Conceptual Engineering in Inferentialist Terms

Metodiy Apostolov (LanCog, Centre of Philosophy, University of Lisbon)

27 October 2023, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: In a recent paper Jorem and Löhr (2022) criticize Herman Cappelen’s Austerity Framework (2018) for not providing a good rationale for doing conceptual engineering. They go on to suggest that Inferentialist semantics as developed by Sellars (1954) and Brandom (1994) provides a good rationale for the practice, therefore conceptual engineering is in the business of improving our inferential devices. I will examine the criticism and its extent over strict representationalist theories of conceptual engineering. I will argue that even if the inferentialist take on conceptual content provides a good rationale for engaging in the practice, this does not constitute a sufficient reason to pick it over other alternatives, e.g. functionalist accounts. Finally, I will discuss some advantages of the broad inferentialist approach to conceptual engineering and use it to propose an alternative reading of a particular case of metalinguistic disputes, i.e., metalinguistic negotiation.

Testimony and Expressive Behaviour

Matthew Parrott (University of Oxford)

20 October 2023, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: People often directly tell us about their thoughts, feelings, and desires. This common practice has led some philosophers to claim that testimony can be a fundamental way of knowing about others’ minds. In this talk, I shall argue that this claim is plausible only if we assume a certain conception of testimony, one which aligns it very closely with perception. By contrast, I shall argue that if we were to adopt a different conception of testimony, such as Richard Moran’s ‘assurance view’, then our acquiring testimonial knowledge of someone else’s mind would epistemically depend upon our having non-testimonial knowledge of their mental states. More specifically, I shall claim that this latter knowledge is based on a person’s expressive behaviours. Although one might naturally think this is either perceptual or inferential, in the final part of this talk, I develop an alternative framework for explaining how expressive behaviours ground our ordinary knowledge of others’ minds.

Can AI Help Humeans? The Laws of Nature Debate in Light of Automated Scientific Discovery

Robert Michels (LanCog, Centre of Philosophy, University of Lisbon)

13 October 2023, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: According to the standard Humean theory of the laws of nature, Lewis’s Best System Analysis, laws of nature have this status at least partly as the result of an optimal trade-off between scientific values such as simplicity and descriptive strength. This idea has recently come under pressure, since — as authors like Roberts and Woodward have pointed out — there might, pace what Humeans like to suggest, be no such trade-off in the way laws of nature are identified in the natural sciences. Recent developments in the field of automated scientific discovery, in particular regarding symbolic regression, promise to provide Humeans with an answer to this challenge and, as we will argue, might even allow them to in turn put pressure on rival theories of the laws of nature: Symbolic regression gives us a method for (re-)discovering laws which closely matches the Humean picture of what makes a law of nature a law of nature and in particular crucially involves a trade-off between simplicity and descriptive strength. In this paper, we discuss whether Humeans can indeed rely on symbolic regression to bolster their theory of laws of nature. (This is joint work with Niels Linnemann [University of Geneva].)

On Being in Two Places at Once

Gabriel Uzquiano (University of South California)

6 October 2023, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: We will discuss the question of whether a material object may be in two places at once. More precisely, the question is whether one and the same material object may have more than one exact location. This is not all that plausible when it comes to spatial location. Many dismiss the hypothesis that a material object may have more than one exact spatial location at a given time as plainly incoherent. However, the stakes are higher when it comes to temporal location. For one way to interpret the thesis that material objects endure through time is as the hypothesis that material objects are exactly located at every time at which they exist. The purpose of this talk is to argue for the coherence of multilocation.

Deprivation and Historical Closeness: A Reply

Diogo Santos (LanCog, Centre of Philosophy, University of Lisbon)

29 September 2023, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: The aim of the paper is to address three recent objections made by Yi (2022) against our strategy of using what we’ve called “Historical Condition” in our analysis of what it is required to be deprived of some value due to a late birth or early death in Miguel & Santos (2020). Yi claims that the Historical Condition (i) is unduly restrictive, for according to it many cases that deprivationists believe are deprivations due to early deaths aren’t; (ii) it makes a problematic prediction, since even our preferred example doesn’t appear to count as a deprivation of value due to a late birth and (iii) it’s theoretically untenable, since it implies a problematic principle. In the paper I show that these objections are misguided for they appear to rely on a misinterpretation of the Historical Condition and the dialectical role it plays in the discussion.

The LanCog group at the University of Lisbon and the Philosophy of Physics group at Warsaw University of Technology are happy to announce the launch of the online Lisbon-Warsaw reading group in the philosophy of physics.

The reading group will meet on Zoom monthly to discuss newly published papers or work-in-progress drafts on timely and relevant topics. The meetings will consist of an extended Q&A session with the authors. The goal is to provide the participants with an occasion to actively engage with state-of-the-art research in the philosophy and foundations of physics.

In the first meeting, Flavio del Santo (University of Geneva) will join us to discuss his paper “Potentiality realism: A realistic and indeterministic physics based on propensities.” The meeting will be on 11 October (17:00-19:00 CEST).

To participate and receive a copy of the paper, please register here.

You can address any query to Antonio Vassallo (antonio.vassallo@pw.edu.pl)

The organizers,

Andrea Oldofredi

Davide Romano

Antonio Vassallo

Sceptical, Complacent, Critical: How Should the Conceptual Engineer Engage with Concepts?

Delia Belleri (LanCog, Centre of Philosophy, University of Lisbon)

15 September 2023, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Conceptual engineering is a method dealing with the assessment and revision of conceptual representations. It operates on the assumption that concepts are often defective and in need of improvement. This assumption can, however, lead to a form of “representational scepticism”. Scepticism is, in turn, depicted by some theorists as if it was the only alternative to uncritical acceptance of our conceptual representations (“representational complacency”). In this talk, I argue that it is not. The conceptual engineer can hold a form of “critical conservatism” about concepts. Critical conservatism emphasizes context-sensitivity, sensitivity to a variety of epistemic and non-epistemic considerations, as well as the exercise of skills that help the thinker evaluate conceptual flaws that can and cannot be tolerated. As such, is it a more nuanced position than representational scepticism, which, however, is still compatible with the conceptual engineer’s expected special sensitivity to conceptual flaws (and ways to fix them).

LanCog Day 2023

Argument Rodizio

30 June 2023, 15:30 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

The Argument Rodizio is a session in which each participant presents a short, desirably surprising, argument in 5-10 minutes, to be discussed in the following 5-10 minutes.

Abstract:

1. Robert Michels – “Why friends of the fuzzy theory of vagueness need not be worried about the objection from penumbral connections”
2. Bruno Jacinto – “On diagonalization”
3. Diogo Santos – “A Kripkean-like argument for evaluatives”
4. Gabriel Malagutti – “Defending the steadfast view through group epistemology”
5. Gabriel Lee – “An argument against the grandfather paradox”
6. Anabela Dias – “Change does not require dynamic time”
7. Luke Kersten – “If you wouldn’t eat Bobby, why are you eating Bobby?”

Novels and Symphonies as Concrete Artifacts

Ned Markosian (University of Massachusetts Amherst)

23 June 2023, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Most philosophers take works of art such as novels and symphonies to be abstract types that are discovered rather than created by the artists associated with them. Recently, a growing minority position has emerged, according to which these works of art are abstract artifacts – non-concrete, repeatable objects that are brought into existence by authors and composers. In this talk, I will defend a more radical proposal, according to which works of art like novels and symphonies are concrete artifacts – non-repeatable, physical objects or events that are created by writers and composers.

Identity Labels as Tools for Building Agency

Carolina Flores (University of California, Irvine)

23 June 2023, 11:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Identity labels (‘mother’, ‘non-binary’, ‘BIPOC’, ‘queer’) are pervasively used. At the same time, their use makes many people uncomfortable. Identity labels can seem reductive and limiting, constraining our agency in undesirable ways. Against these worries, we will argue that employing identity labels can be distinctively liberatory—when we employ them in flexible or playful ways. To argue for this, we offer a novel account of the cognitive role of identity labels as identity-centric frames, not mere categorization devices. Specifically, identity labels lead us to attend, explain, and evaluate in terms of social identities, shaping how we characterize groups and their members. With this cognitive role in sight, we diagnose common complaints about identity labels as being in fact complaints about the rigid use of identity labels. In contrast, switching between identity labels one applies to oneself in an open-ended way can express, enhance, and scaffold individual and collective agency in ways that are otherwise hard to achieve. As a consequence, we should not avoid identity labels. At a structural level, we would be well-served by the production and dissemination of a wide range of identity labels, and by social norms that encourage their flexible employment and make room for play. (This is joint work with Elisabeth Camp (Rutgers).)