LanCog Seminar 2012-13
Session 8
22 March 2013, 15:00
Sala Mattos Romão, Department of Philosophy
Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon
Discussion of R. Stalnaker, Mere Possibilities, Chapter 3
Session 7
8 March 2013, 15:00
Sala Mattos Romão, Department of Philosophy
Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon
Discussion of R. Stalnaker, Mere Possibilities, Chapter 2
Session 6
15 February 2013, 15:00
Sala Mattos Romão, Department of Philosophy
Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon
Discussion of R. Stalnaker, Mere Possibilities, Chapter 1 (conclusion)
Session 5
8 February 2013, 15:00
Sala Mattos Romão, Department of Philosophy
Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon
Discussion of R. Stalnaker, Mere Possibilities, Chapter 1
Session 4
23d November 2012, 15:00
Sala Mattos Romão, Departament of Philosophy
Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon
Manuel Garcia-Carpíntero
De Se Thoughts and Immunity to Error through Misidentification.
Abstract: Castañeda, Perry and Lewis argued in the 1960’s and 1970’s that thoughts about oneself “as oneself” – de se thoughts – require special treatment. I first present the data, and Perry’s and Lewis’s contrasting proposals: while Lewis purports to account for de se thoughts by taking away the subject from their contents, which are thus properties instead of complete traditional propositions, Perry offers an account compatible with the traditional view of content. Then I take up Recanati’s (2007, 2009) arguments for a subjectless view of the content of “implicit” de se thought, on the grounds that we can thus better explain the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification. I argue that this is not the case, and I point out that such a view is in tension with Recanati’s mental files approach to de re thought in general and theSelf concept in particular.
Session 3
16th November 2012, 15:00
Sala Mattos Romão, Departament of Philosophy
Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon
Andreas Stokke
Does Testimonial Knowledge Require Sincerity?
Abstract: According to the traditional view, testimony is a mechanism for transmitting knowledge. By contrast, it has recently been argued that testimony sometimes functions as a generative source of knowledge. Central to these arguments have been cases involving insincere testifiers but in which the listener nevertheless acquires knowledge. I argue in this paper that sincerity is not necessary even for transmission of knowledge via testimony.
Session 2
9th November 2012, 15:00
Sala Mattos Romão, Departament of Philosophy
Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon
Discussion of Robert Stalnaker, “Assertion”
Introduced by Adriana Silva Graça
Session 1
12th of October 2012, 15:00
Sala Mattos Romão, Departament of Philosophy
Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon
Discussion of Carl Baker, “Indexical Contextualism and the Challenges from Disagreement”. Philosophical Studies (2012) 157: 107-123.
Introduced by Pedro Santos