Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Metaph. 333.22-29, writes the following lines: “If, in fact, there are only two answers to each question, and if one of the two answers is an affirmation and the other a negation, and if nothing else is meant by the answers than ‘it is’ by the one and ‘it is not’ by the other, then there will be no intermediary of the contradiction. For if there were such an intermediary, then either there would have to be, apart from the negative ‘no’, a third, different answer, namely that of not answering the question in the affirmative, but positing the intermediary; or to affirm the non-existence of the subject-matter would not be the only meaning of the negative ‘no’, but it could also bear some other, no less definite meaning.” My talk will explore this idea of another meaning of the negation—which amounts to a refusal to affirm the existence of the subject-matter—and show that this is what Γ 7 is all about. In this chapter, Aristotle criticizes thinkers, in particular Anaxagoras, who defended a more ambitious sense of the negation than that of classical logic, similar to a certain use of negation in modern intuitionism. This more ambitious negation is of the epistemic type: to deny, in this context, is to assert that it is established (proven, known) that what is being denied is not the case. Against this epistemic approach, Aristotle defends an interpretation of the negation according to which to deny is just to affirm the non-existence of what is being denied. Relying on philology and philosophical analysis, I shall examine—and reconstruct—how he proceeds.