Stephan Zimmermann

Praxis-CFUL/University of Bonn

Kant’s Distinction between Duties of Right and Duties of Virtue in View of the ‘Table of the Categories of Freedom’

22 November 2022, 17h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+0)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

The way Kant distinguishes between duties of right and duties of virtue in the Metaphysics of Morals makes the unity of his moral philosophy doubtful, at least as some interpreters understand it. He seems to specify the particular nature of these two types of duty in such a way that this specification is in tension with his general concept of duty in the Groundwork and the second Critique. Kant, however, uses several criteria to distinguish between duties of right and duties of virtue. I want to explore suggestions that have so far been ignored by the interpreters in order to deal with these criteria. In the second Critique, Kant maintains that the “Table of the Categories of Freedom” contains the whole plan for the future system of duties. And in this table, he includes one division of duties. In doing so, he emphasises this division above all others. My thesis is that the recourse to the “Table of the Categories of Freedom” provides a reliable benchmark for dealing with the many characteristics of the two types of duty later used in the Metaphysics of Morals: some of these characteristics can indeed be traced back to the table.