Constitutivism in Ethics and Epistemology

University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal

September 4–6, 2025

Constitutivism is the view that the normative standards for something are based in its nature. In ethics, the view is that the standards for human action are based in the nature of our action. In epistemology, the view is that the standards for belief are based in the nature of belief. This conference aims to investigate the promise and power for constitutivism in ethics and epistemology, individually and together. Both papers developing the constitutivist view and those critical of it are welcome.

In addition to the invited speakers, there are 4 open places for speakers. Please submit a long abstract of no more than 1000 words, anonymized for review, to constitutivism.lisboa.2025@gmail.com, no later than January 31st, 2025.

Accommodation and dinners for speakers will be covered by conference funds, but we cannot help with travel.

Papers presented at the conference will be considered for a special issue of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy, who are generously partially funding the conference. Deadline for submission of final drafts of the papers will be December 31st, 2025.

The conference is hosted at the Centre of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon.

Organizers (in alphabetical order):

Luca Ferrero (University of California, Riverside)

Jeremy David Fix (Keble College, University of Oxford)

David Horst (University of Lisbon)

Invited Speakers (in alphabetical order):

Kate Nolfi (University of Virginia)

Hille Paakkunainen (Syracuse University)

T.A. Pendlebury (University of Chicago)

TBA

Structural Essentialism as an Ontology of the Physical World

Tomasz Bigaj (University of Warsaw)

15 November 2024, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: In this talk I will introduce and discuss a structural version of essentialism with respect to the identification of individual physical objects. The adopted approach will be fundamentally generalistic (qualitativistic): the only way to identify a given individual is by reference to its place in a qualitative relational structure designated as “essential”. I will extensively discuss the problem of the multiplicity of alternative identifications of objects in possible scenarios (modality de re) using a broadly Lewisian concept of a counterpart function. Particular emphasis will be put on the possibility of the existence of qualitatively indistinguishable counterpart functions which differ merely haecceitistically, and on the threat such possibility poses to the position of generalism.

How to Start Changing Your Mind

Elise Woodard (King’s College London)

8 November 2024, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Is it ever rational to change your mind based on others changing theirs? This talk answers affirmatively. Changes of mind are doubly epistemically significant. First, they provide compelling reasons for further inquiry. Second, they offer second-order evidence about the existence or quality of first-order evidence. However, critical evaluation is crucial to distinguish meaningful changes from irrelevant ones. By outlining key questions about reported changes and discussing potential pitfalls, we can better identify which changes are epistemically significant. If correct, my proposal highlights mind-changing as a valuable yet overlooked source of information when exploring complex and contentious issues.

This work/event is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310/2020

Evidentially Hedged Assertions

Dario Mortini (LOGOS, University of Barcelona)

25 October 2024, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Speakers make evidentially hedged assertions whenever they weaken commitment to what they assert in virtue of disclosing imperfectly reliable sources of evidence in their assertions. A novel and recently influential case for the knowledge norm of assertion appeals to conjunctions of evidentially hedged assertions and knowledge ascriptions. This paper challenges this novel case: I introduce additional conjunctions that cast serious doubt on the presumed robust connection between evidentially hedged assertions and knowledge ascriptions. The upshot calls for a reassessment of this new linguistic evidence for the knowledge norm, and it also highlights noteworthy but underappreciated features of evidentially hedged assertions.

This work/event is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310/2020

Reliability and Closure

Sven Rosenkranz (LOGOS, University of Barcelona)

18 October 2024, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: First, we argue that to make room for the closure of epistemic justification under competent deduction, reliabilists had better endorse the principle that the (unconditional) reliability of a given belief-forming method m implies the (unconditional) reliability of any method of competently deducing the logical consequences of the contents of the beliefs produced by m. Secondly, we undertake to show that this principle of reliability closure fails and that, therefore, reliabilists encounter difficulties in the attempt to accommodate the closure of epistemic justification under competent deduction. To the latter end, we first briefly lay out a theoretical framework in which to think about methods, their outputs, and the ways in which methods may build on others – with methods that are the single-premise closures of other methods being prime examples of such constructions. We then proceed to distinguish different plausible reliability measures, without taking a stand on which is best. Lastly, we develop an argument against reliability closure, by showing that a method may be reliable, while its single-premise closure is not. This argument succeeds irrespective of which of the plausible reliability measure is assumed. We conclude that we should either abandon the idea that epistemic justification is closed under competent deduction, or else abandon reliabilism. (Joint work with Julien Dutant [King’s College London].)

This work/event is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310/2020

Consciousness and Solipsism

Giovanni Merlo (University of Geneva)

22 November 2024, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: In a characteristically thorny passage of his Philosophical Remarks, Wittgenstein invites us to envisage a language for speaking of pain and other sensations of which any person whatever could, in principle, be the ‘centre’. In this language, one wouldn’t say ‘I am in pain’, but ‘There is pain’ or ‘It hurts’. And, when speaking of individuals other than oneself, one wouldn’t say ‘A is in pain’, but ‘A is behaving as the Centre does when there is pain’ or ‘A is behaving as the Centre does when it hurts’. In this talk, I will identify some aspects of our ordinary conception of pain and other sensations that appear to make the way of speaking about them envisaged by Wittgenstein, not only perfectly appropriate, but also inescapable. I will then outline a metaphysical view that, instead of revising those aspects of the ordinary conception, tries to accommodate them without falling into the pitfalls of solipsism.

Objective Disagreement and Perspectival Differences

Matheus Valente (LanCog, Centre of Philosophy, University of Lisbon)

4 October 2024, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Could rationality require you and I to disagree about something objective like the outcome of a coin toss even if, knowing we’re equally rational, we have transmitted all of our relevant evidence to each other via communication (reaching a point where we have common knowledge that there’s nothing informative left for any of us to say)? It would be surprising if it could, for that would entail a particularly revisionary form of perspectivalism according to which some peers ought to agree to disagree in their worldly credences just because, as they would put it, “I am I, you are you”. Though most would be inclined to repudiate that type of perspectivalism, I’ll develop an argument inspired by Robert Stalnaker’s discussion of the Sleeping Beauty problem to argue that one cannot both repudiate it and side with authors such as David Lewis who subscribe to the Halfer position on that case. By itself, this amounts to an exceptional, and so far unaddressed, challenge to a reputable philosophical view. But the implications of the argument extend beyond this particular case. In particular, it suggests that there’s nothing essentially private or incommunicable about the epistemic import of the ‘I’ and ‘now’.

The LanCog Research Group, University of Lisbon, welcomes expressions of interest from suitably qualified candidates interested in applying for 3-year research positions funded by the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT).

The FCT is the Portuguese national funding agency for academic research and development. In 2024, the FCT will fund the hiring of 400 researchers, holders of PhDs at various stages of career, to carry out their activity in research centres throughout Portugal. The selected researchers are hired by the host institution through a contract between the host and the FCT, which guarantees the funding. In the previous edition, 14 positions have gone to philosophers, and LanCog has a very strong record of supporting successful candidates.

The FCT will accept applications between September 30 and November 29, 2024 (17:00 Lisbon time). Candidates will apply online directly to the FCT, but their application must be supported by a host institution.

The application, written in English, must include the following:

–    A research plan, including a description of the main activities to be undertaken, the expected results, as well as an indication of how the research project fits with (at least one of) the goals set out in the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development;

–    A brief description of previous academic and scientific experience, highlighting the main activities and results obtained in the last 5 years;

–    Curriculum vitae;

–    A plan for the development of the candidate’s career, including a description of the main scientific goals and how this position would contribute to their achievement;

–    A brief description of the conditions provided by the host institution and of how the proposed research plan fits into the overall strategy of the research centre.

Applications will be assessed by an international panel, according to the following two criteria:

–    The candidate’s CV;

–    The proposed research plan.

The applicant is responsible for choosing the appropriate category in which to apply (Junior is only open to those with up to 5 years’ experience, while Assistant is open to all applicants but is correspondingly far more competitive):

Junior researcher: PhD holders with up to 5 years of post-doctoral experience in the scientific area of application – 2.294,95€ gross wage (c. 1742€/month net*);

Assistant researcher: PhD holders with relevant experience (independently of its duration) in the scientific area of application – 3.427,59€ gross wage (c. 2312€ / month net*).

*IMPORTANT NOTE ABOUT SALARIES: the monthly value quoted is paid 14x per year (i.e. double that value paid June and November); salaries also depend on a range of factors based on family composition and income, and on whether the candidate chooses to take out health insurance (ADSE). Quoted figures are based on a single person with no ADSE. Please note that if you need to apply for a work permit to work in Portugal, health insurance of some form may be mandatory. Net salaries are typically higher for those who are married with children, whereas ADSE subtracts 3.5% of the gross salary but also covers spouses and children.

It is mandatory to upload the doctoral diploma. In order to comply with the Portuguese legislation concerning the recognition of foreign qualifications, all the doctoral degrees granted by foreign higher education institutions must be duly recognized. Applicants are advised to visit the website of the Direção-Geral do Ensino Superior (DGES) for further information:

https://www.dges.gov.pt/en/pagina/degree-and-diploma-recognition.

If possible, the recognition certificate (or proof that one has been requested) should be uploaded together with the diploma. Applications will be considered even if the recognition certificate is not available. However, the recognition must be obtained before signing the contract.

More information about the call, including a link to the application portal, is available here.

Interested candidates are invited to contact Dr. David Yates (at david.yates@edu.ulisboa.pt), with a brief description of their intended research and current CV no later than October 8.

Inclusivity and dense connectivity: tensions between two democratic ideals

Catarina Dutilh Novaes (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)

2o September 2024, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Two widely discussed liberal democratic ideals are inclusivity and dense connectivity (to ensure extensive interaction among citizens). Inclusivity is a foundational democratic value, based on the idea that all those who are affected by political decisions should have a say on public matters. Dense connectivity as an ideal is reflected in the influential Millian desideratum that all arguments and ideas should receive equal consideration in an epistemic community. In a community where dissenting voices are not heard, dead dogma is likely to prevail, as received opinions are not suitably challenged. By contrast, if arguments and ideas are exposed to the widest range of objections and counterarguments, then the ‘better arguments’ will prevail—or so claims the Millian. In this talk, I argue that the properties of inclusivity and dense connectivity are in fact in tension with each other. I highlight two such tensions, with conceptual tools borrowed from network epistemology and the epistemology of attention: the problem of scale, and the problem of (in)tolerance (drawing on Popper’s paradox of tolerance). The tensions between these two ideals suggest that they cannot be simultaneously fully achieved; I argue that privileging inclusivity over dense connectivity is to be preferred to safeguard democratic institutions.

Argument Rodizio

05 July 2024, 15:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

The Argument Rodizio is a session in which each participant presents a short, desirably surprising, argument in 5-10 minutes, to be discussed in the following 5-10 minutes.

Abstract:

1. Robert Michels – “At the End of Human Inquiry”
2. Ricardo Santos – TBD
3. João C. Miranda – “Why Are You Booing Me? I’m Right!”
4. Hugo Luzio – “Dream Irresponsibility”
5. Ned Markosian – “The Paradox of Suffering”