On the Optimality of Vagueness
Paul Egré (joint work with Benjamin Spector, Adèle Mortier, Steven Verheyen)
Institute Jean Nicod and École Normale Supériore

27 November 2020, 16:00

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia) & live-streamed

Abstract: What is the function of vagueness in language? We argue that in contexts in which a cooperative speaker is not perfectly informed about the world, the use of vague expressions can offer an optimal trade-off between truthfulness (Gricean Quality) and informativeness (Gricean Quantity). Focusing on expressions of approximation such as “around”’, which are semantically vague, we show that they allow the speaker to convey indirect probabilistic information, in a way that can give the listener a more accurate representation of the information available to the speaker than any more precise expression would (intervals of the form “between”). We give a probabilistic treatment of the interpretation of “around”, and offer a model for the interpretation and use of “around”-statements within the Rational Speech Act (RSA) framework. Broader lessons are drawn concerning the semantic flexibility of vague expressions.

Free Attendance, but preregistration required: https://cful.letras.ulisboa.pt/lancog/registration/

Natural Kinds, Mind-Independence, and Unification Principles
Tuomas Tahko (University of Bristol)

20 November 2020, 16:00

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia) & live-streamed

Abstract: A group of entities may share a number of properties without being a natural kind (say, all green and round things). It’s often enough for our scientific goals of explanation and prediction that there are one or more shared properties among a given sample set. Yet, there is more to being a member of a natural kind than sharing properties with other members of the kind. There have been many attempts to determine what makes a natural kind real, chief among them is the criterion according to which natural kinds must be mind-independent. But it is difficult to specify this criterion: many seemingly natural kinds have an element of mind-dependence. I will argue that the mind-independence criterion is nevertheless a good one, if correctly understood: the mind-independence criterion concerns the unification principles for natural kinds. Unification principles explain how natural kinds unify their properties.

Free Attendance, but preregistration required: https://cful.letras.ulisboa.pt/lancog/registration/

The Fundamentality of Fundamental Powers
Joaquim Giannotti (University of Birmingham)

13 November 2020, 16:00 | The talk will be given in a mixed presence regime

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia) & live-streamed

Abstract: Dispositional essentialism is the view that all or many fundamental properties are essentially dispositional, or powers. The literature on the dispositional essence of powers is abundant. In contrast, the question of how to understand the fundamentality of fundamental powers has received scarce interest. Therefore, the fundamentality of powers stands in need of clarification. There are three main conceptions of the fundamental, namely as that which is: (i) metaphysically independent; or (ii) belonging to a minimally complete basis; or (iii) perfectly natural. Here I present and discuss each of these approaches from the viewpoint of dispositional essentialism. I show that (i) is incompatible with the metaphysics of powers and (ii) – (iii) have more drawbacks than merits. Therefore, the dispositional essentialist should favour a different approach. To this end, I defend a primitivist conception of the absolute fundamentality of powers, which has the virtues of (i) – (iii) but none of the vices.

Free Attendance, but preregistration required: https://cful.letras.ulisboa.pt/lancog/registration/

Grounding the Future (and the Future of Grounding)
Roberto Loss (University of Hamburg)

6 November 2020, 16:00 | The talk will be given in a mixed presence regime

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia) & live-streamed

Abstract: According to what may be labelled ‘serious Ockhamism’, (i) the future is open, (ii) the openness of the future consists in the fact that what exists is insufficient to determine the truth-value of (at least some) future-directed statements, and yet (iii) future-directed statements all possess a determinate truth-value. Serious Ockhamism appears to be in tension with the idea that truth is grounded in reality. Some serious Ockhamists bite the bullet and accept some truths to be indeed ungrounded. Others prefer, instead, a more sophisticated approach and claim that even if future-contingent statements are not grounded in the way reality is, they are nevertheless not ungrounded, as they are ‘cross-temporally’ grounded in the way reality will be. In this talk I will construe the grounding challenge faced by serious Ockhamists as involving the notion of metaphysical grounding and I will argue that, although the kind of ‘cross-temporal grounding’ serious Ockhamists appeal to is in tension with a set of rather ‘orthodox’ grounding principles, serious Ockhamists appear to have independent reasons to embrace at least a certain kind of grounding ‘heresy’.

Free Attendance, but preregistration required: https://cful.letras.ulisboa.pt/lancog/registration/

Against the Pretense View of Fiction
Manuel García-Carpintero (University of Barcelona / LOGOS / LanCog)

30 October 2020, 16:00 | Online, via Zoom

Abstract: In his classic paper “The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse” (1974/5), John Searle argued that fictions don’t result from dedicated, sui generis acts (or, in to me equivalent terms, are not dedicated, sui generis artefacts) in the way assertions, questions or directives are; they are just pretenses of acts like those – the view had been defended earlier by Margaret MacDonald (1954) and Richard Gale (1971). Searle’s arguments were seriously challenged by Currie and Walton, proponents of different versions of the dedicated artefact view in their respective very influential 1990 books. In recent work, Peter Alward and Stefano Predelli have argued for a more sophisticated version of a Searlian view. In this paper I’ll confront their arguments, in defense of (my own version of) the dedicated artefact view. I’ll elaborate in my own terms on two decisive objections, not adequately acknowledged by either Currie or Walton: first, that the Searlian view is implausibly committed to there being fictional narrators in all fictions; second, that the view has implausible commitments on how referential expressions work in fictional discourse, implying that (as van Inwagen and Kripke put it in work in the 1970s) fictional utterances including them “don’t express propositions”.

Free Attendance, but preregistration required: https://cful.letras.ulisboa.pt/lancog/registration/

Musical Contagion and the Metaphorical Mind: What Music Teaches Us About Emotion
Federico Lauria (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

23 October 2020, 16:00 | The talk will be given in a mixed presence regime

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia) & live-streamed

Abstract: Music can infect us. For instance, listeners may feel sad because they perceive an Irish lament as sad. Contagion is central to musical experience and emotion regulation. What is it? What does it teach us about emotion? Many argue that contagion teaches us that the main theory of emotions as cognitive evaluations (cognitivism) is flawed. When feeling sad in response to sad music, we do not evaluate the music as unfortunate; nothing bad happened. According to the dominant picture, music contaminates us through mimicry independently of value appraisal (non-cognitivism). Against this trend, this paper proposes to rescue cognitivism from the musical challenge by offering a new account in terms of metaphor cognition: the value metaphor view. The main claim is that contagion is experiencing the music as a metaphor for emotions and for values, such as unfortunate things. Music “sounds like” emotions and values. This view can rebut the musical challenge to cognitivism. I motivate this account by arguing that non-cognitivism is poorly motivated and by making extensive use of empirical findings. As philosophers have neglected the ample empirical literature on this topic, this project fills an important gap.

Free Attendance, but preregistration required: https://cful.letras.ulisboa.pt/lancog/registration/

What is Moving Right Now?
Elton Marques (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

16 October 2020, 16:00 | The talk will be given in a mixed presence regime

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia) & live-streamed

Abstract: In this talk, I put forth an answer to a scarcely discussed question concerning a particular view in the metaphysics of time, namely the Moving Spotlight Theory (MST). The main advantage of this theory lies in the fact that it introduces a clear view of the kind of nature that might correspond to the ‘moving spotlight’ responsible for the passage of time. More specifically, the account I shall defend in this talk clearly indicates what the spotlight model refers to. The main goal of the talk is not the defense of the moving spotlight theory in itself, but rather an approach for understanding the metaphor at the core of this theory. To achieve this purpose, I will promote the union of two components: a) the idea that the present is the awareness of our mental states, and b) the idea that the flow of such an awareness of our mental states should correspond to the passage of time and to the spotlight itself. I purport to show what is required to satisfy the concept of the ‘spotlight’ in an illuminating way and address anticipated difficulties.

Free Attendance, but preregistration required: https://cful.letras.ulisboa.pt/lancog/registration/

Knowledge-first account of group knowledge
Domingos Faria (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

9 October 2020, 16:00 | The talk will be given in a mixed presence regime

Abstract: In this talk, we want to relate two trending topics in contemporary epistemology: the discussion of group knowledge and the discussion of knowledge-first approach. In social epistemology of group knowledge no one has yet seriously applied and developed Williamson (2000)’s theory of knowledge-first approach. For example, explanations for group knowledge, as presented by Tuomela (2004), Corlett (2007), Gilbert (2014), and Lackey (2020), assume that knowledge is analyzed in terms of more basic concepts, such as group belief, group justification, and so on. However, if Williamson (2000)’s theory is correct, these are not good explanations for understanding group knowledge. Thus, we want to analyze what consequences Williamson (2000)’s theory has for social epistemology, namely for an understanding of group knowledge. We argue that a consequence of knowledge-first approach for understanding group knowledge is to account for factive mental states at collective level (in ways that are not reducible at individual level). So it is necessary to provide and develop a plausible understanding of collective minds and collective mental states in a non-reductionist way.

Why Sensory Consciousness Can’t be Essentially Representational
David Papineau (KCL/CUNY)

25 September 2020, 16:00 | The talk will be given via the virtual platform Zoom

Abstract: Representationalism about sensory experience might be intuitive, but it faces the metaphysical challenge of explaining why conscious character (what-it’s-likeness) and representational content (correctness conditions) should be metaphysically intertwined. I shall argue that representationalism lacks the resources to do this. Attempts to defend representationalism by appealing to “transparency” only deepen the difficulties. In truth, representational content is metaphysically incommensurate with conscious character.

The Iberoamerican Logic Seminar is a collective effort of the main Logic and Philosophy of Logic groups in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Spain, Mexico and Portugal.

You can find the abstracts and the schedule of the past and upcoming talks following this link:

http://ba-logic.com/seloi/#schedule