Healthism, Neurodiversity, and Respectability Politics

Quill Kukla (Georgetown University)

28 February 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: “Healthism” is the pervasive ideology according to which each of us is responsible for valuing and protecting our own health and prioritizing health over other values, while society has the right to enforce, surveil, and reward healthy living. Neurodiversity and other forms of cognitive difference are generally understood through the lens of health: they are taken as diagnosable pathological conditions that should be treated or mitigated via medical interventions. Putting these two ideas together, neurodivergent people are supposed to try to be “healthy,” through pharmaceuticals, behavioral therapy, and the like, and society has an investment in making them be “healthy.” But neurodivergence is not a morbidity in a typical sense, so it is unclear what “health” means in this context. In practice, our societal standards for health for neurodivergent people are defined in terms of what avoids disrupting neurotypical expectations and systems or making neurotypical people uncomfortable. “Health,” for neurodivergent people, is in effect respectability—it is not defined in terms of their own needs or flourishing but in relation to the norms and needs of others. This can be seen from a close reading of diagnostic definitions and official medical “treatment” methods and goals. Trying to “treat” neurodivergent people by making them respectable citizens who are palatable within neurotypical productivity culture is usually likely to backfire; typically bad for their own well-being, and a social loss.

How Do You Know That?

Giada Fratantonio (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

21 February 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: When someone asserts something, we sometimes respond by asking how they know, or what evidence they have, for their assertion. This is often a perfectly legitimate response, both in everyday life and in more formal settings. And yet, in some cases there is something uncomfortable about responding to the testimony of victims of trauma or discrimination with questions of this sort. One might think that this discomfort arises because asking these questions violates norms of privacy, politeness, or morality. This encourages the idea that we can and perhaps should ask these questions anyway in cases where our main concerns are epistemic. However, in this paper I argue that there are a broad range of cases where these questions are epistemically impermissible.

An Uncertainty Model of Suicidality

Sidney Carls-Diamante (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

20 December 2024, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Uncertainty is a factor widely but implicitly acknowledged to contribute to suicidality, but is not often studied as a suicidogenic factor in its own right. This presentation details the role of uncertainty in generating suicidal thoughts and actions. It is proposed that suicidality is a set of cognitive and behavioural strategies for reducing uncertainty and its consequential disruptions to homeostasis, i.e., psychological and/or physiological stability. The presentation argues that there are three dimensions of uncertainty that specifically contribute to suicidality: uncertainty about 1) whether currently experienced adversity will continue into the future, 2) about whether present conditions will improve and 3) about when they will change. Persisting through life entails continued experience of such high-uncertainty states that may prove detrimental to homeostasis. In contrast, death is a high-certainty state, wherein distress, pain, or suffering – manifestations of disrupted homeostasis – are reliably predicted to end. Suicidal ideation thus emerges as a mental model that allows the agent to imagine death as a state wherein homeostasis is restored. When the agent’s distress becomes severe enough, escalation to suicidal action can occur as a behavioural strategy to precipitate restoration of homeostasis (in the form of an end to suffering) through death.

Lisbon Meetings on the Philosophy of Music

5 June 2025

School of Arts and Humanities

University of Lisbon

The Language, Mind and Cognition Group (LanCog), in collaboration with the multidisciplinary group Clepsydra (University of Lisbon), is pleased to announce the Lisbon Meetings on the Philosophy of Music, to be held on 5 June 2025 at the School of Arts and Humanities, University of Lisbon.

This one-day event will feature contributions from leading scholars in the field, and up to five selected presentations from emerging researchers. We invite submissions of extended abstracts on any topic related to the philosophy of music.

Confirmed Keynote Speakers

• Andrew Kania (Trinity University, San Antonio)

• Julian Dodd (University of Leeds)

• Nemésio G. C. Puy (Complutense University of Madrid)

Submission Guidelines

• Submissions should take the form of extended abstracts (maximum 1000 words).

• Abstracts must be submitted in English and prepared for anonymous review.

• In addition to the abstract, authors must include their name, institutional affiliation, and contact information in the body of the email accompanying the submission.

• Accepted abstracts will be allocated a 25-minute presentation slot, followed by discussion.

• Please submit your abstract in PDF format to the following email address: philmusic.lisbon@gmail.com.

Important Dates

• Submission Deadline: 1 March 2025

• Notification of Results: 1 April 2025

Participation Fees

• Registration Fee: 115€

Scientific Committee

• Federico Lauria (University of Lisbon)

• Matteo Ravasio (Peking University)

• Tiago Sousa (University of Minho)

• Vítor Guerreiro (University of Porto)

Organizing Committee

• Hugo Luzio (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

• Madalena Sobral (Clepsydra, University of Lisbon)

For further inquiries, please contact the organizing committee at philmusic.lisbon@gmail.com.

Scientific Realism Under Fire

Michele Pizzochero (University of Bath & Harvard University)

13 December 2024, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Structural realism and entity realism are two widely discussed forms of scientific realism that seek to identify those claims within scientific theories that warrant ontological commitment. Broadly, structural realism holds that belief should be accorded to relations, while entity realism (especially in the version articulated by Ian Hacking) endorses belief in the entities susceptible to manipulation. Both views assert that these claims—relations or entities—underlie the empirical success of science and persist amidst theory change. In this talk, I will challenge both structural and entity realism using the historical case of phlogiston, a fire-like element posited by eighteenth-century chemists that was ultimately deemed non-existent. Despite its referential failure, the phlogiston theory was empirically successful, generating genuine predictions and unifying diverse phenomena. Drawing from this episode, I will develop a twofold argument. First, against structural realism, I will argue that the set of empirically successful relations identified within phlogiston theory was not retained in subsequent scientific theories. Second, against entity realism, I will argue that phlogiston, despite its non-existence, enjoyed manipulative success. Overall, these arguments cast doubt on the general applicability of structural and entity realism as reliable guides to track reality in the face of theory change.

Moral Dimensions of Offsetting Luxury Emissions

Stearns Broadhead

6 December 2024, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: This work addresses moral aspects of using carbon offsets for counteracting individuals’ luxury emissions. After introducing and outlining the main topics and terms related to carbon offsetting, it answers three objections that have been leveled against carbon offsetting: objections from the indulgences analogy, objections from the directness of the duty not to harm, and separateness objections. The work argues that advocates for offsetting have resources to defend against these criticisms by pointing to particularities of individual emissions’ harmfulness, as well as the preemptive nature of offsetting. The work then shows that in spite of these defenses there is reason to regard not emitting as a better option because of a host of problems that plague offsetting in its current forms. This work concludes that offsetting enhances individuals’ options for discharging their duty not to harm, but that standards of justice and efficacy need to be adopted.

Physicalist, Reductive Definitions of Concepts

Arvid Båve (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

29 November 2024, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: I have previously argued that Bealer’s argument against reductive functionalism does not affect a version of the latter which incorporates a functionalist (or conceptual role) view of contents. That response raises questions about the nature of contents, however. Reductive functionalists clearly cannot take them to be physical, on grounds of multiple realizability. It seems the only option is therefore for them to take contents to be “second-order” entities, i.e., merely token-identical with physical entities but, type-wise, definable in physical terms in some way analogous to the way ordinary mental states are. The big question is then how such definitions might read. To explain how, I first make some assumptions about the nature of contents (propositions and their constituents, which I take to be concepts). They have been defended and discussed in detail in other work. On the basis of these assumptions, reductive definitions of concepts (including propositions) are proposed. A potential problem arises but I argue that there are many satisfying responses to it.

What is it to Use a Word?

Indrek Reiland (University of Viena)

29 November 2024, 12:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: What is it, in producing a noise (mark, bodily movement), to use a word, sentence, or other expression? The most common suggestion is that this has something to do with the speaker’s articulatory intentions: the intention to repeat a previous use (Kaplan 1990) or simply the intention to use a word (Hawthorne & Lepore 2011). On some versions of the view, intention isn’t wholly constitutive; the product (noise etc.) also has to satisfy some conventional standards specifying the canonical articulation, within limits of toleration (Hawthorne & Lepore 2011). In this talk I will offer two ways of working out this idea in detail and defend one of them over the other. On the offered view, to use a word is to intend, in making a noise, to put a rule in force that requires the noise to match the canonical articulation. I will end by showing how this view enables us to make sense of LLM-based chatbots like ChatGPT as using words, even if they lack intentions and other mental states.

Constitutivism in Ethics and Epistemology

University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal

September 4–6, 2025

Constitutivism is the view that the normative standards for something are based in its nature. In ethics, the view is that the standards for human action are based in the nature of our action. In epistemology, the view is that the standards for belief are based in the nature of belief. This conference aims to investigate the promise and power for constitutivism in ethics and epistemology, individually and together. Both papers developing the constitutivist view and those critical of it are welcome.

In addition to the invited speakers, there are 4 open places for speakers. Please submit a long abstract of no more than 1000 words, anonymized for review, to constitutivism.lisboa.2025@gmail.com, no later than January 31st, 2025.

Accommodation and dinners for speakers will be covered by conference funds, but we cannot help with travel.

Papers presented at the conference will be considered for a special issue of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy, who are generously partially funding the conference. Deadline for submission of final drafts of the papers will be December 31st, 2025.

The conference is hosted at the Centre of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon.

Organizers (in alphabetical order):

Luca Ferrero (University of California, Riverside)

Jeremy David Fix (Keble College, University of Oxford)

David Horst (University of Lisbon)

Invited Speakers (in alphabetical order):

Kate Nolfi (University of Virginia)

Hille Paakkunainen (Syracuse University)

T.A. Pendlebury (University of Chicago)

TBA

Structural Essentialism as an Ontology of the Physical World

Tomasz Bigaj (University of Warsaw)

15 November 2024, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: In this talk I will introduce and discuss a structural version of essentialism with respect to the identification of individual physical objects. The adopted approach will be fundamentally generalistic (qualitativistic): the only way to identify a given individual is by reference to its place in a qualitative relational structure designated as “essential”. I will extensively discuss the problem of the multiplicity of alternative identifications of objects in possible scenarios (modality de re) using a broadly Lewisian concept of a counterpart function. Particular emphasis will be put on the possibility of the existence of qualitatively indistinguishable counterpart functions which differ merely haecceitistically, and on the threat such possibility poses to the position of generalism.