makes something an action in the first place. In doing so, I aim to show that our standard model of action explanation, encapsulated in the slogan “beliefs and desires cause actions”, has finally run its course.

This activity is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310/2025, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
(https://doi.org/10.54499/UID/00310/2025)

Grasping Models as Epistemic Tools: From Scientific Representation to Engineering Design

Michael Poznic (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology)

16 May 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Models can be used for different kinds of projects in scientific or engineering contexts. Representational uses haven been predominantly discussed in philosophy of science. Next to such uses, the perspective on models as designs is equally important. What is common to most if not all target-directed modeling projects is that grasping the models is a first step to use the respective models for understanding their target phenomena. This talk sketches an account of grasping models that is primarily tailored to approaches that focus on objectual understanding. A central element is the evaluation of the models in terms of their direction-of-fit to their targets. Whether other epistemic achievements can be spelled out with such an account of grasping is something that the proposal does not preclude. An open question is the relevance for exploratory or other uses of models that are not directed at representing or designing targets.

This activity is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310/2025, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
(https://doi.org/10.54499/UID/00310/2025)

Know-How, Action and Proximity

Adam Carter (University of Glasgow)

2 May 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Few theses at the intersection of action theory and epistemology have more adherents than the Simple View, according to which, if an agent φ-s intentionally, then she knows how to φ. That view struggles, however, to account for cases of intentional actions performed in novel circumstances, or when facing novel tasks. We propose to reject the Simple View and instead explain the relationship between intentional action and know-how by appeal to proximity, a relation encoding the extent to which the means for one task (ψ) can be co-opted to reliably succeed in another (φ). According to our Proximity View, if an agent φ-s intentionally, then she knows how to ψ, where ψ is sufficiently proximal to φ. Not only does the Proximity View explain intentional actions performed when facing novel circumstances or tasks, but it also illuminates both the process of learning by doing and the luck that action per se tolerates. (Joint work with Tim Kearl [Flagler College].)

This activity is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310/2025, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
(https://doi.org/10.54499/UID/00310/2025)

How Inference Can Be Explained in Terms of Logical Consequence

Rachel Boddy (IUSS Pavia)

11 April 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Philosophers have held that validity of inference can be explained in terms of logical consequence. In today’s debate on the normativity of logic, however, it is commonly taken for granted that this view is mistaken. Harman’s (1986) criticism appears to have settled the matter: Current logic fails to explain what beliefs may or should be inferred from what other beliefs. The issue here is that logical principles are not defeasible, whereas principles of belief revision are. I argue that this criticism does not settle the matter because it relies on a notion of inference that logical accounts do not share. The focus of this talk is on the question this raises: What is an inference supposed to be in logic? Starting from the view that inference is an epistemic notion, I argue that the notion of inference at play in logic should be expressed in terms of knowledge, not in terms of belief.

This work/event is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310/2025, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
(https://doi.org/10.54499/UID/00310/2025)

Subjectless Certainty

Joshua Rowan Thorpe (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

4 April 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Descartes claims to find certainty in the cogito. Lichtenberg responds: ‘one should say it is thinking, just as one says, it is lightning. To say cogito is already too much as soon as one translates it as I am thinking.’ (Lichtenberg, K 76, translated in Gomes 2024.) Here we have the negative claim that ‘I am thinking’ is not certain. We also have the positive claim that ‘it is thinking’ is certain. The aim of this paper is to assess these claims. I first argue that the negative claim is correct. I also argue that there is something right about the positive claim. We can be certain (only) of the occurrence of something subjectless. However, we should characterise this something in a way that is neutral as to whether it counts as thinking.

The Many-Objects Interpretation of Relativistic Change

Damiano Costa (Università della Svizzera Italiana)

28 March 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: I explore a new solution to Sattig’s problem of relativistic change. First, I provide a reassessment of the problem, according to which the numerically same object appears to have something as a part in one frame but not at another (i.e. its “corner slices”). Second, I present a new solution that takes this mereological difference seriously, thus entailing that the relevant ordinary object is frame-bound. Finally, while this solution is naturally coupled with four-dimensionalism, I explore the possibility of coupling it with three-dimensionalism in order to provide an answer to Gilmore’s location question.

This work/event is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310/2025, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
(https://doi.org/10.54499/UID/00310/2025)