Filipe Ferreira

PUC-São Paulo

The Death of Man

31 January 2023, 17h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+0)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

However strange it may sound initially, I claim that we are currently living the event of the death of man. By man I mean, following Michel Foucault in Les mots et les choses, a particular configuration of Western man, beginning in the end of the eighteenth century, where man appears as the principal actor of a new episteme, the modern one. It is he who I believe is today living the event of his death, even while repressing it violently, or, it seems, especially so. In this research seminar, I will try to detail how I understand this event to have come into being, in these first decades of the twenty-first century. In this sense, I propose to further develop Foucault’s ‘archeology of the human sciences’ into a new one, focused on man, which I call the ‘archeology of man’s death’. I understand, in this second archeology, the twentieth century nouveau roman (Samuel Beckett, in particular) and post-war cinema, as analyzed by Gilles Deleuze in The Time-Image, to be fertile ‘archeological sites’, replete with vestiges of the event of man’s death. My main claim is that the experience of his death is the experience of difference, from which, if man is to regain himself, it will be through his Others, in multiple becomings, becoming-woman, child, black, Arawaté, plant, in becomings where man no longer is. At least in their best versions, the human sciences are understood to play a fundamental epistemic role in the constitution of these becomings. Man’s resistance to his death will also be considered as what gives sense to, defining today, the ‘political’.

Ângelo Milhano

University of Évora

‘Mirror, mirror on the wall, whose body is this, after all?’ Don Ihde – Postphenomenology and the Body Problem in the Metaverse

6 December 2022, 17h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+0)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

The investment of the big digital companies in the concepts of “virtual reality” and “augmented reality” seems to indicate a new course of development of the various digital technologies. Taking into account their ubiquity and the dependence we have been developing towards them, the total immersion of the human consciousness in the digital seems, in fact, to be the most natural development of the digital platforms we have available today. In the unfolding of social networks as “metaverses”, in the transition from smartphones to “neuralinks”, it is possible to understand the tendency of total incorporation of technology, the same one that has marked the whole history of technological development until our days. The technological fantasy continues to be to make technology as transparent as possible: to enjoy its capabilities while eliminating, as best as possible, its sensory limitations. The relation that the human being establishes with the body when using this kind of platforms will be the target of the debate that we intend to raise with this communication. Starting from Don Ihde’s post-phenomenology, we will try to discuss the role that the incarnated body (here body) plays in the construction of a disembodied, digital “dwelling”, like the one that is prefigured in the use of the “metaverse”. How, from it, a user may create a new perception of his body, capable of transcending the limitations that are imposed on it by culture, by biological gender, or by the physical circumstances that limit its mundane existence.

Abbed Kanoor

University of Tübingen | Collège international de philosophie (Paris)

Plaidoyer for an Intercultural Study of Cultural Ontologies

29 November 2022, 17h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+0)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

At a time when cultural encounters have become inevitable, intercultural experience plays an essential role in a deep understanding of cultures. However, it should be noted that in the experience of cultural encounters we are dealing with different, sedimented perceptions of the world and their ontological registers. One of the important dimensions of cultures that is neglected in the culturalist attitude is their inner life: their corresponding cultural lifeworld, their imaginary geography with symbolic cartographies, the dynamic transmission of beliefs, rituals and wisdom passed on from one generation to another; these invisible but living aspects are missing in the culturalist attitude and especially in multiculturalism. In contrast, traditionalism, which is aware of these neglected aspects and the world-constituting dimension of cultures, can easily lead to a conservative and even ideological misinterpretation of cultures. My argument is that an intercultural study of cultural ontologies can be seen as a third approach beyond multiculturalism and traditionalism; an approach that is aware of the invisible world of cultures without neglecting their inner hermeneutic dynamics and falling into a closed and static understanding of traditionalism.

Stephan Zimmermann

Praxis-CFUL/University of Bonn

Kant’s Distinction between Duties of Right and Duties of Virtue in View of the ‘Table of the Categories of Freedom’

22 November 2022, 17h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+0)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

The way Kant distinguishes between duties of right and duties of virtue in the Metaphysics of Morals makes the unity of his moral philosophy doubtful, at least as some interpreters understand it. He seems to specify the particular nature of these two types of duty in such a way that this specification is in tension with his general concept of duty in the Groundwork and the second Critique. Kant, however, uses several criteria to distinguish between duties of right and duties of virtue. I want to explore suggestions that have so far been ignored by the interpreters in order to deal with these criteria. In the second Critique, Kant maintains that the “Table of the Categories of Freedom” contains the whole plan for the future system of duties. And in this table, he includes one division of duties. In doing so, he emphasises this division above all others. My thesis is that the recourse to the “Table of the Categories of Freedom” provides a reliable benchmark for dealing with the many characteristics of the two types of duty later used in the Metaphysics of Morals: some of these characteristics can indeed be traced back to the table.

Marco Maurizi

Lombardo Radice Institute/University of Rome “Tor Vergata”

What is Animal Freedom? Political Perspectives for the Critique of Anthropocentrism

15 November 2022, 17h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+0)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

The theory of liberation and animal rights develops in a period of decline of the Marxist left and in line with the establishment of neo-liberal hegemony. Consequently, the classic utilitarian approaches, those founded on moral rights or on the juridical implementation of the animal condition, but also the kind of liberal-oriented eco-feminism of the 1980s do not seem to take into due account the economic structure of capitalist society. Though the highly industrialized and anthropocentric nature of real socialism has partly justified the disinterest in classical antispecism for the class struggle, the lack of a serious analysis of capitalism and its intrinsic tendencies makes any theoretical definition and practical defense of animals and animality problematic. By judging class relations irrelevant with respect to the “domination of man” over the animal world, classic animal liberation theories have worked with abstract and static concepts of “animality” and “humanity” often falling behind the profound insights into the relationship between humanism and nature proposed by Marx and Engels themselves. Is it possible to overcome the traditional anthropocentric orientation of the Left to make room for a discourse that does not exclude animal liberation from the overall project of emancipation of the working class? This paper will try to criticize the limits of liberal animalism and Socialist anthropocentrism by resorting to the theses defended by Adorno and Horkheimer in their Dialectic of the Enlightenment, while expanding Marx’ and Engels’ insights on the dialectic of nature. We will try to show how the elaboration of different and dialectical concepts of “nature” and “animality” is essential to correctly set these questions and establish a new way to articulate the relationship between animal liberation, critical theory, and eco-socialism.

James S. Pearson

Praxis-CFUL | University of Lisbon

Monsters of our Own Making: The Political Value of Illusory Dystopias

25 October 2022, 17h00 (Lisbon Summer Time — GMT+1)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy) | School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

Dystopian fears currently loom large in the public imagination. In this talk, I examine whether it might be politically valuable for people to fear illusory dystopian scenarios. The dominant view among contemporary political theorists is that members of a polity should only fear real dangers – that is, credible threats, which are based on facts and evidence. On this view, which I call the credibilist view, widespread fear of imaginary threats causes political harm. There is reason to believe, however, that it may in fact be politically beneficial for citizens to fear illusory dystopias under certain conditions. I refer to this competing position as the illusionist view. The first point that speaks in favour of the illusionist stance is that recent political theorists have convincingly demonstrated that pursuing illusory – i.e., infeasible – utopias can promote collective flourishing. Given that utopias are to a certain extent structurally symmetrical with dystopias, we might then reasonably expect illusory dystopias to be just as valuable as their utopian counterparts. To test this hypothesis, I consider the two strongest pieces of evidence that might be cited in support of the illusory view.  First, philosophers and social psychologists have argued that collective fear of hell (perhaps the illusory dystopia par excellence) can foster social cooperation and compliance. The second piece of potential evidence is to be found in the field of international relations (IR). Certain IR theorists (e.g., Thomas Christensen) maintain that political leaders can enhance national cohesion by inspiring the citizenry with a dystopian fear of foreign invasion and occupation – and this is said to hold even where there is no real threat. If groundless fears of hell and foreign occupation can promote the commonweal, then the illusionist view would appear to be correct. I scrutinize these two pieces of evidence, finding them to be too contentious to vindicate the illusionist view. It does follow, however, that we should therefore endorse the credibilist view. Although the current evidence in favour of the illusionist position remains weak, stronger evidence may still be forthcoming. In light of this possibility, we should refrain from automatically dismissing dystopian fears that lack credibility since they may still prove to serve our collective interests.

Daniela Voss

University of Hildesheim

The Machinic Unconscious: Deleuze, Guattari, Spinoza

18 October 2022, 17h00 (Lisbon Summer Time — GMT+1)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy) | School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

How can we desire our own repression? This is according to Deleuze and Guattari the “fundamental problem of political philosophy […] precisely the one that Spinoza saw so clearly” (Anti-Oedipus, p. 29). Spinoza posed this question for the first time in the Theological-Political Treatise, and since then it has been taken up by various thinkers, for instance, Wilhelm Reich. Yet attempts to solve this paradox commonly make use of the concept of ideology, assuming that the masses have been deceived. By contrast, Deleuze and Guattari propose a ‘materialist psychiatry’ that overcomes the dichotomy between the rationality of social production and the irrationality of imaginary production. This paper sketches out their approach to this problem by focusing on their concepts of the unconscious and of desire, and in doing so we will return to Spinoza’s thought.

4º ciclo: Outubro – Dezembro 2022

Precariedade e o Rosto do Outro: Judith Butler e Emmanuel Levinas

Início: 21 de outubro | Fim: 16 de dezembro 2022 – via Zoom

Horário: 9h30-11h30 (Brasília) | 13h30 – 15h30 (Lisboa – GMT+0)*

Contato: animalphilosophy.diversitas@gmail.com

Inscrições:

A atividade é aberta e é necessário realizar inscrição. Os encontros acontecerão com periodicidade semanal, às sextas-feiras, pela plataforma Zoom. Serão emitidos certificados de participação a partir de 80% de frequência. Para o encerramento do ciclo, será realizado um colóquio.

*Atenção: em Portugal, a partir de novembro os encontros acontecerão, das 12h30 às 14h30, em razão do fim do horário de verão.

DESCRIÇÃO

No quarto ciclo do Grupo de Leitura Filosofia Animal (Grupo Praxis- CFUL e Diversitas-FFLCH/USP), lançamos a proposta de trabalharmos a questão dos animais sob o prisma dos estudos da filósofa Judith Butler e do filósofo Emmanuel Levinas — autor com um importante lugar no pensamento de Butler. As discussões sobre uma ontologia do corpo, a precariedade como condição compartilhada da vida — “que une animais humanos e não humanos” — e a divisão política que estabelece quais vidas são dignas de pertencimento social e de luto, apresentadas no livro Quadros de Guerra de Butler, serão os pontos de partida para nossos estudos, que também deixarão espaço para os temas da alteridade e da resposta ética perante o rosto do outro, tratados por Levinas.

A programação e outras informações serão enviadas por e-mail, após a inscrição pelo formulário:

Sobre o Grupo de Leitura Filosofia Animal
O Grupo de Leitura Filosofia Animal é um trabalho de parceria entre o Grupo Praxis do Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa e o Grupo de Pesquisa sobre Ética e Direitos dos Animais do Diversitas-FFLCH/USP. Tem como objetivo reunir pessoas dispostas a, coletivamente, ler e discutir textos clássicos e contemporâneos que se dediquem à análise das complexas relações entre humanos e outros animais, abarcando também o tema da animalidade, nos âmbitos da ontologia, da política, da cultura, da ética e da atual crise ecológica, transitando por diferentes campos do conhecimento.

Realizamos um ciclo de leitura por semestre. Os encontros são semanais e, a depender do ciclo, podem ocorrer às sextas-feiras ou às quartas-feiras, sempre no período da manhã no horário do Brasil e no início da tarde no horário de Portugal. O primeiro ciclo foi dedicado à leitura do livro “O animal que logo sou (a seguir)”, de Jacques Derrida. O segundo, foi dedicado ao tema “Devires-animais?” e o terceiro, à leituras de Donna Haraway. A cada finalização de ciclo são realizados eventos na forma de colóquios ou palestras com convidadas(os) externas(os), com o objetivo de melhor aprofundar os estudos e ampliar as discussões para além do trabalho realizado pelo grupo.

ORGANIZAÇÃO

Grupo Praxis do Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa

Grupo de Pesquisa sobre Ética e Direitos dos Animais do Diversitas – FFLCH/USP (Núcleo de Estudos das Diversidades, Intolerâncias e Conflitos – Universidade de São Paulo)

COORDENAÇÃO
Dirk Michael Hennrich – CFUL (Lisboa) / Diversitas (FFLCH/USP)
Luanda Francine Garcia da Costa – CFUL (Lisboa) / Diversitas (FFLCH/USP)

Mariana Larison

CONICET/University of Buenos Aires

Tempo e revolução: Que ideia de práxis?

11 October 2022, 17h00 (Lisbon Summer Time — GMT+1)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy) | School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

Na segunda metade do século XX teve lugar uma releitura da obra de Maquiavel em autores de diferentes correntes de pensamento que, movidos por diferentes interesses, se viram na necessidade de pensar especificamente sobre o problema da fundação de uma nova ordem política. No pensar o totalitarismo, no pensar a democracia, no pensar a política, no pensar contra Hegel, no pensar com Marx ou sem Marx, emergiram da Europa e da América novas interpretações do florentino que disputam o sentido da instituição da ordem política. Nesta apresentação, o meu interesse será aprofundar apenas numa das muitas leituras da fundação política de Maquiavel na segunda metade do século passado, nomeadamente, a proposta de Merleau-Ponty. O objetivo consistirá em analisar alguns dos problemas fundamentais que surgem da análise da noção de revolução baseada em Maquiavel, assim como pensar as possibilidades que esta oferece para apreciar com clareza o vínculo profundo que se estabelece entre fundação e tempo, o que alguns chamam instituição.