Tasting Together

Giulia Martina (University of Nottingham)

17 October 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Experiences such as cooking and eating together or participating in a wine tasting suggest that we can attend together to the flavours of foods and drinks. But is joint attention to flavour really possible? This talk focuses on two challenges from the case of flavour that existing accounts of joint attention do not address. First, the object question. How can we have the same object of attention if, as in most cases of tasting together, we are not literally tasting the same particular object? Second, the attention coordination question. Since the things we taste may not be public objects we can point to and follow with our gaze, how can we monitor and affect how the other attends to the object? I will argue that a form of joint attention can be established independently of vision, and that communication-based accounts of joint attention are especially well-suited to explain this. However, we need to move beyond the visual model and take seriously the distinctive structure of taste and flavour experiences.

Upper Logicist Ordinals

Bruno Jacinto (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

10 October 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Ordinals are commonly identified with particular kinds of sets. This identification is, however, highly implausible. Accordingly, in this talk I develop an “upper logicist” characterization of ordinals inspired by (i) Cantor’s view that ordinals are abstractions of well-orderings, and (ii) Russell’s view that such abstractions are higher-order entities. After reviewing important challenges to abstractionist characterizations of ordinals, and to Florio & Leach-Krouse’s (2017) recent logicism about ordinals, I will show that the upper logicist characterization does not fall prey to those challenges. I will conclude by sketching how my characterization paves the way for a defense of Upper Logicism – in the sense of (Jacinto 2024) – about ordinals as well as about sets.

The Substrate Flexibility of Consciousness

Jeremy Pober (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

3 October 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: In this joint work with Eric Schwitzgebel, we present a novel argument for the substrate flexibility of consciousness: the claim that consciousness can be instantiated in systems made of different substances (e.g., Chalmers 1996; Bostrom 2003). A common (e.g., Cao 2022; Block 2023; Seth 2025) way of investigating substrate flexibility has been by asking whether a fine-grained functional equivalent to a human brain that is somehow composed very differently, (e.g.,) of Silicon, would also be conscious. We believe the question is the wrong way to go about investigating the topic. The pull of the functional equivalence framing is that functional equivalence to us is sufficient for consciousness: a creature’s being functionally equivalent to us is a good reason to attribute consciousness to it. Functional equivalence is not, however, necessary, and therefore not the only good reason to attribute consciousness to a creature. We provide independent reason to attribute consciousness to creatures with different substrates: the Copernican Principle of Consciousness (Schwitzgebel and Pober, under review).This principle states that we should not assume ourselves as humans special with respect to consciousness among creatures of equivalent behavioral (or functional) sophistication. As long as the extent to which a creature exhibits sophistication is not somehow essentially linked to its substrate, we have no reason to think that consciousness is substrate inflexible.

The Portuguese Epistemology Group (PEG) was set up by Giada Fratantonio, Joshua Rowan Thorpe, and David Horst, to foster the study of epistemology in Portugal.
 
The PEG runs a seminar series, workshops, and conferences.
 

The PEG Seminar convenes in term time, on Fridays at 13:00 – 15:00, in person at the Universidade de Lisboa.

Autumn 2025 Seminar Schedule

26th September

“Disquotation and Silence”, Josh Thorpe (talk)

3rd October 

No seminar

10th October

Chapter of Maria Lasonen-Aarnio’s forthcoming book (discussion)

17th October

“On the Evocation Norm of Questioning”, Giada Fratantonio (talk)

24th October 

Social Role Epistemology, Jesper Kallestrup (talk)

31st October

Chapter of Maria Lasonen-Aarnio’s forthcoming book (discussion)

7th November

Title TBD, Francesca Scapinello (talk)

14th November 

Title TBD, Nuno Venturinha (talk)

21 November

“Epistemic Teleology and the Seperateness of Propositions”, Berker (discussion)

28th November 

“Narrative Epistemology”, Fraser (discussion)

5th December

“Joint attention as a joint communicative action” Felipe León (talk)

12th December

“We Have Positive Epistemic Duties”, McGrath (discussion)

19th December 

“What is the Lichtenberg objection?”, Josh Thorpe (talk)

For updates, see the PEG’s website.

Topics, Focus, and Relevance Properties in First-Order Relevant Logic

Nicholas Ferenz (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

26 September 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: In this joint work with Andrew Tedder, we investigate the problem of providing relevance properties for first order relevant logics by expanding on recent work concerning relevance as topical in propositional relevant logics. We propose a theory of topic for first order languages in general, relying on the use of focus markers in an extension of the usual first order language. Such an enrichment of the language and conceptual apparatus of a logic provides avenues into the problem of identifying relevance properties for first-order relevant logics.

This event is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa.

Argument Rodizio

27 June 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

The Argument Rodizio is a session in which each participant presents a short, desirably surprising, argument in 5-10 minutes, to be discussed in the following 5-10 minutes. The argument should be as clearly stated as possible and written on the board or displayed on the computer.
 

Here’s the lineup for this year’s session:

1. Jeremy Pober:”Either Mind-Brain Reduction is True, or Reduction Doesn’t Matter”
2. Quentin Ruyant: “We Need Quantum Physics to Understand Consciousness (and Conversely)”
3. Bruno Jacinto: “Numbers All the Way”
4. Arvid Båve: “A Simple Argument for S5”
5. Matheus Valente: “One Winner, Two Losers”
6. Carolina Flores: “The Paradox of Security”
7. Sanna Hirvonen: “The Hiddenness of Dishes, or Can We Ever Know What We Eat?”
8. Robert Michels: “Philosophy is Art”

From Spacetime in Physics to Space and Time in Human Experience

Thomas Sattig (University of Tübingen)

20 June 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: The development of the physics of space and time is a story of alienation. Today we face a deep gap between the way humans experience space and time and the way space and time are understood in contemporary physics. In the world of human experience, space and time are very different: space organizes things in a static way, while time organizes things in a dynamic way. In the world of contemporary physics, however, space and time are very similar: space and time form aspects of a single spacetime that organizes all things in a static way. It is a significant task of contemporary philosophy to bridge the gap between the physics of spacetime and the human experience of space and time. This talk will describe the gap and outline a path of reconciliation.

The Problem of Expressive Action in Philosophical Action Theory

Luca Bellini (LMU Munich)

6 June 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: There is a wide range of expressive actions we do. We kick cars that refuse to start, we kiss and talk to pictures, we wreck damage to the belongings of someone who cheated on us, and many others along the same lines. The problem of expressive action is the problem of explaining why we do such bizarre things. According to the received view, these are just actions out of emotion. Instead, I argue they are much more like make-believe games. Having to firstly clarify what makes expressive actions expressive – i.e. what, if anything, they express –, I draw on a hitherto overlooked analogy with both children’s games (e.g. duelling with make-believe swords) and rituals (e.g. burning in effigy) to claim that expressive actions, too, prescribe what is fictionally the case. While furthering our understanding of the role that imagination plays in justifying our conduct, this talk sheds light on the nature of rational agency and the problem of action – the problem of explaining what makes something an action in the first place. In doing so, I aim to show that our standard model of action explanation, encapsulated in the slogan “beliefs and desires cause actions”, has finally run its course.

Grasping Models as Epistemic Tools: From Scientific Representation to Engineering Design

Michael Poznic (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology)

16 May 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Models can be used for different kinds of projects in scientific or engineering contexts. Representational uses haven been predominantly discussed in philosophy of science. Next to such uses, the perspective on models as designs is equally important. What is common to most if not all target-directed modeling projects is that grasping the models is a first step to use the respective models for understanding their target phenomena. This talk sketches an account of grasping models that is primarily tailored to approaches that focus on objectual understanding. A central element is the evaluation of the models in terms of their direction-of-fit to their targets. Whether other epistemic achievements can be spelled out with such an account of grasping is something that the proposal does not preclude. An open question is the relevance for exploratory or other uses of models that are not directed at representing or designing targets.

Know-How, Action and Proximity

Adam Carter (University of Glasgow)

2 May 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Few theses at the intersection of action theory and epistemology have more adherents than the Simple View, according to which, if an agent φ-s intentionally, then she knows how to φ. That view struggles, however, to account for cases of intentional actions performed in novel circumstances, or when facing novel tasks. We propose to reject the Simple View and instead explain the relationship between intentional action and know-how by appeal to proximity, a relation encoding the extent to which the means for one task (ψ) can be co-opted to reliably succeed in another (φ). According to our Proximity View, if an agent φ-s intentionally, then she knows how to ψ, where ψ is sufficiently proximal to φ. Not only does the Proximity View explain intentional actions performed when facing novel circumstances or tasks, but it also illuminates both the process of learning by doing and the luck that action per se tolerates. (Joint work with Tim Kearl [Flagler College].)