Carolina Flores

Research group: LanCog

 

I am a philosopher from Lisbon. I earned my undergraduate degree in Mathematics and Philosophy at Oxford University and my PhD in Philosophy at Rutgers, jointly with a certificate in cognitive science. After that, I was a President’s Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of California, Irvine, and then Assistant Professor at the University of California, Santa Cruz.

 

I primarily write about ignorance and resistance to evidence: their nature, social and psychological basis, and epistemology, as well as their connections with social identity, oppressive social structures, and technology. I also write non-academic essays for public-facing venues on related topics. You can find more details about my work at http://carolinaflores.org.

 

Email: c.flores@edu.ulisboa.pt

Selected Publications

[10] Camp, E., & Flores, C. (in press), ‘That’s all you really are’: Centering identities without essentialist beliefs, in Sally Haslanger et al. (eds.), Mind, Language, & Social Hierarchy: Constructing a shared social world. Oxford University Press.

[9] Flores, C. (in press), Why think that belief is evidence-responsive? in Eric Schwitzgebel and Jonathan Jong (eds.), The Nature of Belief. Oxford University Press.

[8] Flores, C. (2025), Calling trauma, elite capture, and hermeneutical injustice, The Philosophical Quarterly, 75(4): 1294–1320, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqaf076.

[7] Flores, C. (2025), Resistant beliefs, responsive believers. The Journal of Philosophy, 122(4): 133–159, https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil202512248.

[6] Flores, C. (2025), Identity-protective reasoning: An epistemic and political defense. Episteme, 22(3): 707-730, https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.

[5] Flores, C. (2025), Delusions and epistemic style: A neurodiversity approach to reasoning in schizophrenia. Synthese, 205, 173, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-025-04979-8.

[4] Camp, E., & Flores, C. (2024), Playing with labels: Identity terms as tools for building agency. The Philosophical Quarterly, 74(4): 1103–1136, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqae092.

[3] Flores, C., & Woodard, E. (2023), Epistemic norms on evidence-gathering. Philosophical Studies, 180(9): 2547–2571, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-023-01978-8.

[2] Flores, C. (2021), Epistemic styles, Philosophical Topics, 49(2):35–55, https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics202149214.

[1] Flores, C. (2021), Delusional evidence-responsiveness, Synthese 199 (3-4):6299–6330, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03070-2.