Rational Polarization
Kevin Dorst (University of Pittsburgh)

12 March 2021, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – GMT+0) | Online, via Zoom

Abstract: Predictable polarization is everywhere.  When we make decisions about what college to attend, or what books to read, or which friends to hang out with, we can usually predict—not with certainty, but with confidence—that doing so will move our opinions in a particular direction.  Could this process be (epistemically) rational?  A collection of results establish that it can be if and only if the evidence we get is ambiguous, in the sense that it’s rational to be unsure how to react to it.  Thus it’s theoretically possible that a rational sensitivity to ambiguous evidence is what drives predictable polarization. What I want to argue here is that it’s also empirically plausible.  I’ll first report the results of a simple experiment illustrating how this can work.  I’ll then turn to two empirical phenomena that play a substantial role in real-world polarization: confirmation bias and enclave deliberation.  I’ll argue that both processes give rise to particular profiles of evidential ambiguity, and then use simulations to show that such profiles lead to predictable polarization—even amongst people whose goal is to form accurate beliefs.

Free Attendance, but preregistration required: https://cful.letras.ulisboa.pt/lancog/registration/

The threshold of belief and the value of punishment
Julien Dutant (King’s College London)

05 March 2021, 16:00 | Online, via Zoom

Abstract: This paper explores a tension between two putative norms for rational reactions (i.e. reactive attitudes like blame or anger and retributive actions like punishing). The first (Reactive Risk Management) says that how it is rational to react to an (apparent) deed depends on how confident it is rational to be that the deed was done. The second (Reasoned Reactions) says that it is rational to react to an (apparent) deed if, and only if, it is rational to believe that it was done. The two conflict in the context of the Fallibilist idea that rational belief does not require certainty. A well-known source of conflict between them is the problem of ‘naked statistical evidence’ (Buchak 2014). However, one can make the norms compatible even in naked statistical evidence cases by rejecting ordinary intuitions (Laudan 2012, Papineau 2019), or by claiming that reactions have epistemically-sensitive values: namely, that they have no positive value if not done on the basis of knowledge (Littlejohn 2018). This paper considers a separate source of conflict between the two norms: the problem of single-case threshold variance. When one is facing a choice over a range of potential reactions, the level of confidence that rationalizes one reaction appropriate to a deed may differ from that of another reaction appropriate to that deed. This entails that one of the two norms fails. The problem affects even the views that reconcile the two norms with naked statistical evidence. The problem would be avoided if a certain hypothesis, which I call the “Blackstone invariance hypothesi”, was true. Unfortunately, I don’t see much prospect for the hypothesis to hold. I conclude with some challenges to meet if we instead give up one of the three ideas that generate the problem.

Free Attendance, but preregistration required: https://cful.letras.ulisboa.pt/lancog/registration/

Consuming Fake News: Can We Do Any Better?
Michel Croce (Dublin/LanCog) & Tommaso Piazza (Pavia/LanCog)

26 February 2021, 16:00 | Online, via Zoom

Abstract: Extant remedies to the online proliferation of fake news range from promoting a reform of individual epistemic conduct to implementing systemic interventions. This paper defends educational approaches from the charge of being motivated by an excessively strict appraisal of the doxastic conduct of social media users. In particular, we address two versions of this charge, according to which the epistemic conduct of social media users is not criticisable because virtuous (Rini 2017) or because fully excused (Millar 2019). For both authors, we should not target individual behaviors but concentrate on reforming institutions and the architecture of online informational environments. We resist both contentions. Contra Rini, we claim that most fake news is beyond the range of application of the virtue of epistemic partisanship. Contra Millar, we argue that most social media users have some control over their informational diet and, for this reason, can be requested to amend their doxastic conduct

Free Attendance, but preregistration required: https://cful.letras.ulisboa.pt/lancog/registration/

The Classical Limit of Quantum Mechanics: One World, Many Routes
Davide Romano (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

19 February 2021, 16:00 | Online, via Zoom

Abstract: This talk is a presentation of my FCT research project: The Emergence of the Classical World From Quantum Mechanics, hosted by the Centre of Philosophy at the University of Lisbon. The project deals with the problem of the classical limit of quantum mechanics, which can be framed as follows: why does a collection of quantum systems (elementary particles, atoms, molecules) in ordinary macroscopic conditions generally form a classical object (a table, a chair, a human being)? Why does this transition happen, and under which conditions? Nowadays, the standard answer to this problem is given by decoherence theory: when a quantum system interacts with an external environment, it loses some of its characteristic quantum effects (it “decoheres”) and, when measured, it looks like a classical object. Nevertheless, there is no consensus in the literature on what has been really achieved by decoherence and the role it plays in the different interpretations of quantum mechanics. The project will investigate these issues, seeking to provide a comprehensive and ontologically clear account of the classical limit of quantum mechanics.

The talk will be divided into two parts. In the first part, I will present the merits and limits of decoherence. I will show that, despite the experimental success of decoherence, this theory (in the standard context) is unable to provide an explanation of the quantum to classical transition that goes beyond a pure instrumentalist approach. In the second part, I will briefly discuss the role and significance of decoherence theory in three different interpretations of quantum mechanics: the de Broglie–Bohm theory, the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) theory and the Everett/Many Worlds Interpretation. For each of these interpretations, indeed, not only can the problem of the classical limit be framed differently, but even decoherence itself plays either a different role or no role at all. Even though no definite results will be provided, I will suggest what further steps should be taken in order to develop a clear account of the classical limit.

Free Attendance, but preregistration required: https://cful.letras.ulisboa.pt/lancog/registration/

The plan for this term is now ready, as follows:

February 19 – Davide Romano (LanCog)
February 26 – Michel Croce (Dublin/LanCog) & Tommaso Piazza (Pavia/LanCog)
March 5 – Julien Dutant (King’s College London)
March 12 – Kevin Dorst (University of Pittsburgh)
March 19 – Timothy Sundell (University of Kentucky)
March 26 – Delia Belleri (LanCog)
April 9 – Julia Zakkou (Bielefeld University)
April 16 – Robert Williams (University of Leeds)
April 23 – Francisca Silva (LanCog)
April 30 – Bruno Jacinto (CFCUL/LanCog) & José Mestre (Stirling/LanCog)
May 7 – Philip Ebert (University of Stirling)
May 14 – Arturs Logins (University of Zürich)
May 21 – Hugo Luzio (LanCog)
May 28 – epistemology workshop (org. Domingos Faria & Michel Croce)
June 4 – Diogo Santos (LanCog)
June 11 – David Papineau (London)
June 18 – Adam Carter (Glasgow) & Emma Gordon (Glasgow)
June 25 – Liz Jackson (Ryerson University)

The LanCog Research Group, University of Lisbon, welcomes expressions of interest from suitably qualified candidates interested in applying for fix-term (up to 6 years) research positions funded by the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT) in the following conditions:

The FCT is the Portuguese national funding agency for academic research and development. In 2021, the FCT will fund the hiring of 400 researchers, holders of PhDs at various stages of career, to carry out their activity in research centres throughout Portugal. The selected researchers are hired by the host institution through a framework-contract between the host and the FCT, which guarantees the funding. In each of the previous editions, 10 to 13 positions have gone for philosophers, and LanCog has a strong record of supporting successful candidates.

The FCT will accept applications between 29 January and 26 February 2021 (17:00 Lisbon Time). Candidates will apply online directly to the FCT, but their application must be supported by a host institution.

The application, written in English, must include the following:

• A research plan, including a description of the main activities to be undertaken, the expected results, as well as an indication of how the research project fits with (at least one of) the goals set out in the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development;
• A brief description of previous academic and scientific experience, highlighting the main activities and results obtained in the last 5 years;
• Curriculum vitae;
• Motivation letter, identifying up to two main contributions of the candidate in the last 5 years and the expected main contributions for the next years;
• A brief description of the conditions provided by the host institution and of how the proposed research plan fits into the overall strategy of the research centre.

Applications will be assessed by an international panel, according to the following criteria:

• The candidate’s scientific experience, with emphasis on the last 5 years (70%);
• The proposed research plan (30%).

Each applicant can submit only one application for one of the following types of positions:

Junior researcher: PhD holders with limited post-doctoral experience in the scientific area of application – 2.134,73€ gross wage (c. 1.400-1.500€ net wage for 14 months/year, depending on several specific factors related to the family composition and income);

Assistant researcher: PhD holders with more than 5 years of post-doctoral research, with relevant experience in the scientific area of application and limited scientific independence* – 3.201,40€ gross wage (c. 1.800-1.950€ net wage 14 months/year, depending on several specific factors related to the family composition and income);

Principal researcher: PhD holders with more than 5 years of post-doctoral research, with relevant experience in the scientific area of application and demonstrating scientific independence* for the last 3 years – 3.611,83€ gross wage (c. 2.100-2300€ net wage 14 months/year, depending on several specific factors related to the family composition and income);

Coordinating researcher: PhD holders with more than 5 years of post-doctoral research, holders of a title of ‘Agregado’ (or ‘Habilitation’), with relevant experience and demonstrating scientific independence and recognized leadership in the scientific area of application – 4.678,96€ gross wage (c. 2.350-2500€ net wage 14 months/year, depending on several specific factors related to the family composition and income).

*Research independence is demonstrated through scientific competence, originality and international recognition, by experience in doctoral or post-doctoral supervision, or by the competitive research funds attracted at national or international level.

It is the applicant’s responsibility to choose the contract level best suited to their career stage.

It is mandatory to upload the doctoral diploma. In order to comply with the Portuguese legislation concerning the recognition of foreign qualifications, all the doctoral degrees granted by foreign higher education institutions should be duly recognized**. Applicants are advised to visit the website of the Direção-Geral do Ensino Superior (DGES) for further information: https://www.dges.gov.pt/en/pagina/degree-and-diploma-recognition. If possible, the recognition certificate (or proof that one has been requested) should be uploaded together with the diploma. Applications will be considered even if the recognition certificate is not available. However, the recognition must be obtained before signing the contract.

** Cf. Decree-Law No. 66/2018, of 16 August; Portaria No. 33/2019, of 25 January; Portaria No. 43/2020, of 14 February.

More information about the call, including a link to the application portal, is available here.

Interested candidates are invited to contact Dr. Domingos Faria (at domingosfaria@edu.ulisboa.pt), with a brief description of their intended research and current CV no later than 5 February.

The Expression of Hate in Hate Speech
Teresa Marques (University of Barcelona)

18 December 2020, 16:00

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia) & live-streamed

Abstract: This paper offers an account of how hate speech expresses hate. In so doing, it answers two objections to expressivist views. It further gives a hypothesis to explain how and when hate speech can correlate with hate crimes. It combines an account of the illocutionary structure of conversational contexts and of the normative requirements that speech makes on context, and recent accounts of the attitudes or sentiments expressed through hate speech. It concludes that hate speech is illocutionarily expressive, and presupposes ongoing hate as a sentiment which “organizes people’s social world” (Fischer et al 2018, p. 311).

Free Attendance, but preregistration required: https://cful.letras.ulisboa.pt/lancog/registration/

The Logic of Polyreference
Laura Delgado (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

11 December 2020, 16:00

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia) & live-streamed

Abstract: I have defended a novel view of the semantic of proper names, i.e., the Polyreferential View. According to this view, proper names can have more than one semantic referent, indeed as many as bearers of the name there are. This has the implication that a sentence containing a polyreferential name would thereby express many propositions or contents. I believe this way of thinking of the content expressed by ordinary sentences as multiple could have useful applications beyond theorizing about proper names. My current project has two main goals: one would be to develop the logic of this new semantic relation of polyreference and give an account of compositionality. The second goal would be to explore its applications to other areas of research. This talk presents a first approximation to a logic of polyreference.

Free Attendance, but preregistration required: https://cful.letras.ulisboa.pt/lancog/registration/

Knowledge, Luck and Individualised Evidence
Dario Mortini (Cogito, University of Glasgow)

4 December 2020, 16:00

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia) & live-streamed

Abstract: It is intuitively impermissible to convict someone on the basis of mere statistical evidence, but it is intuitively permissible to convict someone on the basis of eye-witness testimony – evidence which is individualised to the incriminating facts. Why? What’s so special about individualised evidence? These are the main questions raised by the puzzle of statistical evidence, and while the notion of individualised evidence may hold the key to solve it, there’s still no agreement on how exactly to define it. To make progress on the problem, epistemologists have proposed accounts of individualised evidence in terms of single causal and modal anti-luck conditions on knowledge like causation (Thomson 1986), sensitivity (Enoch et al. 2012) and safety (Pritchard 2018). In this talk, I show that each of these fails as satisfactory anti-luck condition, and that such failure lends abductive support to the following conclusion: once the familiar anti-luck intuition on knowledge is extended to individualised evidence, an adequate account of individualised evidence will have to invoke knowledge directly rather than separate (and defective) anti-luck conditions on knowledge.

Free Attendance, but preregistration required: https://cful.letras.ulisboa.pt/lancog/registration/