HPhil Seminar: June 26, 2025.

The HPhil (History of Philosophy) Research Group of the Centre of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon announces the 2024/25 edition of its permanent seminar on the history of philosophy, devoted to the presentation of conferences by renowned specialists while also creating opportunities to emerging scholars, aiming to promote advanced studies in groundbreaking debates and the permanent training of its academic community.

In this session of the seminar, Fabienne Baghdassarian (Université de Rennes) will present a paper, entitled “Metaphysics and Axioms: Between Platonic Dialectic and Aristotelian Epistemology (Metaphysics, Gamma 3)”. (abstract below)

The session will take place on June 26, 2025 at 5 p.m., in the Room C201.J (Room Mattos Romão, Department of Philosophy). Admission is free

Abstract

In Metaphysics, Gamma 3, Aristotle proposes to include the examination of the first principles of demonstrations within the scope of the metaphysician. In doing so, he addresses the second aporia raised in book B: does the study of both axioms and substance belong to a single science or to several? Among the questions this claim raises, I would like to focus on how it sheds light on the epistemic status of metaphysics and its relation to the other sciences. More specifically, I aim to show that Aristotle’s way of addressing the second aporia reveals an effort to place the metaphysical study of the axioms within a double continuity: first, with Aristotelian standard epistemology, as developed in the Analytics; second, with Plato’s Republic, which Aristotle echoes in assigning to metaphysics the task of studying the firmest and non-hypothetical principle. The convergence between these two elements indicates a critical reappropriation of the role assigned to Platonic dialectic, allowing to integrate the metaphysical study of the axioms within a different conception of the organization of the sciences––one in which the epistemic superiority of metaphysics is fully compatible with the epistemic autonomy of the particular sciences. This, I argue, is perceptible in Gamma 3 on two complementary levels. In the first part of my paper, I will argue that Aristotle’s strategy for addressing the second aporia amounts to subordinating the particular sciences to metaphysics without depriving them of any epistemic strength. In the second part, I will attempt to show how Aristotle’s defense of the firmness of the Principle of Non-Contradiction reveals a properly Aristotelian conception of a non-hypothetical principle and its maximal intelligibility.