How Inference Can Be Explained in Terms of Logical Consequence

Rachel Boddy (IUSS Pavia)

11 April 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Philosophers have held that validity of inference can be explained in terms of logical consequence. In today’s debate on the normativity of logic, however, it is commonly taken for granted that this view is mistaken. Harman’s (1986) criticism appears to have settled the matter: Current logic fails to explain what beliefs may or should be inferred from what other beliefs. The issue here is that logical principles are not defeasible, whereas principles of belief revision are. I argue that this criticism does not settle the matter because it relies on a notion of inference that logical accounts do not share. The focus of this talk is on the question this raises: What is an inference supposed to be in logic? Starting from the view that inference is an epistemic notion, I argue that the notion of inference at play in logic should be expressed in terms of knowledge, not in terms of belief.

Subjectless Certainty

Joshua Rowan Thorpe (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

4 April 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Descartes claims to find certainty in the cogito. Lichtenberg responds: ‘one should say it is thinking, just as one says, it is lightning. To say cogito is already too much as soon as one translates it as I am thinking.’ (Lichtenberg, K 76, translated in Gomes 2024.) Here we have the negative claim that ‘I am thinking’ is not certain. We also have the positive claim that ‘it is thinking’ is certain. The aim of this paper is to assess these claims. I first argue that the negative claim is correct. I also argue that there is something right about the positive claim. We can be certain (only) of the occurrence of something subjectless. However, we should characterise this something in a way that is neutral as to whether it counts as thinking.

The Many-Objects Interpretation of Relativistic Change

Damiano Costa (Università della Svizzera Italiana)

28 March 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: I explore a new solution to Sattig’s problem of relativistic change. First, I provide a reassessment of the problem, according to which the numerically same object appears to have something as a part in one frame but not at another (i.e. its “corner slices”). Second, I present a new solution that takes this mereological difference seriously, thus entailing that the relevant ordinary object is frame-bound. Finally, while this solution is naturally coupled with four-dimensionalism, I explore the possibility of coupling it with three-dimensionalism in order to provide an answer to Gilmore’s location question.

Necessary in the Highest Degree — Whatever That Means

Cian Dorr (New York University)

21 March 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: There are many reasons to think that the ‘necessity’ in the title and topic of Naming and Necessity is intended to be understood as minimally inclusive, in the sense that whenever it is necessary (tout court) that something is the case, it is also necessary in every other way that it is the case. It is also clear that Kripke believes he has identified a powerful and general technique for arguing for claims of necessity, by appealing to the necessity of identity—a technique that can be applied not just to identities involving proper names, but to “theoretical identifications”, thereby establishing necessity tout court for many facts that Kripke’s immediate predecessors would have classified as merely nomically necessary. But many authors find the modal claims supported by this technique so implausible when ‘necessary’ is read as minimally inclusive that they reject the straightforward interpretation of Kripke as intending such a reading.

            In this talk, I will defend both the straightforward interpretation and the claim that his argumentative technique really does have the power and generality that Kripke attributes to it, for “theoretical identifications” as well as identities involving proper names. My initial focus will be on property identities like ‘The property of being made of gold is the property of being composed of atoms with 79 protons’, as well as related infinitival identities, like ‘To be made of gold is to be composed of atoms with 79 protons’. I will argue that such sentences are plausibly true and support attributions of necessity, even on a minimally inclusive reading of ‘necessary’. This requires rebutting views that either reject such identities, or reject the validity of substituting them into the necessity of identity, on the grounds that this implies false claims involving propositional attitudes such as ‘Everyone who knows that something is made of gold knows that it is composed of atoms with 79 protons’. In response to the proponents of such views, I will sketch a view of speech and attitude verbs as semantically ill-behaved (in a way somewhat reminiscent of quotation). Finally, I will argue that although Kripke’s paradigm “theoretical identifications”—sentences like ‘Water is H₂O’ and ‘Heat is molecular motion’—have readings on which they are not identities of any sort, they also admit readings as equivalent to corresponding infinitival identities (e.g., ‘To be water is to be H₂O’), and are thus equally capable of playing the relevant argumentative role.

The Guise of the Rewarding

Jeremy Pober (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

14 March 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Among empirically sensitive theories of desire, a prominent strain (Arpaly and Schroeder 2014; Schroeder 2004; Pober forthcoming) defines desire in terms of ‘reward’, where ‘reward’ is a technical term derived from its use in the psychology of decision-making. Per these Reward Theories, desires are realized in states of the reward learning system. This system records and constantly updates the reward value of various objects an agent/organism encounters, such that the more rewarding an object type, the more, ceteris paribus, the agent/organism is disposed to behave in ways that support obtaining it. Meanwhile, among other theories of desire, representational, or ‘guise of the good’ theories claim the defining characteristic of desires is that they represent their objects as good in some way. The most influential strain take the vehicle of the representation to be a quasi-perceptual state (Oddie 2005; Tenenbaum 2007). I propose that these two families of views can be fruitfully combined. The core idea is that ‘rewarding’ is understood as a sort of evaluation of goodness, in particular a subjective valuation (Levy and Glimcher 2012), and, in turn, the reward learning system is the vehicle of the evaluations that constitute desire. The resulting ‘Guise of the Rewarding’ view has, I shall argue, advantages over each of its constituents.

Higher-Order Metaphysical Resolutions of the Continuum Hypothesis

Peter Fritz (University College London)

7 March 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: I aim to draw a connection between higher-order metaphysics and the philosophy of mathematics, in particular set theory. Higher-order metaphysics means carrying out metaphysical debates in higher-order logic, using higher-order quantifiers to regiment talk of propositions, properties, and relations. A prominent topic in this area is grain science, the investigation of individuation conditions of propositions, properties, and relations. These topics seem purely metaphysical. But I will argue that they are intimately connected to questions in (the philosophy of) mathematics. In particular, I will argue that views about grain science can resolve the continuum hypothesis. To do so, I will present an example of such a view. I won’t argue for it, but I hope to motivate, first, that the view is attractive, or at least not implausible; second, that the view doesn’t obviously prejudge controversial questions in (the philosophy of) set theory; and third, that the view nevertheless settles the continuum hypothesis. The view assumes that sets obey the principles of ZFC set theory, and that propositions form a structure which corresponds to a particular complete Boolean algebra. Adapting standard forcing results using Boolean-valued models, we can show that this higher-order metaphysical view entails the failure of the continuum hypothesis.

Healthism, Neurodiversity, and Respectability Politics

Quill Kukla (Georgetown University)

28 February 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: “Healthism” is the pervasive ideology according to which each of us is responsible for valuing and protecting our own health and prioritizing health over other values, while society has the right to enforce, surveil, and reward healthy living. Neurodiversity and other forms of cognitive difference are generally understood through the lens of health: they are taken as diagnosable pathological conditions that should be treated or mitigated via medical interventions. Putting these two ideas together, neurodivergent people are supposed to try to be “healthy,” through pharmaceuticals, behavioral therapy, and the like, and society has an investment in making them be “healthy.” But neurodivergence is not a morbidity in a typical sense, so it is unclear what “health” means in this context. In practice, our societal standards for health for neurodivergent people are defined in terms of what avoids disrupting neurotypical expectations and systems or making neurotypical people uncomfortable. “Health,” for neurodivergent people, is in effect respectability—it is not defined in terms of their own needs or flourishing but in relation to the norms and needs of others. This can be seen from a close reading of diagnostic definitions and official medical “treatment” methods and goals. Trying to “treat” neurodivergent people by making them respectable citizens who are palatable within neurotypical productivity culture is usually likely to backfire; typically bad for their own well-being, and a social loss.

How Do You Know That?

Giada Fratantonio (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

21 February 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: When someone asserts something, we sometimes respond by asking how they know, or what evidence they have, for their assertion. This is often a perfectly legitimate response, both in everyday life and in more formal settings. And yet, in some cases there is something uncomfortable about responding to the testimony of victims of trauma or discrimination with questions of this sort. One might think that this discomfort arises because asking these questions violates norms of privacy, politeness, or morality. This encourages the idea that we can and perhaps should ask these questions anyway in cases where our main concerns are epistemic. However, in this paper I argue that there are a broad range of cases where these questions are epistemically impermissible.

An Uncertainty Model of Suicidality

Sidney Carls-Diamante (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

20 December 2024, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Uncertainty is a factor widely but implicitly acknowledged to contribute to suicidality, but is not often studied as a suicidogenic factor in its own right. This presentation details the role of uncertainty in generating suicidal thoughts and actions. It is proposed that suicidality is a set of cognitive and behavioural strategies for reducing uncertainty and its consequential disruptions to homeostasis, i.e., psychological and/or physiological stability. The presentation argues that there are three dimensions of uncertainty that specifically contribute to suicidality: uncertainty about 1) whether currently experienced adversity will continue into the future, 2) about whether present conditions will improve and 3) about when they will change. Persisting through life entails continued experience of such high-uncertainty states that may prove detrimental to homeostasis. In contrast, death is a high-certainty state, wherein distress, pain, or suffering – manifestations of disrupted homeostasis – are reliably predicted to end. Suicidal ideation thus emerges as a mental model that allows the agent to imagine death as a state wherein homeostasis is restored. When the agent’s distress becomes severe enough, escalation to suicidal action can occur as a behavioural strategy to precipitate restoration of homeostasis (in the form of an end to suffering) through death.

Lisbon Meetings on the Philosophy of Music

5 June 2025

School of Arts and Humanities

University of Lisbon

The Language, Mind and Cognition Group (LanCog), in collaboration with the multidisciplinary group Clepsydra (University of Lisbon), is pleased to announce the Lisbon Meetings on the Philosophy of Music, to be held on 5 June 2025 at the School of Arts and Humanities, University of Lisbon.

This one-day event will feature contributions from leading scholars in the field, and up to five selected presentations from emerging researchers. We invite submissions of extended abstracts on any topic related to the philosophy of music.

Confirmed Keynote Speakers

• Andrew Kania (Trinity University, San Antonio)

• Julian Dodd (University of Leeds)

• Nemésio G. C. Puy (Complutense University of Madrid)

Submission Guidelines

• Submissions should take the form of extended abstracts (maximum 1000 words).

• Abstracts must be submitted in English and prepared for anonymous review.

• In addition to the abstract, authors must include their name, institutional affiliation, and contact information in the body of the email accompanying the submission.

• Accepted abstracts will be allocated a 25-minute presentation slot, followed by discussion.

• Please submit your abstract in PDF format to the following email address: philmusic.lisbon@gmail.com.

Important Dates

• Submission Deadline: 1 March 2025

• Notification of Results: 1 April 2025

Participation Fees

• Registration Fee: 115€

Scientific Committee

• Federico Lauria (University of Lisbon)

• Matteo Ravasio (Peking University)

• Tiago Sousa (University of Minho)

• Vítor Guerreiro (University of Porto)

Organizing Committee

• Hugo Luzio (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

• Madalena Sobral (Clepsydra, University of Lisbon)

For further inquiries, please contact the organizing committee at philmusic.lisbon@gmail.com.